Risk and the Post-Modern Society

Summary

Ulrich Beck sees the increasing focus on risk as the consciousness of a new stage of development in society. The return of uncertainty is for him the difference between an industrial society and a risk society: There are at least three debates in society dealing with the issue of society's danger to itself.

First there is the question of the consequences of using so-called advanced technologies. Whether rooted in physics, chemistry or biology, these technologies have a high potential for catastrophe. A characteristic of advanced technologies is that the catastrophic consequences result from accidents which are uncontrollable because their structure is so complex (in terms of both the links between the elements and the complexity of the processes involved) that total control is not possible. Accidents can only be made more improbable, not ruled out altogether. It is precisely this which distinguishes the high potential for conflict which burdens these technologies. If the vulnerability to catastrophe can only be contained but not eliminated, the technical problem of safety measures becomes a social problem of acceptance of possible man-made catastrophes.

In the discourse of the risk debate it has emerged that in addition to the risk associated with possible catastrophic potential (e.g. genetic engineering) a further dimension of uncertainty is generated socially. The discussion involves not only the possible undesired and uncontrolled distribution of dangerous products of genetic manipulation: genetic engineering has suddenly awakened awareness of the growing discrepancy between the intentions behind actions and the consequences of technological actions. Through and with the help of genetic engineering, humanity can now try and manipulate the conditions of its own evolution. Precisely because it gives humanity access to the self-replicating mechanisms of the biological foundation of human life, genetic engineering sharply impacts humanity's cultural understanding of itself and its identity. In other words, we are seeing an intervention in evolution whose effects cannot be even remotely predicted.

A third type of generation of uncertainty appears in the completely non-spectacular consequences of daily actions, i.e. the long-term ecological changes due to everyday acts and decisions. Whether these involve road transport, CO2 production, clearing the tropical rain forests and the massive use of detergents, the consequences of our behaviour are the destruction of forests, possible climatic change or the irreversible pollution of our ground water. Typical of this type of million-strong daily hazard is the long interval between cause and effect and the consequences involve a very large number of contributory factors (destruction of forests, climatic change). Other characteristics are that the effects can only be perceived at all by using science and technology and that the gap between action, consequences and causative agents is so great that it is impossible to establish a clear relationship between them. The causative agent is a particular problem since there is no one individual responsible for the damage but many individuals acting together, sometimes over generations. All this means that it is difficult and perhaps even impossible to set limits marking the beginning of damage, determine what measures can be used to combat it or decide who is actually responsible.

These three areas of self-created hazards to society generate the uncertainty in the risk society. Although the examples cited may appear very different, they have one thing in common, namely that they involve indications of how the future should be shaped: a noone today can predict with certainty how great the danger really is. The scale of possible catastrophes of this nature and the probability of their occurrence - in other words, how great the objective danger is - are both uncertain. The modern issue of risk involves an "irresolvable ambivalence" (Baumann) in the sense that not only is uncertainty created on a previously unknown scale, but all attempts to solve the problem possibly make us even more aware of it.To analyse what risk society means, one must take a series of distinctions. First of all we must separate risk from hazard or danger.

Risk is not, as such, as the same as hazard or danger. A risk society is not intrinsically more dangerous or hazardous than preexisting forms of social order. The difference is that there was no notion of risk in the ancient societies and there doesn't seem in fact to be notion of risk in any traditional culture. The reason for this is that dangers are experienced as given. The idea of risk is bound up with the aspiration to calculate, to control and to decide about the future.

But risk itself is a form of communication which is rich in preconditions. Risk is a challenge to calculate in the present an unknown future. Since the things that can happen depend on decisions to be taken in the present, there is a "multiple stage arrangement of contingency" (Luhmann): the possibility of damage is created incidentally, thus avoidably. Decisions under risk are paradox to the extent that they attempt to include the unknown in considerations. Decisions are to be made on matters, which, in principle, cannot be decided. We always speak of communication of risks whenever this construction is used to mark out the future and missing knowledge in situations requiring decisions. Decisions with regard to uncertainty can only be made as a part of social of processes or hypothetical situations. Processing uncertainty, ambiguity and impossibility is the most distinctive characteristic of future-oriented decision making and risk communication.

We should distinguish risk from danger, but we must also make a distinction between who decides about risk and those who are affected by this decision.

The transformation of risk elements into formal calculations, as done in every risk calculation, carries within it the potential for social conflict, as quickly emerged in public debate on the assessment of the consequences of new technologies. Particularly with risks which do not involve individual options for action but involve impacting third parties, decisions on risks cannot separate the acceptability of damage to others from the actual formal calculation. This is particularly the case when no clear statement can be made regarding the likely scale of damage. The question of social and environmental compatibility, a normative criterion, is inevitably involved. As with pollution limits, it is not possible to establish any objective limit below which it is possible to determine whether something is harmful or not. Instead risk assessment and limits represent the result of a process of debate in which conflicting interests have to be accommodated. This, however, merely shows the complexity of risk calculation, and behind this façade a fundamental social change appears to be taking place. With the development and imple mentation of new technologies and the increasing number of irreversible impacts on the environment, a new line of conflict has emerged separating decision-makers and those affected, which is symbolised by the distinction between risk and danger as a subject of argument.

The points of view are correspondingly different: from the point of view of the decision maker, the threat presents itself as a risk, from that of the affected individual as a danger. The decision-maker tries to rationalise the decision with the help of calculations, estimates, scenarios etc. He or she even goes so far as to take into account the view of the affected individual by factoring in the question of acceptance and even running educational campaigns on the risk. Even so, however complex and fenced in by conditions the decision on possible risks may be, it can never involve seeing the risk as a danger and hence switching to the position of an affected individual.

Conversely, those affected see the consequences of the risky decision as dangers. They see themselves faced by a danger which they cannot control, which they are subjected to and which they only know is regarded as a risk by the individual responsible for causing it - leaving the uncertainty and fear to them.

Technological and ecological hazards generate dissension over a future anticipated as a risk or as a danger. Every decision and every action in this context can be dichotomised in terms of risks and dangers, on the basis of the implicit contingency factors. The fact that uncertainty has become a hidden common denominator and the future has become the point of reference means that there are no general criteria for rationality in resolving this conflict.

The emergence of risk society is embedded into two general transformations in modern societies which are affecting our lives today. Each is connected to the increasing influence of science and technology, although not wholly determined by them. The first transformation can be called the end of nature; and the second the end of tradition.

The end of nature does not mean a world in which the natural environment disappaers. It means that there are now few if any aspects of the physical world untouched by human intervention.The end of nature is relatively recent, it has come largely as a result of intensification of technological change.

However, risk society is also a society which lives after tradition. To live after the end of tradition is essentially to be in a world where life is no longer lived as fate .

The language of risk reflects a new uncertainty in society which takes the form of conscious perception of the future as contingent on the present. Seen in these sociological terms, risk society means that possible damage is already attributed to decision-making attitudes although it is impossible to know the scale of the damage, the occurence of the damage and if there will be damage at all. This ignorance (unpredictability of the consequences of a decision) becomes part of the decision. The only thing that is certain is that a decision must be made, as there is no social entity which future damage can be attributed to, leaving only decision-making under conditions of uncertainty. The expansion of the potential for decision and the disappearance of any metasocial rules with the resulting pressure to choose options has resulted in society an increasing demand for decision criterias.