A Rawlsian approach to technology assessment: The case of autonomous driving

Project description

This dissertation brings together two fields of research that have previously only been considered separately: on the one hand, the societal and ethical challenges of autonomous driving, on the other hand the connection between John Rawls’s political philosophy and technology assessment (TA). The dissertation is therefore intended both as a concrete analysis of the ethical aspects of autonomous driving and as a potential contribution to a theory of TA from a Rawlsian perspective.

Starting point is autonomous driving as an example of how technological innovations can identify existing uncertainties in moral decision making. This is most evident in the question of what ethical criteria the decision-making algorithms of autonomous vehicles should be based on. The academic and public debate, particularly regarding the so-called trolley problem, demonstrates that there is no societal consensus on which moral principles should guide automated decisions in dilemma situations. A look at philosophy reveals that these questions may never be answered – and certainly not in the near future.

Against this background, the dissertation takes up concepts from John Rawls’s late political philosophy, in particular the ideas of reasonable pluralism, public reason, and reflective equilibrium. From this perspective, the central challenge in the context of autonomous driving is not to find a moral solution that overcomes all philosophical objections, but to identify criteria that can be accepted by reasonable citizens in a pluralistic society. This requires methods and processes that can bring together different societal perspectives, make conflicts visible, and facilitate democratic negotiation processes. At this point, technology assessment takes on particular significance due to its focus on participatory approaches, the inclusion of various stakeholders, the consideration of competing values, and its origins in policy advice. TA is, on the one hand, a suitable means of addressing the specific challenges of autonomous driving, but it can also be understood as a Rawlsian concept “in action.”

On this basis, the dissertation argues that there is a substantial, though until now only implicit, connection between John Rawls’s political philosophy and technology assessment. Exploring this connection opens up new opportunities for both the theoretical advancement of TA and its practical application. Rawlsian concepts can help clarify the normative foundations of technological evaluation and provide a philosophical justification for procedures of public participation. Conversely, the practice of technology assessment offers a concrete field of application in which political and moral-philosophical concepts can be empirically observed and further developed.

Administrative data

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Armin Grunwald
Advisor: N.N.
Doctoral students at ITAS: see Doctoral studies at ITAS

Publications

Brändle, C., Grunwald, A. (2019)
Autonomes Fahren aus Sicht der Maschinenethik. In: Bendel, O. (Hrsg.) Handbuch Maschinenethik. Springer VS, Wiesbaden. 281–300.
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-658-17483-5_18

Brändle, C. (2024)
Chapter 23 Soothing the Socio-Ethical Unease: Trolley Problems in the Age of Automated Decision-Making. The De Gruyter Handbook of Automated Futures: Imaginaries, Interactions and Impact, edited by Vaike Fors, Martin Berg and Meike Brodersen, Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter, 379–394.
DOI: 10.1515/9783110792256-023

Brändle, C.; Schmidt, M. W. (2021).
Autonomous Driving and Public Reason: a Rawlsian Approach. Philosophy & Technology. 34. 1475–1499.
DOI: 10.1007/s13347-021-00468-1

Contact

Claudia Brändle, M.A.
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT)
Institute for Technology Assessment and Systems Analysis (ITAS)
P.O. Box 3640
76021 Karlsruhe
Germany

Tel.: +49 721 608-26214
E-mail