

D02.3 Requirements Definition and Specification

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Abstract	OpenTC sets out to develop trusted and secure computing systems based on Trusted Computing hardware and Open Source Software. This deliverable provides a high-level specification to guide design and future implementation. Requirements were derived in part from a media analysis, application scenarios and use cases definitions that are also included in this document.		
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1 Summary

OpenTC sets out to develop trusted and secure computing systems based on Trusted Computing hardware and Open Source Software. This deliverable provides high-level specifications to guide design and future implementation. Requirements were derived in part from a media analysis, application scenarios and use cases definitions that are also included in this document.

2 Introduction

The goal of OpenTC is to define and implement an open Trusted Computing framework. This framework builds on the cost efficient and widely deployed “Trusted Platform Module” (TPM) specified by the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) and the new generation of x86 CPUs from AMD and Intel. Main software components of OpenTC are Open Source operating systems and software, supporting Linux in particular.

The architecture is based on security mechanisms provided by low level operating system layers, with isolation properties interfacing the Trusted Computing hardware. These layers make it possible to utilize enhanced trust and security properties for operating systems, middleware, and applications. The suggested architecture is expected to be applicable to different platform types such as servers, workstations and embedded systems.

This document gives an overview of context information, requirements, and high level specifications guiding the direction of OpenTC. Following this introduction, we present results of a small, consortium-internal survey on Trusted Computing. It was conducted to document views and opinions, to share them between the various partners of this large project, and to highlight potential issues to be taken into account during the design phase. The survey provides a context to consider characteristics of potential application scenarios and to discuss implications for the future dialog between the project and the outside world.

In chapter 4, we present the results of a media analysis on the perception of Trusted Computing by the start of the project. Drawing from a variety of sources, we outline and comment major points of discussion that were raised during the public debate. Where possible, we give recommendations on how to address these concerns in OpenTC's design and implementation. Using these results and input from consortium partners, we make suggestions for an application scenario that concerns the protection of electronic transactions of private end-users in their role as consumers.

Application scenarios and use cases have a dual role in OpenTC. On the one hand, they are starting points for determining necessary and desirable features of the overall architecture. On the other hand, they serve as the context to validate project results. Substantial effort has been spent in the first months of the project on investigating suitable application scenarios and defining corresponding use cases. A summarizing description of three use cases can be found in chapter 5. They address recommendations from chapter 4. In addition, they address datacenter and server environments, and enhanced trust and security properties of remote corporate computers connected to corporate networks via the Internet.

The remainder of this report is dedicated to requirements and high level specifications. We outline the structure and interdependencies of OpenTC activities and give a motivation and overview of the general architecture. The following chapters document requirements (Workpackage 2) and high level specifications for each of the technical Workpackages 3 to 8 (Workpackage 1 addresses management, Workpackages 9 and 10 address distribution and dissemination of results).

Determining requirements and specification is a continuous activity. Current findings will be extended and improved, and it is planned to update this report during the course of the project. Public documents that aim to obtain feedback from the interested public are expected to use updated and refined versions of this report as a

starting point. This document is the final version of the high-level specification. Detailed up-to-date specifications will be made available on the project server.

3 Results of consortium-internal Survey

The consortium conducted a small internal e-mail survey

- (a) for identifying areas to be addressed in the future survey work, and
- (b) for identifying issues to be taken into account when specifying OpenTC.

The results of this survey are presented in an anonymized way. Answers such as “don’t know” have been omitted, which appears justifiable as the objectives are to collect ideas and to share knowledge. Initially, the questionnaire has been tested in personal interviews. As of March 2006, answers have been received from ten consortium members, seven from industry, three from academia.

The questions from the questionnaire are presented in courier font. For the complete questionnaire, please consult the corresponding appendix.

3.1 Survey Results

Experiences with TC

Do you have any practical experiences with Trusted Computing yourself? If yes:

What are your experiences?

Against which threats has TC been used in your case?

All but two respondents have experiences with TC. In summary, most of the ten respondents have a TPM in their PC, but only 2 use it. On computers equipped with TPMs, the hardware is used to secure keys and passwords, for example as encrypting password files.

Is your institution involved in selling TPMs, computers with TPMs, or in offering related software or services? If yes:

What sort of products and services are on offer?

Which experiences did your company make in that field?

Why are your customers interested in TC?

Are there any documents available about private or corporate user interests and experiences?

Respondents from industry are active in the related fields, for example TCG specification work, TPM manufacturing, related software development and evaluation, sales of PCs with TPMs.

Software supporting TC from the following manufacturers was mentioned, supplied either by the respondent's company, or by partner companies: Infineon, Hewlett-Packard, Utimaco, Wave (backup-server), and Tripwire (check of hash values against list).

TPMs are considered the cheapest way to secure critical keys and data. All large corporations are interested in this kind of usage, in particular with regard to portable computers. The feedback obtained from customers suggests that TPMs are being used. Customers do not give any details on what exactly they secure with TPMs. It was not possible to identify any publicly available documents

describing user experiences with TC.

Key finding: Securing corporate networks seems to be the current main market for TC, e.g., to render hard disks on lost and stolen portable computers unusable. This is in contrast to the beliefs expressed in many media (see next chapter) according to which TC is essentially about DRM for increasing revenues from sales of software and content.

Use Cases and Threats

What are the most important use cases for OpenTC which should be taken into account during the design, in your view? Please describe them.

The use cases mentioned by the respondents can be described and grouped as follows:

Protection of PC-networks

Protection of PCs is the most general use case mentioned:

1. Protection against vulnerabilities (viruses, worms, exploitable security vulnerabilities in general).
2. Managing large numbers of corporate PCs: block stolen ones, lost HDD should be unusable, secure email, secure workflow management.
3. Access to WLAN and corporate networks
4. Trusted Network Connect: any use case including corporate users with mandatory use of TC; Trusted Network Connect: checking the integrity of corporate client machines, while allowing user to maintain private execution environment in parallel, for example by means of virtualization.
5. Secure private PCs owned by employees if they are used to access corporate networks. On private hardware, the owner should be enabled to run the company OS configuration in parallel to his own OS.
6. Highly-sensitive corporate networks: security and locking-down of information within a network of computers; restricted usage in specialized facilities where sensitive information is handled.

These remarks are in line with today's predominantly corporate use of TPMs.

Secure servers

1. Virtual data center: several operating system instances running on behalf of different companies or applications run on the same physical server. With support for load balancing, the number of such servers could be reduced, resulting in cost savings for equipment, energy, and hardware maintenance.
2. Server support services: provider installed servers at client location with 24/7 support. The provider needs to assure integrity of servers to prevent changes, manipulations, etc. from his customer that could result in additional support costs.
3. Network components: secure Linux servers and routers.

Server-based scenarios are a promising field for applying OpenTC results, since virtual data centres come with new challenges to isolate execution environments of different customers.

Single services

The following single services were mentioned:

1. Home banking etc.: potential killer application, its value is easy to communicate to the public and the media. The solution should reduce the impacts of unauthorized modifications of application software, viruses, malware, phishing, etc. Solution might be applicable to auctioning and other types of e-business.
2. Secure payment: reduce risks of identity theft and phishing.
3. Improving confidence in digital signatures: “*What You Sign Is What You See*” (WYSIWYS) applications for really secure electronic signatures, to support the European Directive on electronic signatures.
4. Fair DRM allow executing lawful rights of digital media consumers, for example with support for sub-licensing in accordance with mutually agreed policies (copy to portable players, restricted sharing).
5. Shared infrastructure and storage. The traditional client-server model is not optimal for serving media content that needs a lot of bandwidth. Private resources could be used for serving content. In this case, it could be advantageous if private resources can temporarily be put outside the owner's control (by renting them out).
6. General support for users and developers that enhances the transparency of the underlying TC mechanisms and the effective control of platform owners.

Some respondents suggested to use Trusted Computing to secure single applications whose subversion can result in actual financial loss for platform owners. DRM for media content was mentioned, but was required to be implemented with protection of user rights. It was also pointed out that users might need applications to manage their TPM data.

Small platforms

1. OS for small platforms should support features similar to those on trusted PC platforms (better protection against mobile viruses, DRM, etc.).

Overview of application areas and scenarios

The following table gives an overview of use cases for which detailed responses were given.

Name	Threat	Requirements	Compartments	OS	Potential market
Mobile phones, embedded systems	Viruses, malware, SIMLOCK attacks, illegal copying	Adaptation to embedded controller	3-6	Embedded, Microkernel	Top/ middle level mobile phones
Home banking etc.	Viruses, malware, etc.	Protection against code modification, phishing attacks, etc.	2 or more	Windows	10% [of PCs], in the EU about 10-20 million
Secure payment	Identity theft, phishing	Secure storage, communications, non-repudiation		Any	
WYSIWYS	Faking digital signatures	Trusted path between application, keyboard and monitor	2		
Protection against vulnerabilities	Viruses etc.	Identification of executables		Any	
Home office	Attacks on corporate data	Encryption of HDD, sealing. Installation under existing OS would be convenient	2	Any	Thousands
Corporate network	Leaking sensitive information	Encryption Mutual attestation of OS and applications	2	Linux	In specialised facilities
DRM	(copying)	Protect rights; allow copying according to rights/policies	2	Linux	Widespread
Virtual data centre	Malicious code, insider attacks	Load balancing, virtualisation of TPM, strong isolation	20	multiple	4-10

Table 1: Use Cases.

Sorted by number of expected users, with similar use cases being grouped together.

The table shows that use for mobile phones could lead to a deployment of TC on a very large scale. In 2005, some 800 million phones have been sold (Msmobiles 2006); a significant share of these could become candidates for embedding TC-technology, as they become increasingly complex machines which need to be secured.

The second largest application mentioned is home banking (or similar forms of e-commerce). The respondent estimated that this could result in some 10 or 20 million applications in the EU.

Trusted Computing and the Media

Are you aware of any benefits of Trusted Computing discussed in the media? Which are these?

As a general observation, the media tends not to discuss potential benefits.

Are you aware of any disadvantages of Trusted Computing discussed in the media? Which are these?

Responses can be summarized as follows:

- The media tends to equate TC with Digital Rights Management. Most consumers do not like DRM, and some emphasis has been put on the fact that it will become more difficult to work around DRM-schemes.
- There is fear that privately owned computers will be controlled by Microsoft. The technology could be abused to reduce owner's freedom of choice with regard to installing and using software.
- There could be infringement of privacy if a user is required to communicate his configuration to external parties that want to check whether the owner's system has been set up in a defined way.

Which critiques are justified or unjustified, in your opinion?

The comments received can be summarized as follows:

- If crucial software components and application are made to run only with TC capabilities, this could put restrictions on the user.
- Privacy-related critiques should be taken seriously. Representative bodies of users should be able to check privacy-related technical developments.
- Much critique from the media is speculation without factual basis. Where critique is justified (lack of a compliance program and conformance criteria), it is often ignored by the media since the topics are difficult to understand.
- Trusted Computing is shrouded in secrecy: information, developer tools and end-user tools that would help to interact with TPMs in a straight-forward way are difficult to come by or unavailable. People fear what they do not understand.

Do you think the public debate around Trusted Computing has somehow changed during recent time? If so, how would you characterise the current state of debate around TC?

The responses can be summarized as follows:

- Over the last couple of years, the discussion has improved as it has become more fact-based. Take [the German computer magazine] c't, an important computer magazine in Europe. You can see from the

archives that their representation of Trusted Computing changed to reflect the actual technical facts, notwithstanding that they remain skeptical.

- The IT and software manufacturers had to address the problem of trust in end systems as an industry – the alternative was potentially inadequate and inflexible governmental regulation. Some vendors had preceding work that came from research on DRM which addressed parts of the requirements, and this may have influenced some early decisions in the specification phase. For example, years ago a marketing person from Microsoft had said the area [for applying TC] was „content“. This was communicated in all media. The TCG was supposed to be more balanced than the TCPA.
- The problem of lost and stolen portable computers has received increasing attention from the media. The public debate has motivated TCG standardisation people to add additional privacy and security features into the TC specification (Direct Anonymous Attestation, option of deleting the endorsement key). Important parties such as governments have contributed to the discussion. They now have a stake in the development of TC and a more balanced view on potential advantages and disadvantages, and there is an active debate about using TPMs for Linux.
- Public opinion and opinions on certain websites with misinformation are negative (3 such statements). The general public still does not understand or even know about TC and its potential benefits, and the broad mass of users is not interested. Presentations and news about TC at the RSA conference 2006 did not add to the level of public understanding, as the only relevant papers were of scientific and research nature. The use of TPMs in Microsoft VISTA is not a point in public discussion.
- The last case from Sony [a DRM system based on a Windows rootkit] seems to be unequivocally bad. [this respondent apparently assumes that negative news about DRM are implicitly negative for TC which is widely regarded to be related to DRM]

Are there any particularly important websites, newspapers or journals we should take into account?

Are there any specific documents which were published during the last few months which we should take into account?

The following recommendations were put forward:

- Richard Stallman's and Linus Torvald's recent comments on the GPLv3 and Trusted Computing;
- statements produced by the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC);
- work on DRM conducted by the EU-funded "Indicare" project;
- search for TC/TCG and "discussion forum" and check German and US-Wikipedia, there is tracking of discussion of content;
- check the questions written by the German Federal government, and the

TCG answers.

Some of these suggestions have been taken into account in the media analysis (next chapter).

If you think of the perception of Trusted Computing by the general public, is there any action the OpenTC-consortium should take, e.g. regarding PR activities, or use cases to be chosen?

The responses can be summarized as follows:

- In general, public perception could be improved by moving towards the open software developing environment. The most effective contribution of OpenTC would be if results can be used as yardstick for Microsoft's effort.
- Regarding PR activities, it was suggested to involve a PR-agency to introduce OpenTC-concepts to the media. On the other hand, it was remarked that it is an uphill struggle to improve public perception. OpenTC is probably too small for real PR activities, its primary chance of producing a positive echo are the attractiveness of its technical approach and results.

There are important publications such as the Communications of the ACM or Business Week where technologists and executives get their opinions from. However, one may have doubts whether Trusted Computing is a topic for them. In any case, we need the technology first to substantiate our claims.

This issue should probably be discussed with the TCG and their media professionals (the TCG-website includes a section on publications). From a practical perspective, OpenTC could produce a bootable system with practical applications which could be promoted at public and open events to present first results to some relevant people.

- Regarding application scenarios and use cases, OpenTC should promote positive aspects of Trusted Computing, e.g. by showing important use cases like protection within a company network. People will probably be interested to know that we are close enough to TCG to make an impact, and OpenTC's relevance and specific approach should be communicated to the Trusted Computing Group.

Simple end-user tools (under Windows or a bootable Live Linux CD with tools to support easy interactions with TPM hardware) are likely to be well received by the liberal media. The same could be true for solutions where users have control over controversial aspects (DRM keys, certificate generation etc.). Solutions should demonstrate that the Open Source approach allows implementers to modify or replace "official" components that are considered problematic.

Application scenarios should be chosen with regard to their relevance to the public, choosing solutions that are considered reasonable to the average user. In theory, OpenTC could investigate open alternative payment systems or DRM, but the feasibility and practical impact of such efforts is somewhat questionable.

- Regarding interviews to be conducted, suggestions were made to involve persons with well known critical attitudes, asking them for concrete suggestions and for feedback to OpenTC use cases. It was also suggested to interview a named representative of the German Ministry of the Interior about requirements.

Design Issues

Are there any open issues in the design of OpenTC? Which are these?
Any comments?

Answers to these questions can be summarized as follows:

- In general, we need to maintain speed and momentum, as indifference may set in and people become complacent about negative aspects of TC implementations. This, in turn, may result in moves from commercial organizations to abuse the technology and to stake their claims on home-user PCs (a captive audience).

Currently it is quite tedious to use TC, since security adds complexity. We don't have clear indications on how much additional complexity users would accept. In OpenTC, we should try to make things as seamless as possible.

- Concerning single technical issues, there are real challenges to verify the integrity of a particular system based on PCR values (Platform Configuration Register) in a meaningful way. Using open and evolving OpenTC OS which operates on a variety of hardware only adds to these difficulties.

Measurement of application trustworthiness is also an issue. Multiple steps are needed to measure applications and compare their metrics against a huge database somewhere that is vouched for by an organisation. This appears to be feasible for components that are rather static, but many components may be subject to frequent change. This can be addressed by a monitoring mechanism that does not log everything into the TPM.

An important issue is to find policy expressions with an appropriate level of granularity to express the configuration and information flow of virtual machines. This is required to reason about security properties of virtual machine compartments connecting to the outside world.

The design should make sure that “trusted” compartments cannot assume control of the whole computer, and that compartment running on behalf of other parties are erasable. Some scenarios may leverage pre-existing trust (for example in data centers). OpenTC may therefore also consider a design that do not require hardware TPMs.

3.2 Summary and Conclusions

The responding partners presented their views about opportunities and risks of TC, the likely evolution of the market, and suggestions on potential areas of work. In this section, we summarize issues which appear to be of particular relevance to the project.

The most attractive areas for widespread deployment of Trusted Computing technology, in terms of numbers, are probably mobile phones and home banking. The first scenario is addressed in an OpenTC Workpackage that investigates TC usage for embedded and mobile controllers. Regarding home banking or similar application scenarios, a Linux-based demonstrator using OpenTC components appears to be feasible, and it could be beneficial to demonstrate the value of TC architectures. As demonstrated for XEN, components used in OpenTC might eventually be capable of hosting proprietary operating systems such as Windows (Shankland 2005).

According to the survey, the most realistic market for Trusted Computing are solutions for securing corporate networks and data assets (Trusted Network Connect), integrity validation for remote systems, support for data and hard disk encryption. This is in contrast to commonly expressed opinions that TC mainly targets DRM for consumer PCs to increase revenues for software and content providers. A demonstrator protecting portable computers (with virtualization, migration of keys and protected data, etc.) could therefore be useful.

Concrete suggestions put forward by the respondents concern specific application scenarios (isolation mechanisms for data centers, security design that does not require TPMs, consumer friendly DRM). It was highlighted that additional system complexity caused by improved security properties may lead to acceptance problems. Several technical challenges need to be addressed in the areas of policy, configuration, monitoring and maintaining a trustworthy initial state.

The public perception of TC remains a potential inhibitor, not least because potential benefits of Trusted Computing are under-represented. Public perception of Trusted computing might be improved by

- involving parts of the open software development communities and user groups in the design and implementation effort.
- providing developer and end user tools, support and information for Trusted Computing hardware for the public,
- providing applications that appeal to the general public
- addressing privacy concerns in the design, e.g., by implementing solutions base on Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA).

The OpenTC consortium should, within its means, contribute to the public debate. Professional PR support could be of advantage here. PR-activities could be discussed with the TCG, and a public event could be used to present first OpenTC results. The consortium should consider to maintain links with representatives of TC-critical groups and interested public bodies for obtaining concrete suggestions.

4 Media Analysis

The following analysis of media had the objectives

- to assess TC and its relation to DRM systems,
- to outline the conditions of TC and DRM acceptability,
- to identify general requirements to be taken into account by the project, and
- to identify areas to be discussed with stakeholders, for example in workshops and a web-based discourse process.

The findings from this analysis are described in this chapter.

4.1 Method and Selected Media

Between January and March 2006, we conducted a systematic search for printed and online material about Trusted Computing. For online searching, we used engines from *Google*, *Financial Times*, *New York Times*, *Heise Online*, *c't (Magazin für Computertechnik)*, and *Golem* (the last 3 being in German). To identify articles, statements on blogs, etc., we used the following keywords (the first two alone, and in combination with all others): *Trusted Computing*, *OpenTC*, *digital rights management*, *benefits*, *critique*, *risks*, *technology assessment*. We then followed links to web-based content and literature (see the references section). This approach was followed to gain a broad overview of how TC-systems are being assessed by those participating in the debate (interested citizens, professionals, authors of print media, etc.). Note that links leading to information from companies offering TC components and services have not been evaluated. We also included explicit suggestions for media to be looked into by consortium members.

4.2 TC in General

4.2.1 Public Discussion

In the media identified, a general skepticism towards Trusted Computing prevails. We did not evaluate these arguments statistically (e.g. by counting arguments and articles, as common in media analysis), since this would not provide additional insights relevant for the OpenTC project. The reason is that it became obvious that much of the material reiterates arguments that were put forward at early stages of the public debate by Anderson (2003), Stallman (2002), EPIC (2002), and Schoen (2003).

The main arguments of these and subsequent authors can be summarized as follows:

1. The main motivation behind TC is to support powerful DRM-systems for protecting content and software (see Anderson 2003 or more recently Thompson 2005). “It is about setting up toll booths deep in your own pockets” is one comment made on Slashdot (2006). Another one is: “The software companies realize they have a product that never gets old, never wears out and will perform the task it was purchased to do until hell freezes over unless they find a way of breaking it. Software companies have been trying to find ways of making software wear out for decades so they can rake a continuous income from their customers the way other manufacturers do. They use product

activation to tie the non-wearing software to the fragile hardware for example, but their customers hate them for it. The customer wants to buy a tool and use it forever...”

2. TC will take away the control of a PC from the user (Anderson 2003).
3. The computer will have keys kept secret from the user.
4. Control of TC-using computer systems will be with media companies and with companies such as Microsoft and Intel (cf. Graff 2005).
5. Software may stop operating if one does not obey to the new rules enforced by means of TC, e.g., with regard to using content, but also with regard to files from word processors and email programs (Anderson 2003).
6. Exchange of files produced by Open Source software and by TC-using software will be hindered. Customers could be locked into proprietary solutions. For instance, Schneier (2005) criticizes that interoperability is not strongly enforced by the TCG.
7. Existing copyright exemptions, such as those for librarians, scientists, educators, blind people etc. are difficult to implement in a DRM system implying that DRM should not be used at all.
8. Users might be traced using keys provided and configuration attested by the TPMs.
9. Patents owned by TCG-companies could be used to limit competition.

These skeptical views are motivated by the following observations:

- Since the mid-nineties, there have been plans by the US government to implement a “Trusted Third Party” for key escrow.
- In the late 1990s, Intel planned means of unique identification in its Pentium III processor, a move which was abandoned after widespread criticism.
- “This is a new focus for the security community,” said David Aucsmith, security architect for chip maker Intel “The actual user of the PC – someone who can do anything they want – is the enemy.” (quoted after Lemos 1999)
- The U.S. Digital Millennium Copyright Act might hinder cryptanalysis and hence progress in cryptography.
- The subsequent proposal by US Senator Fritz Hollings to use a trusted chip in all consumer electronics equipment (Anderson 2003). In critical comments the chip has since been nicknamed the “Fritz” chip.
- Bill Gates reportedly considers exploring the business opportunities of restricting office document usability: “We came at this thinking about music, but then we realized that e-mail and documents were far more interesting domains” (after Thurrott 2002). Similarly, Brad Brunell of Microsoft reportedly said that with Palladium one could send E-Mails which dissolve after one week or can’t be printed. Palladium was said to remove any weaknesses of software-based DRM-systems (EBI-Newsletter 2003).

- More recently, Sony modified the Windows operating systems by installing a rootkit for DRM purposes without informing the users. The rootkit has been said to produce vulnerabilities. Skepticism increased because the providers of anti-virus software did not issue warnings (Schneier 2005b).

Richard Stallman even concluded that the potential threats of what he calls “treacherous computing” makes public resistance necessary (Stallman 2002).

From the perspective of those who are actively developing Trusted Computing specifications and technology, the public debate is characterized by a high level of speculation, fear, uncertainty and doubt. Although the applicability of TC for DRM might have been a driver for some companies, Trusted Computing targets long-standing problems of IT security and trustworthiness in general.

Whether or not TC enabled systems might take away control from the user will depend on software implementations and policies that may be required during electronic interactions, for example, when a remote computer connects to a corporate network. To disallow direct inspection and modifications of TPM protected keys lies at the heart of this technology; however, no alternative solution has been put forward that could achieve the goal of remotely attesting a platform state in a trustworthy manner.

At this stage, one can merely speculate about the level of control that might be executed by external parties such as content or software providers. Customers may simply insist on base levels of openness to run arbitrary software or on interoperability with Open Source based systems, and they may just refuse systems that stop software from working. Even if it proves possible to implement TC based constraints, their deployment will primarily depend on market forces and user acceptance.

The problem of DRM solutions allowing privileged access for librarians, researchers and educators is not specific to those based on Trusted Computing technology. For this audience, the strength of DRM mechanisms is irrelevant, since their actual access to content does not rely on circumventing or breaking these mechanisms. As far as user traceability is concerned, TC included privacy protecting mechanism from the outset, and this aspect has since been improved by supporting Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA).

Potential implications of intellectual property (IP) ownership on aspects of Trusted Computing are unclear, and it remains to be seen whether they will become stumbling blocks for non-proprietary implementations. However, as of April 2006, we are not aware of a single case where IP claims have been brought against freely available implementations.

In summary: it is currently a matter of speculation whether Trusted Computing will in fact yield the negative consequences dreaded by its critics. First commercial applications provide support for protecting keys and sensitive data (cf., e.g., Hewlett Packard 2003), are mainly targeted at corporate environments. To this extent, TC has been non-controversial.

For the OpenTC project, the following conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of the aforementioned, mostly sceptical debate:

1. The project could show that TC can work in the user's interest. The usefulness of reducing impacts of potential vulnerabilities on PCs and providing hardware support for storage protection is undisputed. The same holds for checking whether remote PCs are properly configured before connecting to corporate networks.

2. It would be attractive to demonstrate TC-protected compartments, using virtualization to confine the impact of TC-based enforcement mechanisms to locked-down components.

4.2.2 Some German Positions

For OpenTC, it is interesting to review opinions which are either deviating, more neutral or referring more closely to the TCG specifications. The most detailed one we were able to identify is the German government's position. In 2003, it expressed 47 different requirements towards the TCG and towards Microsoft (cf. Federal Government 2003, Sandl 2004, Schallbruch 2004; similarly: BITKOM 2004). In turn, the TCG responded to the demands (2004). For the OpenTC project, the following issues are of potential relevance:

- "It must be possible to transfer the information stored in an existing security module to a new hardware platform in such a manner that users can continue using their software even on the new hardware platform." (request 3.1)
Comment: Key migration is part of the TCG specifications. It could be beneficial for the public perception of OpenTC if the consortium demonstrated key migration, e.g., with backup or DRM applications.
- "If DRM solutions are developed which are based on the security module (TPM), such solutions must consider the user's right to copy data and programs for private purposes and must be implemented accordingly." (request 3.2)
Comment: While the TCG specifications render this possible, demonstrating this could be beneficial.
- "Users must have full control of their keys, and they must be able to delete these keys when necessary and to generate new keys... It should be possible to delete any information previously stored in the TPM and to cancel its functionality (for example, when scrapping the PC)." (request 4.3)
Comment: The TCG responded to these demands by writing that the owner has the ability to create, use and invalidate any key. Regarding the endorsement key, the TCG anticipates that the TPM owners will use it as provided. The consortium could consider to enable owners and users to view data stored in the TPM, edit such data as appropriate, and invalidate them as appropriate, e.g., when a PC is to be handed over to another user or to be scrapped.
- Zero-knowledge attestation should be aimed at (request 5.7). Comment: As DAA has become part of the TCG specifications, there is no need for OpenTC to address this. It could be considered for demonstrators to be built later in the course of the project.
- The TCG should find a solution which exempts non-commercial open-source projects from license fees (request 6.1-6.4). The manufacturers in the TCG should disclose the relevant intellectual property. Comment: The OpenTC consortium might consider to make related information supporting or hindering the free use of TC available on its website.

- “The TCG's actions may not lead to the occurrence or reinforcement of market-dominating positions in the IT sector.” (request 8.1) Similarly, interoperability of TC-using software with other software is demanded (request 9.2) Comment: The OpenTC project as such can be seen as an initiative aiming at reducing market-dominance. Using virtualization it will be possible to demonstrate that locked-down software can run side-by-side with ordinary software components.
- “If personal data is transmitted in conjunction with the use of the NGSCB, the user must have the possibility to consent to such transmission in each and every case.” (request 10.3). Comment: While this is a demand towards Microsoft, the OpenTC consortium could conclude that it might be beneficial to display to the users if relevant data are transmitted. It could be considered to offer at least the option to see whether an attestation to a remote partner is being conducted.

A number of authors have suggested that transparency can be supported by applying the TC approach for securing Linux computers (cf. Kursawe, Reimer 2005; Sadeghi et al. 2004, 2005; Kuhlmann, Gehring 2003). It has also been suggested to provide attestation for only a small part of the computer, which would allow to leave other parts un-attested (Bechtold 2005b, see also Weber, Weber 2006).

In summary, the German debate has become somewhat more neutral. E.g. the article “Trusted Computing in der Diskussion” in the German wikipedia edition clarifies that software running on TC computers does not need to be certified by a central agency and that TC does not imply a monopoly in operating systems.

4.2.3 Views on OpenTC

In journals and on the WWW, some opinions about the OpenTC project have emerged already. In December 2005, news emerged about OpenTC planning for a DRM demonstrator. A commentator on the “Golem” blog (2005) accused the consortium members of being “traitors” to the concepts of Open Source Software. When the German computer magazine “c't” published an article about OpenTC early in 2006, it provided some correct information about the project. Referring to the planned MPEG-21 demonstrator, the article concluded: “The research objectives by OpenTC will hardly be capable of resolving the doubts which the sceptics have”. Similarly, Bottoni (2006) said in his Italian blog that the OpenTC “project is based on the availability of ... the ‘famous/notorious’ Fritz Chip” and would essentially deal with DRM. This is just another example of the old arguments against TC, in particular that it essentially means DRM, show up again and again.

However, there are also more neutral voices, such as the German “PC-Magazin” which remained neutral when reporting about OpenTC in an article available online (2005).

4.3 Suggestions

The following suggestions are based on the media analysis above, and on discussions in the consortium. The OpenTC project could consider the following actions:

1. OpenTC could render possible TC usage for providing multilateral security, by, e.g., not only protecting a remote party, but also the user. It could be shown that virtualization allows to constrain the impact of TC-based enforcement mechanisms to defined components.

2. OpenTC could demonstrate tools to inspect the TPM as well as for editing and invalidating TPM protected data as appropriate, e.g., when a PC is to be handed to another user or to be scrapped. Options to migrate keys and protected data could be included, for example when providing backup or DRM applications. Demonstrating this for DRM-protected data could be beneficial.
3. OpenTC could address privacy concerns by supporting to inspect privacy-relevant data transmitted by TC based mechanisms. The user should get a clear indication if attestation to a remote systems is in progress. Implementing DAA could be considered.
4. Information on Intellectual Property-issues that could support or hinder the free use of TC could be made available on the OpenTC website.

In summary: demonstrating the benefits of TC in practical scenarios appears to be the most promising line of action. Four types of demonstrators may be of particular interest:

1. A demonstrator showing how to browse and manipulate TPM-data. This could be of interest for implementers, the Linux-community, specialised media, etc.
2. A demonstrator showing the benefits for organisations such as corporations and governments. It could show protection against theft and loss of portable computers, etc.
3. A demonstrator targeting a DRM application that safeguards basic consumer rights.
4. Finally, a demonstrator could focus on protecting online transactions of private users.

Regarding the last point, consumers might be interested to better protect private assets currently at risk. An obvious example is improved protection of browser based home banking from password and transaction number “phishing”. Using TC based attestation, users could convince themselves that the execution environment dedicated to e-commerce transaction has not been tampered with.

Such a demonstrator would be easy-to-understand, and the underlying principles could be equally applicable for protecting users in the Windows world. The idea of securing a browser and its execution environment can be extended to other browser-based electronic transactions such as auctioning or eGovernment. In the next chapter, we will outline some ideas in the “Private Electronic Transactions”, or “PET”, application scenario.

This analysis of media will be continued and refined. We intend to discuss the analysis, conclusions, requirements and specifications in this document with stakeholders in interviews, conferences and web-based discourse.

5 OpenTC Application Scenarios

Application scenarios and use cases have a dual role in OpenTC. On the one hand, they are starting points for determining necessary and desirable features of the overall architecture. On the other hand, they serve as the context to validate project results. Substantial effort has been spent during the first months of the project on investigating suitable application scenarios and defining corresponding use cases. A summarizing description of three use cases can be found in this chapter. They address recommendations from chapter 4, datacenter and server environments, and enhanced trust and security properties of remote corporate computers connected to corporate networks via the Internet.

5.1 Private Electronic Transactions

As part of a Banking Scenario Use Case, the OpenTC project explores how its architecture can reduce the risks currently involved in doing home banking over the Internet. First and foremost, these efforts are targeted at enhancements of user's security. At the same time, an increase of the protection of banks is achieved. Banks can benefit from trusted computing e.g. through a reduction of expenses for disputed transfers.

5.1.1 Problem Scenario

Home banking via the Internet has become a convenient and simple way to do their financial transactions. Although commonly used, Internet home banking has several security issues which have been reported in public media. For example, phishing is a popular form of attack based on social engineering and deception: An eavesdropper tries to gather the Personal Identification Numbers (PINs) and Transaction Authentication Numbers (TANs) of a user by impersonating the website of the user's bank. The obtained confidential information is then used to redirect funds from the user's bank account. Other forms of threats are malicious modifications of the user's operating system environment, for example by worms, viruses or Trojan horses. In such a case, the correct behaviour of the system and its applications can no longer be ensured. Such malicious code might disclose confidential information or interfere with sensitive transactions of the user.

It is assumed that a private user will continue to use a legacy operating system for his everyday tasks. In parallel to the legacy OS, OpenTC will provide fully isolated compartments tailored for specific purposes. Such a compartment is the banking compartment of this use case. Interaction with the bank is based on a web browser which is running in this trusted compartment. For secure communication with the bank, the user switches from the compartment running the legacy OS to the banking compartment.

The protection offered by this use case is twofold: On the one hand, the user is guaranteed that the banking compartment is technically protected from malicious modification. In addition, the trusted compartment provides reasonable protection against phishing attacks. On the other hand, the bank benefits from a trusted computing enhanced architecture because it can anticipate reduced losses from fraudulent transactions, less disputes and a better image in the public.

Furthermore, we assume banking components to be hosted in compartments. A

compartment is characterized by services and applications it hosts, its configuration and policies attached to it. These policies define

- the protection level for data accessed and processed
- the protection level of applications and services that participate in the processing of data
- the information flow between different compartments (both local to the hardware platform and on remote platforms)
- permitted interactions with the virtualization environment and management
- events that trigger a change in the trust state of a compartment and/or its execution environment

We focus on what can be controlled or configured on a standard computing platform. We do not address dependencies from central network services (DHCP, DNS, ...), and at this stage, we also ignore configuration options for the network and storage fabric (routers, switches etc.).

5.1.2 Security Environment

Assumptions:

- **Correct hardware:** The underlying hardware (e.g. CPU, devices, TPM, ...) is non-malicious and behaves as specified. Optionally, the correct properties of the hardware can be attested by platform certificate.
- **Correct trusted credentials:** Assuming that we have the bank server credentials (i.e. all certificates on the certification path for the SSL/TLS server authentication, from the root CA to the server certificate, both included) already installed and if we assume that we implicitly trust these credentials, no man-in-the-middle attack can occur. By saying “already installed” we mean that the credentials are part of the bank domain image.
- **Trusted Administrator:** The standard services for compartment administration and platform management must be trusted to act in accordance with the wishes of users, since they have to access security-critical information.
- **No physical attacks:** Physical attacks against the underlying hardware platform must not happen.
- **Trusted Bank.** The actual bank is a trusted party. That means that it is assumed that the bank handles all sensitive data of users securely.

Threats:

- **Phishing:** An attacker tries to impersonate the banking website of the user's bank. This way, confidential data such as credentials (user name, password, PINs, TANs) might be disclosed. The attacker can then use this information to illegally withdraw money from the user's bank account.
- **Trojan horse and Malware:** Potentially harmful software such as Trojan horses or key loggers might get installed on a computer system without the knowledge and approval of the user. This software might report sensitive data of the user to an attacker.
- **Modification of the Untrusted Compartment:** Assuming that a modification

of the untrusted compartment does only aim at the modification of this compartment we can exclude a modification of the trusted compartment.

- **Network redirection to a fake web server:** Network redirection to a fake bank server due to *pharming*, DNS cache poisoning and similar attacks.
- **Exploitation of software vulnerabilities**
- **Modification of the Trusted Compartment.** An attacker (malicious software) modifies the trusted compartment. As consequence, banking transactions must be denied as attestation fails (by whatever attestation mechanism).

5.1.3 Functional Requirements

5.1.3.1 Goal

The goal of the demonstrator is to show how home banking transactions can be protected against attacks such as phishing by means of trusted computing. Moreover, the demonstrator is designed in way that it can relatively easily be modified to cover other browser-based electronic transactions such as auctioning.

5.1.3.2 Target Groups

The target group is the software service consumer, a user that wants to do bank transactions using his home or office PC while he/she still wants to use insecure software installed on the same PC.

5.1.3.3 Roles and Actors

- **User:** The entity that performs the bank transaction in the trusted compartment and various tasks in the untrusted domain. In some scenarios [user] and [admin] may be the same person.
- **Admin:** The system administrator (client side) installs the software (i.e. bank domain image) and performs the “take ownership” operation.
- **OpenTC-OS:** Open Trusted Computing Operating System. This is the virtualization layer that is managing the multiple compartments of the client. Building blocks of this component are trusted boot mechanisms, a hypervisor to run multiple compartments as well as related management infrastructure.
- **Browser:** The browser is the interface to the banking application. It is pre-configured with the trusted certificates from the bank and can only connect to the [client proxy]. Both, the [browser] and the [client proxy] are started when the trusted compartment is instantiated.
- **Untrusted Compartment / Legacy OS:** For everyday tasks such as word processing, surfing the Internet or image processing the user is working with his well known, general purpose operating system. This system is executed on top of a hypervisor in parallel to trusted compartments such as the banking compartment. Due to its size and the number and variety of applications that are executed on this system, it is not practical to enhance such a general purpose system with trusted computing functionality. As a consequence, this compartment is considered untrusted.

- **Bank:** The entity the user wants to do his banking transactions with. The detailed internal setup of the bank is unknown, the external representation is the bank proxy (see next paragraph) and the bank application. The bank builds and issues the banking domain software image to the user. Further, the bank defines the policy whether a connecting user machine is to be considered “trusted” or not.
- **Bank Proxy:** This proxy or gateway is placed within the domain of the bank. It provides access to the banking application and performs verification of attestation values received from the client. In addition to that, it provides signed measurements of its own state to the client. The proxy could be operated by the bank or managed by a third party.
- **Client Proxy:** The client side proxy is responsible for forwarding the requests from the local browser to the [bank proxy] and vice versa. Additionally, the [client proxy] provides measurement values of the client to the bank and verifies the attestation values received from the bank. In contrast to realizing this functionality as a browser extension, this approach is more flexible: It can not only be used to add attestation to *http(s)* connections, but to any kind of IP based communication protocol.
- **Phisher:** A phisher is a person who tries to trick someone into giving away confidential data such as access information for a bank account. A common form of phishing is based on e-mails containing information that is seemingly coming from a trusted entity. If the user is unable to identify the provided information as forged and follows links contained in the mail, he typically will be directed to a website that closely resembles the one of the trusted entity. If the user enters sensitive data into forms of the website, this information is disclosed to the phisher. In case of a bank website, that way the phisher can gain access to the bank account of the user.
- **Malware:** A malicious piece of code, which is able to infiltrate and modify a computer system without the owner's consent. Note that it is out of scope for this document how in particular this is achieved, be it e.g. through exploitation of bugs or design weaknesses of the system or by tricking the owner into granting unknown software too many security privileges.
- **Credential manager:** The credential manager is responsible to manage and store the user's credentials. The credentials actually used when authenticating the user to the bank are derived from those credentials the user has received from the bank. The credential manager ensure that these derived credentials are securely stored (preferably protected by the TPM). Since the credential manager relies on the availability of secure storage, it might not be included in demonstrator implemented in the first phase of the project.

5.1.4 Description of Use Cases

The use cases are separated into four different subsets, namely

1. Installation of the OpenTC-OS and the banking compartment
2. Normal operation of the system
3. Use Cases showing how phishing attacks are prevented
4. Use Cases showing how (malicious) modifications of the code base are handled

Installation:

- **Preparation of the Bank Domain Image.** The bank domain image is developed by the bank. The image is then distributed to the customers.
- **Taking TPM Ownership.** If not already done previously, the “take ownership” operation of the TPM is carried out by the system administrator.
- **Installation of Bank Domain Image.** The trusted bank domain image provided by the bank is installed on top of the trusted core operating system. Any number of untrusted compartments can be installed in parallel.
- **Setting Policies and Credentials for Banking Compartment.** As the final step of the installation process, the security policies for the banking compartment have to be set. This includes firewall rules and credentials for compartment access.

Normal System Operation

- **Platform Boot.** The user boots his platform in order to perform arbitrary operations
- **Instantiation and activation of banking compartment.** The user wants to do banking transaction and starts the banking compartment.
- **Derivation and secure storing of Credentials.** The credentials which are sent to the bank are derived from the credentials which have been provided to the user by the bank. The derivation involves some additional secret which is obtained via a secure connection from the bank.
- **User Authentication with Derived Credentials.** The derived credentials are presented to the bank for authentication in an automated process that does not involve the user.
- **Stopping the Banking Compartment:** The user disables interactions of the compartment and the compartment is unloaded by the hypervisor.

Prevention of Phishing attacks

- **Phishing Attack without derived credentials (and without Secure Storage)** A phishing mail tries to direct the user to a forged banking website. When following the link contained in the mail, the browser of the untrusted compartment looks visually different from the one in the trusted compartment.
- **Phishing Attack with Derived Credentials (and Secure Storage).** Attack scenario as above. The user is protected by using derived credentials. As the original credentials he got from the bank are not transferred, no useful authorization data is disclosed to the phisher.

Handling of malicious modifications

- **Modifications of the trusted compartment.** Modification of the banking software to be run in a trusted compartment.
- **Start of modified compartment.** A trusted compartment starts up, but no transaction should be possible because the modified software gets noticed. The proper detection of a modification as early as possible and thus prevention of further harm to the end user is an absolute requirement for wide acceptance of e-banking.

- **Modifications in untrusted compartment.** This use case reflects the current situation in personal computing: unwanted software silently taking control of his PC.
- **Startup trusted compartment from untrusted insecure one.** Demonstrate switch from known insecure compartment to the secure and safe banking one.

5.1.5 Security Objectives and Security Requirements

The implementation of the application scenario has to fulfil the following security objectives and requirements. They address the identified security environment aspects; reflect the stated intent, counter all identified threats and cover all identified organizational security policies and assumptions.

- **No unauthorized use of compartments.** Unauthorized entities must not be able to execute applications within protected compartments.
- **No unauthorized change of compartment properties.** Unauthorized entities must not be able to change properties of the software, configuration, and information flow policy of a compartment.
- **Secure connection between client platform and banking server.** Connection between client and bank must not be eavesdropped or manipulated in any way. Furthermore, the end points of the connection i.e. the bank server and the client must be non-ambiguous authenticated.
- **Attestation of the client.** The client (user's platform) must attest that it has not been manipulated.
- **Identification of trusted compartment.** The user shall be able to tell the difference between the trusted from the untrusted compartment.
- **Attestation of the bank (optional, extended version).** The banking gateway must attest that it has not been manipulated.

The TCB should be protected from manipulations to guarantee the enforcement of security policies.

The following functional and assurance security requirements should be satisfied by the product and the supporting evidence for its evaluation in order to meet the security objectives:

- **Confidentiality and integrity of application/data.** This requirement should hold during execution and storage.
- **Trusted path to user.** The inputs/outputs of the application a user interacts with should be protected from unauthorized access by other applications.
- **Trusted channel between trusted compartment and external parties.**
- **Non-ambiguous distinction of trusted and untrusted compartments.** A secure, non ambiguous signalling mechanism is required that clearly identifies the compartment the user is working with.
- **Secure compartment activation facility.** A mechanism to securely start compartments and to switch between them is required.

5.2 Trusted Virtual Datacenter

This part of the document summarizes the trusted virtual data center application scenario; a more detailed version is available in OpenTC document IST-027635 (“Virtual Data Center”) provided by IBM and HPLB.

5.2.1 Problem Scenario

The trusted virtual data center application scenario illustrates the provisioning of physical resources in a data center to customers' virtual infrastructures while satisfying strong security requirements to ensure the level of security is comparable to physically separate servers. The scenario is intended to demonstrate the cross-platform security management framework for managing multiple machines. The goal is to show that trusted virtualization in a data center can improve security assurances for the outsourcing company while maintaining the advantages of virtualization, namely increased utilization and more efficient allocation of resources, improved flexibility and adaptability, and decreased expenses.




Figure 1: Mapping Virtual Infrastructures to Physical Resources in a Data Center

In this scenario, we are interested in the management of security policies, network connectivity, and information flow policies for clusters of virtual machines belonging to multiple outsourcing companies with potentially conflicting interests. The management entity must be designed to ensure transparent migration of virtual machines (potentially needed for dynamic load balancing, improved resource utilization) while meeting security/flow policies. Virtual machines must be isolated from crashes, errors, transient failures, malware, and other "bad" things on other virtual machines. The management entity must be capable of dynamically rebooting, creating, and destroying virtual machines and interconnections among them.

To provide context for the rest of the description of the trusted virtual data center scenario, we first describe the various actors in the scenario and the roles they perform.

5.2.2 Security Environment

5.2.2.1 Assumptions

- **Correct hardware:** The underlying hardware (e.g., CPU, devices, TPM, ...) is non-malicious and behaves as specified. Optionally, the correct properties of the hardware can be attested by a node or platform certificate. Network cables are plugged into the right ports in hardware switches. More generally, the hardware configuration of the system is assumed to be "safe".
- **No physical man-in-the-middle attack:** An attack that relays the whole communication between users (administrators or customers) and the platform to another device by inserting a dummy device must not happen.
- **Trusted Administrator:** The standard services for compartment administration and platform management must be trusted to act in accordance with the wishes of compartment owners, since they have to access security-critical information. A certain amount of trust on the data center administrator seems inevitable.
- **Management Entity as One Logical Unit:** The management entity is logically a single entity, providing a unified interface to the outside world.
- **Differing Trust Levels for Administrators of Virtual Infrastructure and Physical Infrastructure:** The service provider trusts its own administrator (virtual infrastructure administrator) more than the data center administrator.
- **Trust on TCB:** The TCB (including the chain of components from the hardware TPMs up to the management entity) is trusted.

5.2.2.2 Threats

- **Spoofing of authentication information:** An adversary may try to eavesdrop the authentication information of service providers.
- **Trojan horse:** An adversary may try to eavesdrop confidential information from a compartment by inserting a Trojan horse application that looks like a legitimate part of the compartment's applications, services, or configuration.
- **Faked component identities and credentials:** Adversary components may try to interact with service components hosted in customer compartments by presenting faked identities and credentials, stating that they are part of the customer's service.
- **TCB manipulation:** An adversary may try to violate security policies by maliciously manipulating software-components of the TCB. Examples are manipulations of the boot loader or the security kernel. Alternatively, the adversary tries to bootstrap an alternative (untrusted) security kernel.
- **Malicious device drivers:** An adversary may try to manipulate device drivers such that hardware functions (e.g., direct memory access) can be used to violate security policies.
- **Denial of Service:** An adversary may try to prevent that authorized users can use a protected domain by denial of service attacks against the Legacy OS. He also may attempt to deliberately provoke changes of the trust state of the

secure OS environment, thereby preventing it to operate on data protected by access control that requires compartment integrity properties.

- **Unauthorized resource sharing:** An adversary with platform administration privileges may try to eavesdrop data from a compartment A by allowing other platform components to access A's memory space or persistent storage.
- **Unauthorized changes of information flow policy:** An adversary with platform administration privileges may try to change the information flow policy of a customer's compartment, thereby allowing interactions with defined or arbitrary components that can reside on the same node, on another node inside the datacenter, or outside of the datacenter.
- **Unauthorized Actions by Data Center Administrator:** The data center administrator may replace software components (such as the management entity) with malicious ones, change the configuration of the whole system to an unsafe configuration, or migrate the VM to hosts that are not part of the data center.
- **Theft of VM Image:** by data center operator or administrator, from the network while migration (through sniffing), or by obtaining a copy of the physical hard disk.
- **Process Impersonation:** Impersonation with respect to the platform. e.g., impersonating the automated software update procedure.
- **Bugs in Management Entity:** Software bugs in the management component can be exploited as vulnerabilities, potentially leading to control of the entire physical infrastructure by an adversary.

5.2.3 Functional Requirements

5.2.3.1 Goal

The general idea underlying our architecture is to establish various compartments on one computing platform where each compartment can have its own security policy. The policy defines

- the protection level for the data accessed and processed in a compartment as well as for the applications that run in this compartment, and
- the information flow between individual compartments as well as between the compartments and external parties.

The primary goal is that each compartment behaves as if it is a single platform separated from other compartments.

A secondary, mid-term goal is to provide compartments with identities, isolation and protection properties that can be kept 'alive': it should be possible to 'hibernate' a compartment and its protected resources. At a later stage, it should be possible to re-instantiate the hibernated compartment in an execution environment that has security properties equivalent to the original one. Ultimately, this would allow to 'migrate' a compartment before changes to the platform's trust state actually take place.

5.2.3.2 Target Groups

- Datacenter operators
- Software service providers
- Software service consumers
- P2P/GRID operators and service providers

5.2.3.3 Roles and Actors

Infrastructure Owner: also referred to as *infrastructure provider or platform owner*. The infrastructure owner provides virtualized computing resources. This entity defines the allowed configurations of the underlying platform and the shared network and storage infrastructure. Note that this also includes (re-)configuration of infrastructure elements and certain changes to the platform's configuration. The platform owner is also owner of the TPM and thus is aware of the TPM owner authorization information. Typical example is a data center represented by an infrastructure administrator.

Infrastructure User: also referred to as *computing service provider or infrastructure customer*. This entity uses the virtualized resources allocated to him by the infrastructure provider. Permitted interactions between infrastructure user and virtualized resources are defined in Service Level Agreements (SLAs). These SLAs may include specific information flow and protection policies for user components. In technical terms, the usage and interaction of virtualized resources is constrained by a compartment policy and that of the underlying platform. An example is a distributed rendering service running on top an infrastructure provided by a datacenter operator or by a P2P network. Infrastructure Provider and Computing Service Provider might be identical in simplified scenarios.

End User: also referred to as *service consumer*. The end user is an entity that consumes the service offered by the computing service provider.

Verifier: The verifier an entity that is interested in verifying properties of a platform or a compartment. This can be the infrastructure owner, the infrastructure user, an end user, or another party. The verifier can be remote, local to the data center, local to the service, or local to the node. The verifier is typically represented by a software component implementing an automated decision process; however, interactive verification is permitted. Platform and compartment policies may define which properties to verify. Disclosure of properties to the verifier may be subject to policies of the attester.

Attester: The attester is an entity that reports about a platform or compartment in response to a request of a verifier. More concretely, an attester may issue qualitative or quantitative statements regarding a platform or a compartment, or he can confirm that certain statements correspond to recorded state information. For instance a binary attester determines/measures the configuration of a platform according to a certain metric. An example of a *local attester* is a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), or a combination of a TPM and a software component hosting a machine to be attested. An example of a *distributed attester* is a software agent that gathers, evaluates and compiles attestation information from all nodes and compartments that are required for a composite service.

Legacy OS: The Legacy OS is the default operating system running inside a compartment.

Configuration Database: database operated by the Infrastructure Provider that contains up-to-date information about node characteristics: unique identifier, MAC/IP addresses, hardware characteristics, TPM endorsement key/certificate, platform attestation identity certificate (AIK).

Data Center CA: Certificated Authority operated by the Infrastructure Provider. The DCA can certify AIKs and legacy keys for secure protocols such as SSL and ssh.

5.2.4 Description of Use Cases

The use cases are separated into three subsets, namely

1. System initialization and bootstrapping,
2. Configuration Management, and
3. User-level use cases.

5.2.4.1 System initialization and bootstrapping

- **Node bootstrapping:** The platform owner boots a management image on a node to configure basic platform parameters.
- **System Initialization:** The platform owner sets initial platform values.
- **Take Ownership:** The platform owner (infrastructure provider) takes ownership over the TPM.
- **Platform AIK generation:** The platform owner (infrastructure provider) installs an AIK.
- **Build infrastructure service image:** The infrastructure provider/platform owner builds a service image including virtualization layer, management and driver domains, and management software.
- **Boot infrastructure service image:** The platform owner creates a service platform ready to host customer components.
- **Create Legacy Keys:** The owner creates and certifies key pairs for secure network protocols. Keys are bound to the platform.

5.2.4.2 Configuration Management

- **Create Service Management VM:** The infrastructure owner creates a dedicated management compartment for a customer. Services and interfaces hosted by this compartment concern the definition of virtual services from collaborating components, allocation of resources and deployment of service components to customer compartments.
- **Define Compartment:** The prospective owner of a compartment defines the properties (software components configuration, policies).
- **Register Compartment:** The prospective owner of a compartment instantiates a compartment image.
- **Start Compartment (Policy Enforcement):** The compartment owner enables interactions of the compartment that are subjected to its information flow policy.

- **Stop Compartment (Policy Enforcement):** The compartment owner disables interactions of the compartment that are subjected to its information flow policy
- **Unregister Compartment:** The compartment owner terminates the compartment.
- **Change Compartment (Policy Enforcement):** Changes compartment properties.
- **Report compartment state:** Quotes state of compartment, might include information of platform (HW) TPM, virtual TPM allocated to compartment, and audits from security monitors that are part of the platform TCB
- **Report platform state:** Quotes state of hardware TPM, might include audits from security monitors that are part of the platform TCB
- **Create Service Management VM:** The infrastructure owner creates a dedicated management access point for a customer running in a compartment. Services and interfaces hosted by this compartment concern the definition of virtual services from collaborating components, allocation of resources and deployment of service components to customer compartments.

5.2.4.3 User-level use cases

- **Open Session:** The user wishes to use another compartment.
- **Close Session:** The user wishes to end a session with a compartment.

5.2.5 Security Objectives and Security Requirements

The implementation of the application scenario has to fulfil the following security objectives and requirements.

5.2.5.1 Security Objectives

- **Separability:** The use of different security-critical applications based on the OpenTC security architecture has to be at least as secure as the execution of the same applications on physically separated computing platforms connected via a network.
- **No unauthorized use of compartments:** Unauthorized entities must not be able to execute applications within protected compartments.
- **No unauthorized change of compartment properties:** Unauthorized entities must not be able to change properties of the software, configuration, and information flow policy of a compartment.

5.2.5.2 Security Requirements

- **Integrity of the TCB:** The TCB should be protected from manipulations to guarantee the enforcement of security policies.
- **Confidentiality and integrity of application/data:** This requirement should hold during execution and storage.
- **Trusted path to user:** The inputs/outputs of the application a user interacts with should be protected from unauthorized access by applications running in

other compartments.

- **Trusted channel between trusted compartment and external parties:** Information flow between a trusted compartment and external parties must be protected from unauthorized access.
- **Information flow:** The information flow policies between different compartments (both local to the hardware platform and on remote platforms) must be satisfied.

5.3 Corporate Computing at Home

Existing computing platforms cannot provide a secure environment to protect security critical data/applications against attacks by malicious applications/processes. This problem concerns many different application scenarios in private and business areas.

Here, we focus on a special case of the compartmented workstation scenario, corporate computing at home: an employee of a company is performing corporate tasks on her home PC. This part summarizes the scenario; a more detailed version is available in OpenTC document “otcW05-01-Compartmented Security” provided by RUB.

5.3.1 Problem Scenario

In the given scenario, the employee is interested in protecting her private data (taxes, medical, financial, web browsing history etc.). She requires the assurance that her sensitive information can only be accessed by applications she trusts. In particular, applications of the company running on her PC must not be able to access her private data.

The company, on the other hand, is interested in controlling access to and handling of critical information (e.g., classified documents, contracts, content) securely, i.e., protecting it from non-cleared usage. The employee should not be able to circumvent control mechanisms by using available functions for her own purpose, or by exploiting security weaknesses of existing software components.

In general, each party desires to enforce its own security policy on the platform. The security architecture underlying the application scenario will provide functionalities that allow secure enforcement of both policies.

The general idea is to establish two compartments assigned to trust domains on the platform where each compartment can have its own security policy. The policy defines

- the protection level for the data accessed and processed in a compartment as well as for the applications that run in this compartment, and
- the information flow between individual compartments as well as between the compartments and external parties.

The goal is that each trust domain behaves as if it is a single platform separated from other trust domains.

One trust domain is assigned to the employee (for private computing usage) and one to the company (for corporate tasks that the employee performs at home). From the employee's perspective, her compartment is trustworthy and the company's compartment is untrustworthy. She therefore executes all privacy-critical applications

in the trustworthy domain, while company related applications, e.g., editing corporate office documents, are done in the untrusted one. Of course, inversely, the company does not trust the employee's compartment.




Figure 2: Diagram of the platform architecture

5.3.2 Security Environment

Concerning the environment of the application scenario, it has to be considered which kinds of theoretically possible attacks are realistic and which are not. In our concrete case, we can assume that certain attacks do not occur; therefore, we explicitly exclude them from examination. Furthermore, we define a list of realistic threats to the assets against which specific protection within the product or its environment is required.

The following assumptions describe the security aspects of the environment in which the product will be used or is intended to be used:

- **Correct hardware.** The underlying hardware (e.g., CPU, devices, TPM,...) is non-malicious and behaves as specified.
- **No physical man-in-the-middle attack.** An attack using a dummy device that relays the whole communication between the user and the platform to another device must not happen.
- **Trusted Administrator.** The compartment administrator of the system must be trusted to act according to the owner's wishes, since she will have access to all security-critical information.
- **Physical attacks.** Physical attacks against the underlying hardware platform must not happen.

The following threats are realistic in our application scenario and have to be taken care of by the OpenTC security architecture:

- **Spoofing of authentication information.** An adversary may try to eavesdrop the user authentication information.
- **Trojan horse.** An adversary may try to eavesdrop confidential information by deceiving users by a Trojan horse application that looks like a secure application.
- **Faked identity.** An adversary may try to bypass control mechanisms by providing a faked identity.
- **Trusted Computing Base (TCB) manipulation.** An adversary may try to violate security policies by maliciously manipulating software-components of the TCB. Examples are manipulations of the bootloader or the security kernel. Alternatively, the adversary tries to bootstrap an alternative (untrusted) security kernel.
- **Malicious device drivers.** An adversary may try to manipulate device drivers such that hardware functions (e.g., direct memory access) can be used to violate security policies.
- **Denial of Service.** An adversary may try to prevent that authorized users can use a protected domain by denial of service attacks against the Legacy OS.

5.3.3 Functional Requirements

5.3.3.1 Goal

The general idea is to establish various compartments on one computing platform where each compartment can have its own security policy. The policy defines

- the protection level for the data accessed and processed in a compartment as well as for the applications that run in this compartment, and
- the information flow between individual compartments as well as between the compartments and external parties.

The goal is that each compartment behaves as if it is a single platform separated from other compartments.

5.3.3.2 Target Groups

Target groups are companies and their employees. By means of the OpenTC security architecture, employees are enabled to securely perform corporate tasks on their home PC.

5.3.3.3 Roles and Actors

In this section we define different roles and actors important for the use case model.

- **Owner:** The owner of a platform is an entity who defines the allowed configurations of the underlying platform. Note that this also includes certain changes to the platform's configuration. In practice, these changes are patches/updates. The platform owner is also the owner of the TPM and thus is

aware of the owner authorization information.

- **User:** The user of a computing platform is an entity interacting with the platform under the platform's security policy. In our application scenario, user and owner are typically both personified by the employee.
- **Verifier:** The verifier is interested in verifying a certain property of a platform. This party can be a local user or a remote party.
- **Attestor:** The attestor is a machine that reports about a client machine in response to the request of a verifying machine. More concretely, the attestor may confirm a certain statement or quantity of this machine. For instance a binary attestor determines/measures the configuration of a client machine according to a certain metric. An attestor can be local, i.e., located on the platform or it can be distributed. An example of an attestor is a Trusted Platform Module (TPM), or a combination of a TPM and a software component hosting a machine to be attested.
- **Legacy OS:** The Legacy OS is the default operating system that is used by the user. It is executed within its own compartment.

5.3.4 Description of Use Cases

From a user's (employee's) perspective, this section gives a short and limited description of the use cases for the “Compartmented Workstation (Corporate Computing at Home)” application scenario. For a detailed view, refer to OpenTC document “*otcW05-01-Compartmented Security*”.

- **Bootstrapping.** The owner boots the OpenTC security architecture from CD-ROM. After completion, the applications of the OpenTC security architecture can be used.
- **System Initialization.** The platform owner sets the initial platform values. After completion, initialization values, an owner secret, and a default user have been set.
- **Take Ownership.** The platform owner takes ownership of the TPM of the hardware platform. After completion, the TPM has a valid owner.
- **Register Compartment.** The owner defines the properties of a new compartment to be executed by users. After completion, the registered compartment can be executed by authorized users as described.
- **Unregister Compartment.** The owner removes a compartment from the list of valid compartments. After completion, the compartment cannot be used any more.
- **Change Compartment.** The owner changes the configuration of a compartment.
- **Private Computing.** The user (employee) executes her private applications within an isolated compartment.
- **Corporate Computing.** The user (employee) executes tasks for her company within another isolated compartment, which is assigned to the company.

5.3.5 Security Objectives and Security Requirements

The implementation of the application scenario has to fulfil the security objectives and requirements that are listed in the following. They are crucial for both involved parties, company and employee.

The security objectives address the identified security environment aspects; they reflect the stated intent and counter all identified threats and cover all identified organizational security policies and assumptions:

- **Separability.** The use of different security-critical applications based on the OpenTC security architecture has to be at least as secure as the execution of the same applications on physically separated computing platforms connected via network.
- **No unauthorized use of compartments.** Unauthorized entities must not be able to execute applications within protected compartments.

The security requirements have to be satisfied by the product; they define the functional and assurance security requirements that the product and the supporting evidence for its evaluation need to satisfy in order to meet the security objectives.

- **Integrity of the TCB.** The TCB should be protected from manipulations to guarantee the enforcement of security policies.
- **Confidentiality and integrity of application/data.** This requirement should hold during execution and storage.
- **Trusted path to user.** The inputs/outputs of the application a user interacts with should be protected from unauthorized access by other applications.
- **Trusted channel between trusted compartment and external parties.** The communication channel between the company and its trusted compartment on the employee's home PC should provide confidentiality, authenticity and integrity.

6 Workpackage Structure and Relationships

In line with the Technical Annex, this specification covers workpackages 3-8. The relationships between these work packages are depicted in Figure 3




Figure 3: Dependencies between OpenTC workpackages

Workpackage 3 (Basic Interfaces and Trust Layer) leverages TC hardware mechanisms for boot loader and operating system. It includes the development of a basic driver and software stack for Linux, L4 and Xen, the provision of TC functionality via PKCS#11, and its integration in standard cryptographic protocols. Furthermore, it addresses isolation and bootstrapping features of new CPU types with trusted operating system layers.

Workpackage 4 (Trusted OS development) designs and implements trusted OS layers on the basis of L4 and Xen. It provides a common set of basic Trusted Computing mechanisms in a OS-independent way through a common management interface.

Workpackage 5 (Security Management and Infrastructure) designs and implements security services on top of trusted OS layers. This concerns services for local platform configuration as well as for managing collections of trusted platforms.

Workpackage 6 (Test/Prototype Applications for Proof-of-Concept and Use

Examples) designs and implements a set of applications that exploit mechanisms provided by the TC hardware and the trusted OS layer for application scenarios.

Workpackage 7 (Software development support, quality evaluation and certification) investigates the question of how to ensure trustworthiness of trusted platforms from the angles of testing, formal analysis and methodology.

Workpackage 8 (Trusted Computing for embedded controllers and mobile phones) will provide a proof-of-concept for porting one of the trusted OS layers (L4) to a mobile phone base controller, exploiting results from all Workpackages mentioned above.

The next chapter gives a high-level overview of the OpenTC architecture. This is followed by describing the specific goals and approach for each Workpackage in dedicated chapters.

7 High Level Architecture Overview

OpenTC provides secure virtualization and Trusted Computing (TC) technologies in order to increasing the security of operating systems and applications.

Our central goal is an architecture that combines Trusted Computing hardware and platforms on the one hand and Operating System virtualization technology on the other, allowing to isolate and secure execution environments for applications. In addition to this, an application can make use of TC features in the traditional way, that is, directly through device or library interfaces to the Trusted Computing Module (TPM) or Trusted Software Stack (TSS).

This chapter gives an overview of the architecture. We will first outline the central characteristics of virtualization and motivate how to complement them with Trusted Computing mechanisms. This is followed by a description of the architecture, its main software components and its trusted computing base, and a summary overview of important components and services.

7.1 Motivation

In virtualized architectures, operating systems are hosted by a *Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM)* or *hypervisor*, a thin software layer that allows to run multiple independent instances of (potentially different) Operating Systems in parallel. These OS instances – typically referred to as *Virtual Machines (VMs)* – are isolated against each other: the VMM guarantees that VMs can only act within the boundaries of their defined execution environment (*compartment*).

The main hypervisor task is to share and schedule resources of the underlying hardware platform between multiple hosted VMs. From a trust and security perspective, it is of importance that access of VMs to resources can be subjected to access control mechanisms built into the hypervisor. These mechanisms can effectively be employed to control how a VM interacts with the 'outside world' – that is, with resources and other VMs on the platform as well as with physically remote entities.

The VMM features mentioned above – compartmentalization, access controlled resource sharing and information flow policing – offer core functionality that can be exploited for computer security architectures. From a risk management perspective, virtualization constrains the potential damage that can be caused by attacks on any hosted VM. A successful attack on a VM does not lead to the subversion of the whole platform (which would be the case if the OS would run directly on the hardware), nor are other hosted OS instances affected. Security critical platform management functions can be separated out to run in compartments with locked-down OS versions, thereby minimizing their exposure to attacks.

With *mandatory control mechanisms* supported at the hypervisor layer, VMs and software executed by them can be turned into appliance-like entities that operate in execution environments with defined security properties. This makes it possible to treat VMs as sandboxes or *compartments* with individual access control and information flow policies attached to them. For example, the environment may inhibit modification or inspection of executed code or processed data during runtime. In this case, assurances may be required that the hypervisor provides no (or only strictly controlled and audited) mechanisms to override a compartment policy.

This is where Trusted Computing technology as defined by Trusted Computing Group (TCG) comes into play. TCG technology makes it possible to audit startup and configuration and to attest to the auditing log, in a trustworthy and verifiable manner. Furthermore, TCG hardware can protect cryptographic secrets from being accessed in an untrusted environment. The OpenTC architecture for Open Trusted Virtualization exploits these mechanisms amongst others.

7.2 Trusted Virtualization Platform Architecture

This section gives an overview of the architecture that is present on a single platform (physical machine). Minimum platform prerequisite is an X86 architecture with an integrated Trusted Platform module (TPM) and BIOS support for TPM-assisted trusted boot. An optional prerequisite are next generation CPU and chipset support for virtualization as provided e.g. by AMD's *Pacifica* architecture.

7.2.1 Main Components

A trusted virtualization platform includes the following software components

- **Support for Trusted Platform Boot.**

During Bootup, integrity metrics of the platform's Trusted Computing Base are generated and logged into the Trusted Computing Module. They can be retrieved for attestation purposes.

- **Platform Security Kernel.** The platform's Trusted Computing base includes
 - the virtualization layer (hypervisor, VMM),
 - its configuration and policies,
 - management components and platform-wide security services.

During platform initialization, integrity metrics of these components are generated and logged into the Trusted Platform Module. They can be retrieved for attestation purposes.

- **Virtual Machines.** These OS instances that have been booted and initialized by the platform security kernel and are hosted by the virtualization layer.

Prior to their execution, these virtual machines might be checked for their integrity in a process that is similar to the platform's trusted boot process. In this case, Security Kernel component generates integrity metrics for the hosted OS instances and logs them into the hardware TPM or a dedicated and properly protected virtual TPM. The metrics can be retrieved for attestation purposes.

Virtual machines are stored on and launched from disk images that include the OS and all applications that can run under its control. VM access to platform resources and interactions with other VMs are controlled by elements of the security kernel. The architecture may employ one or more dedicated VMs for direct support of the Platform Security Kernel. This is discussed later in this chapter with regard to hosting hardware drivers and security services.

The current OpenTC architecture is based on *paravirtualization*. This approach requires active co-operation of the hosted OS, which makes it necessary to modify the original OS accordingly. In future, hardware support for virtualization provided by next generation X86 CPUs and chipsets will allow to run unmodified OS versions. User

applications, on the other hand, do not have to be modified. Irrespective of the approach to virtualization they can be executed in their original form.




Figure 4: High Level OpenTC Architecture (idealized logical view)

An idealized, layered view of the OpenTC platform architecture is depicted in Figure 4.

7.2.2 Trusted Computing Base

Virtualization introduces an additional level of control and isolation at the level of hosted VMs. Operating system instances can be subjected to information flow policies enforced by the underlying layer. In conjunction with the platform hardware, this layer constitutes the Trusted Computing Base (TCB). As a general rule, it is desirable to minimize the TCB.

To this end, the virtualization mechanism, its management components and platform-wide trusted services should preferably be self-contained without relying on support of a full-fledged host OS. It is possible to design the architecture to honour this principle: in addition to hosting OS instances, both virtualization layers used in OpenTC (L4 and XEN) allow to run generic tasks directly on top. In particular, the design of L4 would allow a very close approximation of the idealized architecture in Figure 4.

Nevertheless, there are strong arguments in favour of hosting OpenTC security components inside an OS. Firstly, this concerns the availability of hardware drivers. Both L4 and XEN can interface drivers that are integral parts of a hosted Linux VM. This approach requires only minimal modifications to the original Linux drivers to make them usable for the hypervisor – a much preferred alternative to developing generic drivers for the hypervisor layer from scratch. Second, it makes it possible to employ helper applications (in particular, scripting tools) for booting and configuring VMs. In the absence of such tools, generic applications have to be written for the hypervisor layer; each minor modification requires re-compilation. This complicates the development process and makes system administration more difficult.




Figure 5: VM-hosted Security services

Figure 5 shows how the idealized architecture could be mapped if security components and drivers are to be hosted by a VM that is part of the security kernel. While advantages for development and configuration suggest this alternative for the first phase of OpenTC, an evolutionary approach will be investigated to strike a balance between a security centric view emphasizing the reduction of the Trusted




Figure 6: VM-hosted to generic Security Service

Computing Base and practical considerations about system development and administration.

Abstract interface definitions may allow us to rebuild Linux hosted components as tasks running generically on the virtualization layer. TCB minimization could thereby be achieved in a stepwise fashion. This approach is depicted in Figure 6.

7.2.3 Component and Service Layering

This section outlines where the components produced by Workpackages 3, 4 and 5 reside in the OpenTC architecture. For a detailed discussion of these components, the reader should consult the corresponding chapters on these Workpackages.

7.2.3.1 Hardware and Virtualization Layer

Secure Boot/Secure Initialization. For traditional X86 CPUs, this functionality can be provided by a boot loader that supports Trusted Computing hardware. With next generation X86 CPUs, it will be possible to invoke secure initialization from an ordinary boot loader or as integral step of starting the virtualization layer (see description of SWP3a).

Hardware Virtualization Abstraction Interface. This component supports to run paravirtualized or unmodified guest operation systems hosted by the virtualization layer. The implementation will be adapted for the XEN and L4 hypervisors (SWP3a).

Virtual Machine Monitors / Hypervisors. OpenTC explores two different hypervisor architectures (L4 and XEN) for hosting instances of the Linux operating system. (SWP 4c/d).

7.2.3.2 Trusted Software Layer

The components in this section will typically be hosted by a management domain (provided by a dedicated Linux VM). As discussed in the previous chapter, we will explore an evolutionary path of migrating such components to generic hypervisor tasks where appropriate.

Platform Support and Management Components

Trusted Platform Driver. This driver provides the interface to the Trusted Platform Module hardware. Access to the TPM-driver is intermediated by a security service of the trusted software stack.

TSS Services: This component implements a service interface between the Trusted Platform Driver and higher level services and application (SWP3b).

Basic Management Interface. This component offers a unified view on basic management operations for both hypervisors (XEN / L4). Its first instance provides a common set of user commands. Later instances will extend this to lower system levels (library API or kernel interface).

TPM Virtualization. In a virtualized environment, each hosted operating system may require a dedicated Trusted Platform Module (TPM). This can be achieved by providing virtual instances for TPMs – effectively the functionality of hardware TPMs simulated by software (SWP4b).

TPM enabled cryptographic protocols and services. Existing security protocols and components (ssh, SSL and IPSec, PKCS#11) extended to use the TPM as cryptographic and key storage device. (SWP3c)

TPM enabled JAVA VM. A JAVA environment that allows easy integration of TCG features into JAVA-based applications (SWP3d).

Trusted Platform Services. As part of the trusted software layer, these services use the functionality offered by the hardware and virtualization layer to implement security requirements of the secure computing platform. It also includes functions for local platform management (SWP5a).

Infrastructure Support and Management Components

Security Management Services. As part of the trusted software layer, these services support platform and compartment management on behalf of a local or remote management entity (SWP5c).

Key Management Support. User side key management, key and certificate exchange protocols aware of additional trusted computing features, services for identity creation, revocation and verification of credentials, Trusted Computing enabled PKI (SWP5d).

7.2.4 Applications

At this stage, we do not envisage any of the applications to become part of the core architecture. They serve the threefold purpose of i) demonstrating the benefits of Trusted Computing hardware at the application layer, ii) producing requirements for services in the Trusted Software Layer, and iii) serve as a prototypic environment to validate concepts and services of the OpenTC architecture. For a more detailed overview, the reader should refer to the chapter describing WP6.

7.2.5 Development Support

Potential implications of development support, quality assurance and evaluation are under investigation. Activities and approaches can be found in the chapter describing WP7.

8 Workpackage 03: Basic Interface and Trust Layers

This Workpackage provides the interfaces to the trusted computing hardware according to the requirements of unified SW APIs. It separates functions of the platform's enhanced main processor, the platform security module (TPM) and relevant peripherals from those of the required abstract SW layer. It comprises four main tasks listed below.

TC enhanced CPUs

Next generation x86 CPUs such as AMD's *Pacifica* and INTEL's *Vanderpool* processors have been designed to leverage concepts of Trusted Computing. In addition, they include functionality for hardware-supported virtualization. This allows for substantial improvements when implementing security and protection features required for Trusted Computing architectures in general and TC hardware support in particular. The implementation of the corresponding software components will become easier with virtualization support built into the CPUs, and it allows to migrate resource management into user space and to encapsulate runtime environments.

OpenTC aims at producing a vendors-neutral solution that allows for broad and universal access to TC on all standard platforms. Cambridge University Computer Laboratory (CUCL) maintains an open research cooperation with INTEL and will adopt their virtualization layer XEN to support the new CPU architecture. This work is performed outside of OpenTC's project activities. In the past, however, all results have been made publicly accessible under Open Source licenses. We expect this to be the case in future, too. The solutions built by OpenTC can be expected to reflect the specifics of both CPU architectures

TCG Software Stack (TSS)

The TCG Software Stack (the TSS) includes driver and interface software on TPM-equipped platforms. Its specification was produced by the Trusted Computing Group and is publicly available (TCG 2005a). The project we will adapt the TSS for Linux as well as for the trusted OS layer based on L4 and XEN.

TPM-enabling widely available crypto interfaces and basic crypto services

Trusted Computing hardware offers key protection mechanisms, cryptographic functions, and authentication features that can strengthen the implementation of standard security protocols such as SSL and SSH. We will extend the widely deployed, full-strength open source implementations of these protocols (OpenSSH and OpenSSL) and their cryptographic libraries. A PKCS#11 module and IPsec tools for Linux will be adapted to use the TPM for key storage protection and as hardware crypto device. We will define and implement a privacy enhancement of the SSL/TLS protocols and perform a study about privacy enhancement of the IKE/ISAKMP protocols.

JAVA Integration

Given the importance of JAVA for management components, web services or mobile applications, it is essential to interface and support TCG / TPM technology under Java.

8.1 SWP 3a: Trusted Computing enhanced CPUs

AMD will provide support to adapt the trusted OS layers to the AMD *Pacifica* processor virtualization extensions and *Presidio* platform-level security extensions according to the evolving requirements. In particular, this concerns the development of a CPU hardware interface layer and a low level virtualization with security package, allowing for easy use and development of this new technology to support TC issues.

Virtualization refers to the creation of one or more execution environments on the same machine each of which mirrors the original platform in order to make the respective operating system believe it was exclusively running on a real platform. This approach has several advantages over the traditional way to share the resources of a platform and enables a variety of valuable applications such as the simultaneous execution of multiple operating systems or server sharing.

Together with hardware security features such as secure initialization this can address the vast challenge of computer security present in today's computer platforms. Potentially untrusted software or operating systems can run in a sandbox like environment with complete separation from the rest of the system.

The traditional approach to implement virtualization are based on a complicated virtual machine monitor running on top of the operating system. In contrast to that, more modern para-virtualization introduces a very thin hypervisor layer which manages the virtual machines and provides most basic operating system functionalities and an interface for the guest operating systems running inside the virtual machine. Here, the operating systems are modified for the virtual machine to reuse infrastructure of the management software called virtual machine monitor (VMM) or hypervisor. This para-virtualization leads to a significant performance improvement but incorporates the disadvantage of needing to modify the requested operating system. This is especially a problem for proprietary operating systems.

Hardware virtualization features can extend the hypervisor based solution by supporting unmodified operating systems and further improving performance. Thus the disadvantages of traditional and hypervisor based software virtualization can be overcome with special hardware features of the processor.

8.1.1 Requirements Breakdown

AMD's secure virtual machine (SVM) technology consists of hardware extensions for virtual machine monitors (VMM) and security enhancements of the overall x86 platform.

For support of unmodified operating systems inside a virtual machine SVM provides a new guest execution environment that enforces strong isolation between the virtual machines and the VMM and hence enables protected compartments on the system. All actions of the guest OS that might compromise this isolation cause the control of the machine to be transferred back to the VMM.

In order to ensure the trustworthiness of the VMM the SVM extension provides means to establish a Trusted Computing Base (TCB) with a new instruction called SKINIT (secure kernel initialization). This instruction protects, measures using a TPM and executes a so called secure loader (SL).

We will provide secure initialization software which will verify platform validity and establish a TCB. Furthermore low-level interfacing to hardware virtualization is specified.

8.1.2 High-level Specification and Design

8.1.2.1 Hardware Virtualization Abstraction Interface

The SVM technology by AMD comprises several hardware mechanisms for virtual machine monitors or hypervisors to be able to run unmodified guest operating systems. In order to reduce the effort to adapt the VMM to the new technology an abstraction layer is required which hides the complexity of new CPU instructions and structures from the VMM code.

On the other hand existing code for virtualizing components of an x86 CPU and platform should be leveraged as much as possible if they are not explicitly replaced by hardware support.

Therefore this new software entity called Hardware Virtual Machine (HVM) not only provides several C functions and structures but also requires a number of C functions and structures to be exported by the VMM. The functionality is hidden behind a function pointer table and is directly accessed by the VMM.

The HVM shall be responsible for running a guest inside a virtual machine, save and restore its state, handle intercepts and interrupt injection whereas the VMM remains accountable for initializing and managing guests in terms of interrupt and exception handling, shadow page table maintenance and other system services.

8.1.2.2 Secure Initialization Architecture

Additional to virtualization functions the SVM technology also provides security enhancements which can be used to establish a trusted computing base (TCB). The following elements comprise the SVMs support for a TCB:

- Hardware enforced privilege levels
- Strong domain separation
- I/O protection
- Device protection
- Attestable initialization of the TCB software elements
- TPM support

The first four of these elements are directly provided by the SVM guest execution environment. For I/O port and MSR (Machine Specific Register) protection special bitmaps specify the privileges of each guest. Furthermore bus-master peripheral devices are prevented from accessing arbitrary memory by a mechanism called multi-domain device exclusion vector (DEV).

Secure initialization requires immutable hardware components in order to prevent software based attacks. The new SKINIT instruction provides this immutability while retaining the ability to use traditional platform boot mechanisms. This can be achieved since uncontrolled software triggers the secure initialization process which comprises of loading a secure loader (SL) and TCB code into memory and executing the SKINIT instruction.

This instruction will then securely measure and start the secure loader. This measurement is extended to the TPM. It is made sure that no external hardware event

can tamper with or interrupt the secure initialization process.

The software components involved in establishing a TCB are the following and depicted in figure Figure 7.

- SL1, the 64 KB part of the secure loader executed by SKINIT
- SL2, the rest of the secure loader, measured and executed by SL1
- Configuration verification (CV) makes sure the platform configuration is in a known state by using tables which contain platform information and platform specific code

The SL1/2, CV and the secure kernel have to be loaded in the untrusted portion of the boot process. After all I/O operations have been stopped SKINIT instruction is executed which then measures the SL1 using the TPM and executes it. SL1 itself only measures and executes SL2.

SL2 then measures and verifies the configuration verification core and the associated tables and executes the CV core. After the configuration has been verified the secure kernel is measured, verified and initialized.

All measurements are extended to TPM PCRs.




Figure 7: Software Components for TCB

8.1.3 Services of this Layer

8.1.3.1 Hardware Virtualization Abstraction Interface

The HVM will provide the following functions to the VMM or hypervisor:

- Execute a guest using VMRUN instruction
- Handle low-level intercepts
- Inject interrupts/exceptions
- Save state of host and guest
- Provide a soft interrupt mechanism for VMM in order to execute arbitrary VMM code

The VMM on the other hand has to provide the following functions as a fixed API exported to the HVM component:

- Shadow page table management
- Memory and I/O handlers
- IRQ handler
- virtual (A)PIC
- Scheduler

A common structure is defined which holds all information required for a virtual CPU.

8.1.3.2 Secure Initialization

The AMD secure initialization software will provide a dynamic root of trust for measurement (DRTM) and platform validity verification. It is intended to be OS independent and requires a multi-boot secure kernel image.

8.1.4 Dependencies: Required Services from Sub-Layers

The software provided in this Sub Workpackage requires an AMD Athlon™ 64, AMD Turion™ 64 or AMD Opteron™ processor revision F or later. Furthermore a TPM version 1.2 is required.

8.2 SWP 3b: TSS-Stack according to TCG Specification

The TCG main specification defines a subsystem with protected storage and protected capabilities: This subsystem is the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). Since the TPM is both a subsystem intended to provide trust and an inexpensive component, its internal resources have been kept to a minimum. While these limitations reduce production costs and make it easier to verify security properties, it also make it cumbersome to directly interact with the TPM hardware.

The TCG architecture addresses this issue by treating functions that require protected storage capabilities differently from those that don't. Functions that do not directly require hardware protected storage are not implemented in the TPM hardware. They are implemented as software modules that use the abundant resources of the platform's main CPU and memory. These software components provide comprise the TSS.

8.2.1 Requirements Breakdown

Well defined interfaces are a prerequisite for a thorough understanding of TSS structure and allow to easily adapt to future changes of the specification. This is of some importance since the extensions of the original specification are under active development by various TCG working groups. We therefore favour a distributed, modular design where each module implements a functionality that is explicitly defined in the TCG specification. This requires to take the structure specification as a template for the architecture.

8.2.2 High Level Specification and Design

The TSS specification distinguishes TCG Device Driver (TDDL), TSS Core Services (TCS) and TSS Service Provider (TSP) components. The TDDL provides the transition between user and kernel mode and offers a standard library interface to the TPM. The TCS resides in user mode interfacing the TDDL. It is a single instance system service offering access to all TPM primitives and additional functions to efficiently manage the TPM resources. Its main function is to provide a simple interface to functions of the hardware TPM. It must provide single threaded access to the TPM and can support to multiplex the hardware between parallel threads.

The TSP is the topmost layer that will typically be interfaced by applications. The TSP also includes a small number of auxiliary functions. It is intended, although not mandatory, that the TSP obtains TCG services through the TCS. In environments that provide layered protection (for example, by memory rings) or process separation for applications, this module is intended to reside within the same ring and process as the application. Typically, multiple TSP instances will exist on multi-process systems.




Figure 8 : TSS Stack

8.2.3 Services

Trusted Device Driver Library and Interface

The TCG Device Driver Library (TDDL) is an intermediate module between the TCS and the kernel mode TPM Device Driver (TDD). The TDDL will offer a user mode interface. In contrast to a kernel level interface, this approach permits to abstract from OS specifics, ensures the different TSS implementations can communicate with any TPM, and allows TPM vendors to provide a software TPM simulator as a user mode component.

The TDDL is implemented as single-instance, single threaded module. The TDDL expects TPM commands to be serialized, which is typically performed by the TCS. The TPM vendor is responsible for defining the interface between the TDDL and the TCG device driver. The vendor is free in his choice of communication and resource allocation mechanisms between this library on the one hand and a kernel mode TPM device driver or software TPM simulator on the other.

TSS Core Services (TCS)

The following figure gives an overview of the functions to be implemented as part of the TCS. They are explained in more detail in the list below.




Figure 9 : TCG TSS architecture – core service

1. **TCS-Interface-Layer (SOAP-Interface).** The interface to the TCS is the TCS Interface (TCSI). This is a simple 'C' style interface but should be realized in SOAP (Simple Object Access Protocol). While it may allow multithreaded access to the TCS, each operation is intended to be atomic. It resides as a system process, separate from the application and service provider processes. If the environment provides for the TCS to reside in a system process, communication between the service providers and the TCS would be via an RPC.
2. **Persistent-Storage-Access-Component (System).** Component covers the physical access and representation of the TCS persistent storage representation. The TSS specification separates the storage context into a per user boundary and in a system linked one. This functionality and the data representation reflect a TSS (i.e. TSP and TCG) common code component.
3. **Facade-Abstraction-Component.** Component contains a facade factory to generate separate facade objects per calling context. This layer performs the parameter checking for the TCS-Interface.
4. **Synchronization-Helper-Module.** Collection of some small helper classes; encapsulate the native system calls for synchronization object handling.
5. **Logical cache content handling.** Characterize a logical TPM device per connection context and organize logical resource cache management.
6. **Logical TPM Resource handling.** Contain a management class and resource

classes for the two major handled resource types key and authorization sessions. The task is divided into a resource map management and into a resource representation unit.

7. **Setting and Policy access.** Function and class pool to summarize operations used to access and validate setting information.
8. **Extended TPM Resource and access handling.** Characterize a physical TPM device designed as singleton and organize physical resource cache management. Due to the character as single entry point for all TPM operations this layer is responsible for TPM access synchronization.
9. **Error-Handling-Class.** Helper class(es) used in the exception handling process of the TSS components (i.e. TSP and TCS). The structured exception concept will be used for error handling inside of the TSS modules.
10. **Streaming-Helper-Classes.** Helper classes transform TCG structures into BYTE-Stream-Representation and verse versa.
11. **Physical cache strategy and organization.** Contain physical management classes and resource classes for the two major handled resource types key and authorization sessions. The task is divided into a resource map management and into a resource representation unit. In addition this component automatically detects the underlying TPM device version and selects the corresponding physical caching strategy and function set.
12. **Physical-TPM-Command-Module.** Module is responsible for the TPM command stream generation (byte-stream-generator) receiving the response and extracting the response parameter elements.
13. **TPM-Device organize management.** Component includes classes and functionality to handle TPM device specific startup and shutdown procedures. In addition it controls the consistence of the resource management of the TCS.
14. **TPM connection management.** Contain the management classes and functionality to establish the connection to the TPM device. A further task is to setup the power management control handling between Infineon-TPM-Driver and TCS.
15. **Common-Module-Service.** Common functions used for TCS module management (e.g. registration, start and stop).
16. **TCS-Module-Management.** General operations used to administrate and arrange TCS module wide services (e.g. memory handling).
17. **TCG-Core-Service-TPM-Access.** Component covers the physical access and representation of the TDDL communication. Abstraction layer offer the functions to establish, operate and close the TPM communication in a local situation.
18. **TCS-Persistent-Storage (System).** Contain the physical data representation for TCS persistent storage (on per system and access able for all users). The preferred mechanism would be XML based.

TSS Service Provider (TSP)

The following diagram and list gives an overview of the functions that are to be implemented as part of the TSP.




Figure 10 : TCG TSS architecture service provider

1. **TSP-Interface-Layer (C-Interface).** Represents the TSPI of the TSS-Service-Provider and uses the C-Interface notation. Includes the first object access abstraction layer; accomplishing the object oriented nature of the TSP interface. Contains functionality to create and release interface layer objects which are linked to the working layer.
2. **TSP-Working-Objects.** Collection of all TSP related productive objects (e.g. Key, EncData...). Act as a kind of business workflow control for all TCG related transformations and calculations. These operations are performed with assistance of the different specialized support components and classes.
3. **Synchronization-Helper-Module.** Collection of some small helper classes; encapsulate the native system calls for synchronization object handling.
4. **Setting and Policy Access.** Function and class pool to summarize operations used to access and validate setting information.
5. **Authorization-Handling-Component.** Component contains the knowledge and TPM command parameter data for the authorization data stream construction. This unit interacts with the TSP-Policy-Class from the TSP-Working-Object and the Auth-Session-Handling module to calculate the authorization (e.g. HMAC) data package. It interacts as a kind of instrumentation factor for the TCG authorization flow.
6. **Streaming-Helper-Classes.** Helper classes transform TCG structures into BYTE-Stream-Representation and verse versa.

7. **Persistent-Storage-Access-Component.** Component covers the physical access and representation of the TSP persistent storage representation. The TSS specification separates the storage context into a per user boundary and in a system linked one. This functionality and the data representation reflect a TSS (i.e. TSP and TCG) common code component.
8. **Crypto-Service-Module.** Abstraction layer to offer a set of cryptographic functions needed for the TCG related data transformations (e.g. HMAC, SHA1...) in the TSP. The native algorithm suite is not part of the TSP module.
9. **Error-Handling-Class.** Helper class(es) used in the exception handling process of the TSS components (i.e. TSP and TCS). The structured exception concept will be used for error handling inside of the TSS modules.
10. **TSP-Context-Organization.** Cover the lifetime control for all TSP context object elements. Represent a kind of garbage collection for open context resources.
11. **Auth-Session-Handling.** Envelop the lifetime control for all TSP authorization sessions for a context object element. Contain functionality to validate the status of the sessions.
12. **Secret-Memory-Helper.** Offer functionality for limited permission memory area access used to store e.g. secret data.
13. **Transport-Protection-Helper.** Set of helper function to support the construction (e.g. encrypt, decrypt...) of the transport protection related data streams. In addition export the central execution method for transport protected communication.
14. **TSP-Module-Management.** General operations used to administrate and arrange TSP module wide services (e.g. memory handling).
15. **Common-Module-Service.** Common functions used for TSP module management (e.g. registration, load and unload).
16. **TCG-Core-Service-Access.** Component covers the physical access and representation of the TCS communication. Abstraction layer offer the functions to establish, operate and close the TCS communication in a local and a remote situation.
17. **TSP-Persistent-Storage (User).** Contain the physical data representation for TSP persistent storage. The preferred mechanism would be XML based.
18. **Crypto-Algorithm-Support-Module.** Extern crypto module or library (e.g. OpenSSL) which offers all basic algorithms (e.g. hashing) required to derive the TSP crypto function set (e.g. HMAC).
19. **TCG-TSS-Core-Service.** System service reflects the TSS-Core-Service.

8.3 SWP03c: basic TPM-enabled crypto services

This Sub Workpackage is mainly related to the use of the TPM as a “classic” cryptographic device that provides a limited set of cryptographic primitives and a protected storage for keys and certificates. In order to use the TPM that way with existing applications, these must be modified to access the TSS. A complementary approach suitable for existing applications (like Firefox) already enabled to use

standard crypto API is to develop an instance of such APIs (e.g. PKCS#11) on top of the TSS stack. Both approaches can also include the exploitation of the sealing feature, a unique TPM capability to bind the keys' protection also to a well specified platform status. Another task is related to the design and the development of an enhancement to the SSL/TLS protocols to support the Direct Anonymous Attestation protocol as an additional authentication protocol, for both the user platform and the user itself.

8.3.1 Requirements breakdown

There are several widely used application that can use the TPM as crypto device. If these are applications that implement the crypto operations internally, the proper approach to TPM-enable them is to modify their source code to use the TSS functions for the crypto primitives and the protected storage.

Each application has its own information model for data, keys and certificates, but such information models share some aspects:

- the keys/certificates have some attributes associated or can be considered as attributes of other objects (like an IPsec security association)
- the keys are identified by means of textual labels
- the keys and all other information data are stored in files

On the other side the TSS/TPM provides a protected storage for keys and other data that can be stored within the TPM or outside the TPM, with the same security level, through a chain of encrypted keys up to the Root of Trust for Storage (RTS) keys, stored only within the TPM. These features allow the creation of an arbitrary information tree that may contain asymmetric keys used directly within the TPM and other keys and data to be used by the application. All data stored within the TSS protected storage are identified by UUIDs.

In order to minimize the work to be done for the adaptation of the existing applications to the TSS, a new component called Key Management Adaptation (KMA) module will be developed.

A component to setup and manage the KMA with different applications will be also developed.

Furthermore, to TPM-enable existing applications that support standard cryptographic interfaces (like Firefox), a PKCS#11 interface module will be developed on top of KMA.

This Sub Workpackage includes also activities related to the privacy and trust enhancement of security network protocols. It includes the definition of the enhancement of the SSL/TLS protocols for using the DAA protocol and its implementation by modifying the OpenSSL toolkit and a study about the enhancement of the IKE/ISAKMP protocols with DAA.

This activity will provide a first look at the needs of privacy/trust enabling the network security protocols and at the complexity of this task. Therefore the results of this study will be useful to evaluate the opportunity to start further activities or projects more specifically focused on the standardization of the privacy/trust enhancement of network security protocols and on the implementation of the related prototypes.

8.3.2 High-level Specification/Design

The overall architecture from the cryptographic libraries/applications perspective is represented in Figure 11. Several components will be developed or modified and they are represented respectively with the uniform gray boxes and the faded gray boxes. Instead, components already existing or developed in other Sub Workpackages are represented with the white boxes. The components are:

- Key Management Adaptation module (new module)
- modules on top of KMA
- OpenSSH client and server (adaptation)
- OpenSSL engine (new module)
- IPsec configuration tools like setkey (adaptation)
- IKE demon Racoon (adaptation)
- PKCS#11 module interface (new module)
- DAA enhancement of the libssl library of the OpenSSL toolkit (adaptation)




Figure 11: Architecture of the cryptographic libraries/applications

8.3.3 Functionality: Services/APIs, Message/Key/Policy formats

The component that serves as the basis for most of the other is the KMA module that is an API logically positioned on top of the TSS and provides the following services facilitation services:

- database built on top of the TSS protected storage for storing keys, certificates and related attributes or data for more complex information models;
- referencing keys, certificates and other data by using textual labels or searching for them by using the values of associated attributes;
- binding the keys and other data to the status of the system through the TPM's sealing features or other ways supported by the OpenTC architecture;

- support for keys/data access control built on top of the TSS/TPM authorization mechanisms;
- optional support for configuration by policy;
- optional support for returning keys and other data as pseudo-files.

The KMA configuration tool serves to set up the KMA database to build the information model for each specific application and to set the properties for each key (like sealing, etc.) that cannot be set directly by the modified application.

The adaptation of OpenSSH, Ipsec tools, and Racoon (IKE) will consist in the use of the TPM as protected storage (and optionally also as cryptographic device for RSA encryption, only if this feature will be evaluated as necessary for the OpenTC architecture); the new OpenSSL engine and the PKCS#11 interface module, instead, will use the TPM for both purposes.

The adaptation of the libssl library will be done on top of the DAA wrapper component that is built in turn on top of the DAA functions provided by TSS v.1.2.

8.3.4 Dependencies: required services from sublayers

The components designed and developed in this Sub Workpackage are built on top of the TSS, developed in SWP03b and on top of the DAA wrapper component, developed in SWP05d.

8.4 SWP03d: Java Integration – High Level Overview

This Workpackage focuses on the integration of Trusted Computing (TC) technology into the Java programming language. This section outlines the importance of this work and presents an overview of the individual aspects addressed as part of this Workpackage.

8.4.1 The Role of Java

The Java programming language and related technologies have undergone a broad adoption ranging from large-scale business applications hosted in dedicated data centers to resource constrained environments as found in mobile phones or Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs). Java programs are not compiled to native machine code but to a special form of intermediate code, called byte code. This byte code is then executed by a virtual machine (VM) called the Java VM. This characteristic makes Java an excellent choice for development aiming at heterogenous environments as for example grid computing provides.


In contrast to other programming languages such as C or C++, Java is equipped with inherent security features supporting the development of more secure software. Among those features are automatic array-bounds checking and garbage collection. These features help to avoid common problems such as buffer overflows or memory leaks. Additional aspects that distinguish Java from other environments are code-signing mechanisms and the verification of code when it is loaded.

8.4.2 Integration of Trusted Computing into Java

With the advent of Trusted Computing (TC) as envisioned by the Trusted Computing

Group (TCG), it becomes possible to further enhance Java in terms of security. As a first step, it is required to provide simple mechanisms for Java developers to access the functionality provided by the Trusted Platform Module (TPM) and the TCG Software Stack (TSS).

Note that the TSS not only exposes a software interface to access the functionality of the TPM, but also features more complex operations, which are typically combining several basic functions. Amongst others, the TSS provides functions to generate cryptographic keys and signatures. Furthermore, it provides functions to measure and attest the state of a platform and to cryptographically protect data via sealing and binding functions.



The TSS itself is designed to be implemented using the C programming language and thus offers a very straightforward way to call each function. In the Java environment a programming interface is expected to be an object oriented Application Programming Interface (API). To enable the use of the TSS functionality from Java, additional layers have to be introduced. Figure 12 depicts a possible implementation, giving an overview of the stacked layers from highest abstraction (Java) down to the hardware. Each layer transforms and adapts calls to the next layer, offering functionality as possible by the specific environment constraints.

In order to allow access not only to the local TSS but also to trusted environments located on remote machines, the Java TSS API has to implement a remote procedure call mechanism. Conforming to the TSS 1.2 specification, this facility will be based on the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP) ensuring interoperability with TSS implementations from different vendors running on a variety of platforms. The two ways to access the TSS from Java (local API calls and SOAP) are presented in Figure 13.




Figure 13: TSS Access Mechanisms

Java integration, as planned for the OpenTC project, will go beyond simply allowing Java developers to access TPM and TSS functionality. The features of the TC architecture will be used to extend the trust and security provided by the underlying operating systems to the Java VM and its applications.

A fundamental part of the TCG specification is the creation of a chain of trust that is rooted in the TPM and its surrounding trusted building blocks. These building blocks include the core root of trust for measurement which measures the BIOS before it hands over control to it. The measurements, which actually are cryptographic hashes of the code, are securely stored in the TPM.

The chain of trust is continued up to the operating system and application level. In fact, a Java VM is nothing else but an application that is executed by the operating system. After control has been passed to the Java VM, it is up to the VM to enforce TC features. Java allows to dynamically load additional code in the form of classes at runtime. Consequently, the class loading mechanisms have to be extended in such a way that all loaded classes get measured and the hash values are stored in the platform configuration registers of the TPM. This measuring however is not limited to classes loaded from local storage.

Other variations of dynamically loaded code such as Java Applets have to be taken into account. Additionally, the behavior and trustworthiness of applications can considerably be influenced by configuration files or external scripts processed by the application. Therefore, these aspects have to be considered as well as native code. With the Java Native Interface (JNI), developers are able to write native libraries which can be loaded by the Java VM. Not all these goals can be achieved by modifications and extensions of the Java class library. Additionally, enhancements of the VM itself are required. Figure 14 shows the chain of trust, beginning by the root of trust and ending in the dynamically loaded classes.




Figure 14: Chain of Trust

8.4.3 Network Security and Isolation of Security-Critical Applications

Remote attestation - which means that a remote party is able to verify that a platform is in a specific state regarding the applications it is executing - is one of the core issues of Trusted Computing. It allows a remote party, such as an Internet-merchant, to verify that it is communicating with a valid customer and that the machine of the customer is in a proper state – e.g. not infected with viruses or worms that could illegally interfere with a business transaction. At the same time, the customer significantly benefits from trusted computing because it enables him to undoubtedly verify that the merchant is the one he claims to be. Additionally, the customer can ensure that the server of the merchant was not manipulated by a third party in order to reveal sensitive information.

Remote attestation as well as verification mechanisms have to be made available to Java. Aside from verifying the state of the connection partners, the protection of network connections is an important topic. This topic is addressed by the Trusted Network Connect (TNC) working group of the TCG.

As part of this effort, Transport Layer Security (TLS) Attestation is specified providing an extension to the currently deployed TLS protocol.

The secure network communication facilities already present in Java will be enhanced to take advantage of TLS attestation.

Securing an entire general purpose operating system might not always be practical or feasible. With the availability of virtualization technologies, it becomes possible to

establish secure and isolated compartments within one physical machine. While a legacy operating system is running in an untrusted compartment, a secure application for doing sensitive transactions over the network can be executed in another, secure compartment. Java could significantly benefit from that approach by running the Java VM in such a compartment. This allows to keep the underlying hardware abstraction and operating system layer as small as possible. By minimizing the secure code base, the complexity of measurement and remote attestation is greatly reduced. Notwithstanding, the TC enhanced Java environment will be able to run in a stripped-down, special-purpose compartment as well as on full featured operating systems.

8.4.4 Applicability of TC-Enhanced Java

As mentioned before, Java is used for network oriented applications such as grid computing or any kind of web service. This type of application will especially benefit from the integration of TC capabilities into Java environments. For the first time, it becomes possible to establish trust in properties of communication partners that is not only based on software but rooted in a trusted piece of hardware.

Other kinds of application that are gaining more and more momentum across Europe are e-Government and e-Commerce applications. They cover various areas such as civil services like financial management, health services, netbanking or e-voting which require a very high level of trust and security.

In order to demonstrate the benefits of TC in combination with Java a proof-of-concept prototype will be developed. A reasonable demonstrator could be for example an adaption of the Austrian Security-Layer framework to the features of TC. Other prototypes could show for example the use of trusted computing in the areas of grid computing, peer-to-peer applications or any kind of distributed computing.

9 Workpackage 04: Virtual Machine Monitors

The overall aim of WP4 is to provide a thin trustworthy software layer designed to simultaneously host multiple service and operating system instances of differing trust levels on the same physical platform in a secure and safe manner. As a foundation for the trust and security services / applications of WP5, WP4 will support the enforcement of mandatory information flow security policies governing the behaviour of instances running on top of the virtualization layer as well offering an interface to basic TPM management functionality as also required by WP5.

To achieve this, the thin software layer, referred to as Trusted Virtualization Layer, will combine traditional virtualization technology such as Xen and L4 with trusted computing technology (TCG).

The Trusted Virtualization Layer (TVL) provides an homogeneous, reliable and secure software layer needed to support the applications described in the chapter on WP6 and meet their security requirements. Both Xen and L4 will provide an implementation of a common architecture for this TVL, ensuring both interoperability and consistency regarding the security of the whole system.

WP4 focuses on defining the basis for the interoperability and the security features of the TVL. Those elements will first be derived from the various use cases (see corresponding chapter), and then will be implemented under Xen and L4.

(Terminology note: in the following discussion we refer to *instances* – these are tasks running on top of the virtualization layer and may be whole operating systems or individual applications).

9.1 Specific Goals and Deliverables

1. A virtualization layer and associated management components for the *safe* hosting of multiple operating system instances with differing trust levels concurrently. The architecture and design will seek to minimize the TCB of the system whilst still allowing for effective management of the system as required by the scenarios of WP5. Prototypes will be provided based on both Xen and L4.
2. Base mechanisms layered on top of the platform HW security technology¹ interface of WP3 that will allow for secure and verifiable boot of both the virtualization layer and individual instances running on top of the virtualization layer in order to satisfy the needs of WP5. Prototypes will be provided based on both L4 and Xen.
3. A common management API for the configuration and management of the functionality provided by the virtualization layer. This will include basic tasks such as starting and stopping an instance running, the configuration of mandatory security policies for instances running above the virtualization layer and sufficient TPM management capability to satisfy the higher level needs of WP5. Prototypes will be provided based on both L4 and Xen.
4. Mechanisms for the enforcement of mandatory information flow security policies governing the behaviour of OS instances running on top of the virtualization layer. Prototypes will be provided based on both L4 and Xen.

1 TCG and the hardware virtualization/security extensions available on the AMD SVM platform.

9.2 Requirements and Architecture Discussion

9.2.1 Virtualization

The primary function of the TVL is to provide an homogeneous executing environment for a set of components being executed concurrently on the same physical platform. The type of components that are supported to be hosted by the TVL includes unmodified standard operating systems, operating systems modified to take advantage of the functionality of the TVL, and simple monolithic tasks dedicated to perform specific operations using the functionality of the TVL. In order to host unmodified operating systems, the TVL will require the assistance of hardware specific mechanisms provided by the platform, as described in the previous chapter on WP3.

Like any virtualization technology, the TVL is responsible for providing resources to each of the hosted components, scheduling their execution over time and managing their lifecycle. It also provides an I/O communication mechanism between the hosted components and their associated resources.

The project will define a Common Management Interface for the TVL, which will allow management components to allocate and configure resources of a physical machine. The Common Management Interface will also provide functionality for managing the hosted components life cycle and configure their I/O channels with their resources and other devices.

Last, the development of the TVL will also involve the implementation of several virtual resources (such as virtual network, virtual TPMs, virtual hard drives, etc.) to support the OSes needs for the applications described in the chapter on WP6.

9.2.2 Run-Time Protection and Isolation

The TVL is the first layer of software which provides active protection of the system following the boot of the platform. It uses hardware mechanisms provided by the CPU and/or chipset to protect its memory from other running components (see WP3). It also uses the same hardware mechanisms to provide memory isolation between running components themselves. Because the hardware resources will be shared between potentially malicious hosted components, the TVL also needs to use these hardware mechanisms to provide robust I/O isolation between the hosted components. As a result, the TVL must be able to isolate each component and contain it inside its own virtual network and its own virtual hardware, independently of the actual physical hardware resources being shared. This approach supports application scenarios described in WP6 where the entity controlling the software environment is different from the (potentially malicious) users of the software.

The project will first define the protection and isolation needed for the components and the hardware, and will then define the programming interface for managing the security and protection mechanisms of the TVL, thus ensuring the interoperability of the management solutions.

9.2.3 Trusted Computing Base

Because the complexity of the TVL is limited, configuration of the virtualized resources and of the security mechanisms will be driven by some other privileged components running on the physical platform. Together with the TVL, those components form the

Trusted Computing Base (TCB).

In order to protect long term secrets associated to the TCB (such as identities), the TVL together with other TCB components will integrate TCG technology and integrity measurement. The TPM will be used to allow for the protection of the long term secret even when the active protection provided by the TVL is unavailable (for example, when the platform is switched off or booted in an uncontrolled environment).

The TVL will implement the chain of trust as described by the TCG specifications and will provide some extended functions to capture and verify the integrity of the TCB and other critical hosted components. Those functions will be available through a programming interface provided by the TVL allowing the definition of access control policies based on the integrity of the TCB.

The integration of those functions together with the security and protection mechanisms will allow the management components to configure the system- including its physical and virtual resources and various required I/O channels - in a secure and verifiable manner.

9.3 Goals and Deliverables

As outlined in the introduction WP4 has 4 main goals and deliverables. In this section we go through each of the 4 main goals in more depth and describe further detail of the deliverables intended to meet the goals.

9.3.1 Trustworthy Virtualization Layer

Both Xen and L4/L4env are already capable of running multiple isolated OS instances simultaneously on a single physical platform. WP4 will explore how a balance can be achieved between the small TCB of L4 versus the manageability of the current Xen platform. Under Xen, a single OS instance running in domain 0 (as it is known) provides all the platform configuration, management and security services. Domain 0 typically runs a full Linux OS distribution, thus making the TVL TCB significantly large when implemented under Xen.

WP4 will provide Xen with the capability of splitting the main security services away from the large body of domain 0 code. The security services will run in their own isolated domain without needing to be hosted by a full operating system with the aim of reducing the size of the TVL trusted computing base.

L4 on the other hand supports the notion of an application or service in its own right running as a task on top of the virtualization layer. Unlike on Xen, the service does not need hosting by an operating system. However, under L4 it is difficult to get a system wide view of the platform making the managements requirements of WP5 hard to satisfy. WP4 will provide sufficient management capability for L4 to satisfy the requirements of WP5 whilst constraining the size of the TVL TCB.

9.3.2 Base TCG virtualization support

The TVL is part of the chain of trust as defined by TCG and therefore needs to be measured. The TVL guards access to the platform hardware (including the TPM), it must also provide support for reporting measurements that were logged into the module. WP4 will assume an implementation of the Root of Trust (RTM) for measurement and of the chain of trust available to boot the TVL. In order to integrate

the TVL with the TCG trusted boot chain, WP4 will Implement :

- **A Trusted Boot Process.** This process can be provided by combining the TCG boot chain in the platform firmware with a Trusted Boot Loader. This loader is the first software executed by the firmware during the boot sequence. It will be measured by the firmware and its measurement stored in the the TPM. The Trusted Boot Loader will then measure the TVL image as well as any parameters passed to the TVL at boot time. The TVL measurement will be stored into the appropriate PCRs of the TPM. The Trusted Boot Process will then execute the provided TVL image.

An alternative trusted boot process can exploit new CPU initialization mechanisms provided by AMD's *Pacifica* and Intel's *LaGrande* technology (see last chapter). This approach does not rely on firmware based RTMs and trusted launching components with asserted integrity.

- **Integrity Measurement functionalities and interface in TVL.** Once the TVL is loaded, the Trusted Boot Process (potentially with the help of the TVL depending on the implementation) will ensure the chain of measurements is carried on until all the software parts of the Trusted Computing Base are loaded. The measurements will be reported to the appropriate PCRs of the TPM (NB: The exact measured components will vary depending on the implementation of the TVL, namely Xen and L4). Once each component part of the TCB has been loaded and measured, the TVL can pass on execution to the appropriate booting instance.

In addition to the implementation of the chain of trust described above, the TCB will implement a specific measurement mechanism for the various instances it hosts. The implementation of the measurement mechanisms will vary depending on the underlying implementation (Xen or L4) but both the executed image and the configuration of the instances will be measured. The result of the measurement will be accessible to the instances through an interface provided by the TCB. This interface will allow an instance to verify the integrity of the whole boot chain as well as the integrity of any instance. Integrity measurements can be used to ensure enforcement of mandatory security policies, which can be configured through the provided interface.

Common management API

The aim of the common management API is to allow higher level management components drive the configuration and management of the virtualization layer functionality in the same way regardless of whether L4 or Xen is being used as the basis for the virtualization layer. The common API can be viewed down into 3 areas. Firstly the basic life-cycle management of an OS or service instance running on top of the virtualization layer. Secondly, configuration and management of the mandatory information security policies associated with the OS / service instances (see section 2.4). Finally, to support the needs of WP5, some basic TPM management functionality must be provided in the virtualized environment.

9.3.3 OS instance life-cycle management

Currently Xen provides a fairly rich and usable interface to the life-cycle management of OS instances running on top of its virtualization layer. Figure 15 shows the current architecture. Typically, management of the OS instance life cycle is through use of the

XM command, as shown in the figure this interacts with the *xend* management daemon, which itself is layered on sub-management services such as the console daemon.




Figure 15: Xen management architecture

Figure 16 shows the functionality of the Xen management services available via the XM command. A C based API is also available for accessing the management functionality. It is proposed that the Xen management interface forms the basis of the common API for OS/service instance life-cycle management for WP4.

```
[root@localhost ~]# xm
Usage: xm <subcommand> [args]
       Control, list, and manipulate Xen guest instances

xm common subcommands:
console <DomId>                               Attach to domain DomId's console.
create [-c] <ConfigFile>                       Create a domain based on Config File
        [Name=Value]..                         Terminate a domain immediately
destroy <DomId>                                 Display this message
help                                             List information about domains
list [--long] [DomId, ...]                     Adjust the current memory usage for a domain
mem-set <DomId> <Mem>                          Migrate a domain to another machine
migrate <DomId> <Host>                         Pause execution of a domain
pause <DomId>                                   Reboot a domain
reboot <DomId> [-w][-a]                        Create a domain from a saved state file
restore <File>                                  Save domain state (and config) to file
save <DomId> <File>                             Shutdown a domain
shutdown <DomId> [-w][-a][-R|-H]              Monitor system and domains in real-time
top                                             Unpause a paused domain
unpause <DomId>                                Set the number of VCPUs for a domain
vcpu-set <DomId> <VCPUs>

<DomName> can be substituted for <DomId> in xm subcommands.

For a complete list of subcommands run 'xm help --long'
For more help on xm see the xm(1) man page
For more help on xm create, see the xmdomain.cfg(5) man page
```

Figure 16: Xen management functionality

9.3.4 Mandatory security policy configuration

It should be possible to configure the mandatory secure policy controls over OS / service instances on the virtualized platform in a unified fashion for both the L4 and Xen virtualization layers. The policy configuration API should be at the same level as the abstractions used in defining policy control requirements in WP5. See section 9.3.6 for more detail on the proposed mandatory policy controls.

9.3.5 Basic TPM management

The Common Management API will also provide support for the initialization and management of the TPM. Especially, it will allow configuration of access control to the hardware TPM for various instances. The configuration will be captured as part of the integrity measurement, either into the TPM itself if the configuration of the access control relates to the instances part of the TCB, or as part of the integrity and measurement interface if the configuration relates to the hosted instances. The measured integrity of the platform combined with the TPM Management interface will allow management instances to lock specific secrets to the integrity of the Platform, its TVL+TCB and its configuration, and thus ensure enforcement of security policies of the management instances.

A specific implementation might chose to either provide a direct access to the hardware TPM with hardware enforcement of the access control, or provide TPM functionalities through some proxy. Regardless of the implementation, the interface should allow an instance specialized in the management of the platform, to perform standard TPM management functions such as Ownership management and Identity creation for instance. Should the TPM access be provided through a proxy, the interface will ensure an authentication and confidentiality at least as good as the one obtained through standard TCG protocols. This should ensure the TPM Management Interface to be usable securely by both local and remote management entities. Note however, that the TPM Management interface should only be accessible locally, and any remote entity wishing to use this interface will have to rely on a local agent relaying its actions.

9.3.6 Mandatory information flow policy enforcement mechanisms

An important aspect of WP4 is the ability to place mandatory information flow policy controls over OS / service instances running on the virtualization layer. The underlying virtualization layers (L4 and Xen) should provide sufficient functionality to strongly enforce the policy controls required by WP5. Initially, WP4 intends to support network based information flow controls over instances running on top of the virtualization layer.

As a simple example, take an an operating system running on top of the virtualization layer that is hosting a web server. In this case, it may be desirable to restrict incoming network traffic to TCP port 80 (the HTTP port). Likewise, outgoing traffic from that operating system may be restricted to TCP connections already established.

An important point about these controls is that they should be mandatory – even if the operating system hosting the web server is fully compromised it should not be possible to subvert the network policy controls associated with that instance. An other important point is that these controls should be easy to associate with a particular instance. This ties in with section 9.3.2 above. The controls should be specifiable using the level of abstraction required by WP5 as far as possible, with the aim of being able

to directly map user security requirements into system configurations. With this in mind, the underlying access control primitives of the virtualization layers of Xen and L4 should not be exposed unnecessarily. The underlying virtualization layers may require additional access controls primitives / mechanisms to be implemented in order to enforce the required policies.

WP4 will explore with WP5 what the most useful abstractions are for the specification of policy controls, again with the aim of being able to directly map as far as possible user security requirements to particular system configurations. WP4 will also explore the value of system wide and distributed group based policy controls over multiple instances as well as the initial case of controls that apply to an individual instance only.

9.4 Xen and L4 specifics

9.4.1 Xen Virtual Machine Monitor

9.4.1.1 High-level Design

The Xen Virtual Machine Monitor is a thin layer of software which multiplexes physical resources between a number of *domains*, each of which typically hosts an guest operating system. A domain receives a certain portion of CPU time and physical memory which it further subdivides between user-space processes running on top of the guest operating system. Xen enforces the invariant that a given domain may only access its own physical memory², thus providing isolation and safety. A domain also has a set of *ports* which can be “connected” to other domains to form a primitive 1-bit communication mechanism called an *event channel*. Xen must be invoked to connect a pair of ports between two different domains, and thus can easily check if such communication should be allowed.

Primitive event channels are analogous to hardware interrupts: they are useful for notification, but not in general for data transfer. Xen provides one more important primitive to enable inter-domain communication when required: *grants*. A grant is effectively an access token for a page of physical memory, conferring read-only, read-write or “map” permissions to a particular domain. Only the owner of a physical page may issue a grant. This is done by invoking Xen which can check the page ownership as well as the target and mode of the grant – only if this is permissible under the current access control policy will the grant issuance proceed.

By using these various primitives, Xen can securely multiplex a set of guest operating systems on a single physical machine. However to more fully support the TVL, support for *security services* running in isolated tasks is required. This involves creating a simple single address space “operating system” with cooperative multi-threading along with support libraries and functions to effectively use event channels and grants. In addition, support must be added to enable the use of 1.2 TPMs for integrity measurement and attested boot. Finally Xen needs to be enhanced with support for IOMMU and related I/O protection hardware as and when it becomes available (e.g. Intel's VT-d).

² An exception, explicitly using shared memory communication via *grants*, is described below.

9.4.2 L4 Virtual Machine Monitor

9.4.2.1 High-level Design

The L4 microkernel is a minimal software layer, which multiplexes basic physical resources such as memory pages, CPU time, and I/O ports among various servers. Multiplexing of higher-level resources such as network packets or hard disk devices is done by *L4Env* servers. This multi-server approach results in a small Trusted Computing Base TCB, clean interfaces between the various components, and strong isolation. As a consequence, a compromised server cannot affect the whole system. This basic platform supports running multiple instances of paravirtualized guest operating systems, such as L4Linux.

The current L4 microkernel provides isolation and a message transfer mechanism. However, it cannot restrict the communication and sharing of memory among various servers. We will extend the microkernel with a simple mechanism to enforce communication restrictions and we will explore capability-based solutions. Mandatory access control on higher levels either can be mapped to communication control or must be implemented in servers.

To support authenticated booting of *trusted services*, we will provide the Open Secure LOader OSLO, which uses the *skinit* instruction on AMD SVM platforms to generate a Dynamic Root of Trust for Measurement (DRTM). OSLO is responsible for measuring the microkernel and the basic servers using a TPM. Additional servers or guest operating systems started on top of this microkernel-based platform are measured by a server providing minimal virtual TPM functionality. Using such a TPM abstraction allows to create a tree of independent authentication chains as well as to minimize the complexity of the virtual TPM server.

9.4.2.2 Management interface

The three areas of the common management interface will be implemented as follows.

Firstly, the interface for basic life-cycle management of an OS instance running on top of L4 will provide a subset of the functionality offered through the Xen command line interface. Configuring, starting and stopping of VMs will be supported. Migration of L4Linux instances should be possible as well. Fine grained accounting of resources is out of the scope of the first 18 months. Secondly, configuration and management of the mandatory information security policies associated with the OS instances will be implemented based on a common policy language developed by HP, CUCL, and TUD.

Finally, for the basic TPM management functionality the input of WP5 is needed. The interface should be as small as possible.

9.4.2.3 Offered Services

On the lowest level, we will provide the Open Secure LOader OSLO and the L4/Fiasco microkernel. The microkernel will be supported by a set of *L4Env* core servers such as memory pagers and an application loader. We will also provide the *ORe* network multiplexer, which allows to share a physical network interface card among multiple VMs. Furthermore, we will implement a server for Virtual TPM support.

Multiple instances of L4Linux 2.6 will be used to provide isolated VMs.

Full virtualization of the L4-based platform is not a goal for the first 18 months of the project. For the time being, we will use the paravirtualization approach implemented in L4Linux. We will not offer a trusted graphical user interface (GUI).

10 Workpackage 05: Management of OpenTC Framework


WP 5 delivers the infrastructure that configures and manages the Virtualization Layer of WP4 in order to provide the rich security services required by the OpenTC applications (WP6, WP8).

The Virtualization Layer built by WP04 constitutes the foundation of the OpenTC framework. It is capable of running multiple compartments (applications, agents, or virtualized operating systems) on the same hardware platform while guaranteeing strong isolation as well as enforcing given security policies.

In order to enable the Virtualization Layer core to work and to provide the functionality required by the security-critical applications, a variety of infrastructure components are needed. Workpackage 05 specifies and builds the following layers (see Figure 18):

- The **security services** provide high-level security services that are essential for the Virtualization Layer to function. In addition, they provide security assurances and rich functionalities that applications of WP06 and WP08 require. By leveraging the OpenTC platform, these security assurances will go beyond the security provided by today's security services in software or on smart cards.
- The **security management services** provide services to manage the OpenTC platform. This includes keys as well as security and networking policies. Security policies define how the kernel and the compartments are configured in order to implement the higher-level security requirements of applications. Networking policies define the connectivity of the virtual networks as well as flow policies among them. A particular focus in this area is the privacy-enablement of all components. It also includes certificate and key management as well as life-cycle management for the trusted components (e.g., Trusted Platform Module (TPM) in the the case of TCG) that plays a crucial role for security functionalities.
- **Management applications** are components to allow users to configure and manage the OpenTC platform. There are two management applications that we will build. A trusted platform agent provides a GUI to individuals using a machine, whereas a DMTF-CIM provider provides an XML management interface that enables automated management of OpenTC machines.

These goals are achieved by implementing a number of security services on both hypervisors. These security services provide the functionality needed by the operating system to satisfy these goals.



Workpackage 5 is the first overall approach to building an integrated infrastructure for multilaterally-secure trusted computing. As a consequence, we face various research and integration challenges. Some of the key challenges are:

Policy management: This concerns the establishment of a security policy management for both local hosts and large clusters of machines. The goal is to provide a unified interface for managing the security-relevant configurations and security policies of the underlying Virtualisation Layer such that the machines can meet overall security requirements. One example is to define overall security requirements (such as corporate security guidelines in an intranet) and then automatically break them down into per-platform policies that assure that the cluster achieves the overall security objectives.

Multilateral security: This concerns the capability of the trusted infrastructure to satisfy the (security) requirements of different parties with different (and possibly conflicting) interests. One example of such seemingly conflicting interests is that citizens demand full privacy including secrecy of the software used whereas enterprises and governments want to verify that their security requirements are met. One approach towards resolving this paradox is to enhance the new paradigms *Property-based Attestation* and *Direct Anonymous Attestation* that

allow anonymous proofs of platform capabilities towards arbitrary credentials and security assurances. We expect to resolve this aspect by using mechanisms that allow verification of the properties and capabilities of the components in the sense of multilateral security, i.e., without violating the defined privacy policies.

Trust management: In order to enable a remote party to evaluate the trust in a component or platform, it is essential to develop a well-defined concept of identities, roles, and assurances. On the technical side, this requires resolving key management challenges that are posed in a equalized environment. One example of such a challenge is seamless migration: As we aim at enabling seamless migration of virtual machines between physical machines, the key management needs to enable the consistent migration of the hardware-protected keys that belong to this virtual machine.

10.1 The OpenTC Security Services

This section provides an overview of the security services. The OpenTC security services are based on the Virtualisation Layer and provide security services to the applications layer. In addition, they provide management interfaces to the management layer.




Figure 18: Security Management Components sorted by Abstraction

In this section we describe general services that are implemented on most platforms. In the next section we describe services that are platform-specific.

10.1.1 Trusted User Interface

The trusted user interface service provides a secure path between the platform and the user. This trusted user interface is separate from the user interfaces of the hosted platforms. The main goal of the trusted user interface is to authenticate users and communicate the trustworthiness of the different compartments to the user. Another important goal is to communicate security-relevant information such as warnings to the user reliably.

For devices used by individual end-users (as opposed to servers), the Trusted User Interface may be implemented as a Graphical User Interface that controls the graphic adapter and the input devices, i.e., mouse and keyboard, to establish a trusted path

between the user and a compartment. It realizes compartment authentication by secure compartment window labels containing user-readable information about the compartment's configuration such as a unique compartment name provided by the Compartment Security Manager. The Trusted GUI strictly enforces a strong isolation between compartments to prevent information leakage on the GUI level. Unauthorized compartments cannot, for instance, access the graphical output of other compartments.

In a secure banking scenario, for example, the user would easily be able to note, from the label or the color of the banking compartment window border provided by the Trusted GUI, that the integrity and confidentiality of his security-critical input is indeed protected.

Hosts in data centers do not need a graphical user interface to an administrator. The trusted user interface can therefore be implemented by one of the following options:

- **Secure console:** One option to implement the trusted user interface is by means of a secure remote shell such as SSH that enables an administrator to issue administration commands.
- **Management Interface:** By means of a standardized management interface such as SNMP and DMTF-CIM, management software can manage a platform. This includes the management of security functions.

For data centers, the second approach will be our focus. More details can therefore be found in Section 10.2.

10.1.2 User Identity Manager

The User Identity Manager administers users (each defined by a name, a state (e.g., user is logged in) and a secret (to be used for authentication purposes)), roles and groups. It is a high-level abstraction of identities and attributes that are associated with a user.

10.1.3 Compartment Security Manager

In a secure system that should be capable of executing potentially malicious compartments without violation of the mandatory security policy, the installation and update of compartments and security-critical services have to be controlled by a trustworthy service. One task of the Compartment Security Manager therefore is to help users to derive the minimal set of privileges for a desired compartment, and to translate and provide the results. As the Compartment Security Manager enforces a security policy defined by the platform owner, it is, for instance, possible to ensure that the entire system or only a compartment behaves like a closed system that can only be manipulated by authorized entities.

The Compartment Security Manager also defines the compartments that are allowed to be executed. Before a new compartment is started, the Compartment Security Manager measures the integrity of the compartment's binary. After having verified that the compartment conforms to the security policy, the compartment is started. Moreover, the Compartment Security Manager offers a mapping from local process identifiers to global unique compartment identifiers. The compartment identifiers can be used by other compartments to derive the compartment's configuration in order to enforce their own compartment-related policies.

10.1.4 Compartment Trust Manager

The Compartment Trust Manager reports compartment identifiers (and thus implicitly the compartment's configuration) provided by the Compartment Security Manager to remote compartments. Moreover, it offers an interface to create and certify cryptographic keys that are bound to compartments. By means of the Trust Manager, a remote trusted channel can be established between different entities (platforms).

An example use case is that of secure content distribution. The content and a corresponding license are encrypted with a key provided by the Trust Manager and sent to the user via a trusted channel. The Trust Manager certifies that the cryptographic key used to encrypt the content and the license is bound to a specific compartment (or a compartment with a specific property); the identity and attributes of which are reported by the Compartment Security Manager. Through this means it can be ensured that the license is respected by the compartment. In addition, the certificate issued by the Trust Manager implies that the compartment runs in a secure environment.

10.1.5 Storage Manager

The Storage Manager enables other compartments to persistently store their local states. Optionally, it preserves the integrity, confidentiality, and freshness of the managed data and/or binds compartment data to certain properties, e.g., a user, a role, the Trusted Computing Base (TCB), or the compartment's configuration. The latter ensures strong isolation of persistently stored compartment states, because it prevents compartments from accessing the state of another compartment.

In a typical use case, the Storage Manager interacts with the Compartment Security Manager, the User Identity Manager and the TPM Server: A user might want to save a text document that no one else should be allowed to read; the document should be bound to the user. To achieve that, the text editor sends the document to the Storage Manager.

The Storage Manager contacts the Compartment Security Manager to get an affirmation that the document indeed originates from the assumed compartment, and then checks whether the compartment is actually allowed to bind documents to the user (for, e.g., privacy-related reasons, it is reasonable not to generally allow compartments to bind data to users). Given that the answer is positive, the Storage Manager now connects to the User Identity Manager, which verifies whether the given user indeed exists, is logged in and is allowed to bind data to herself. In case all is cleared, the Storage Manager contacts the TPM Server in order to be provided with the TPM functions needed to finally bind and save the data.

10.1.6 TPM Server

The TPM Server provides compartments with an abstract and simple interface to the functions of the Trusted Platform Module (TPM), independent of varying TPM implementations of different vendors. One interface that can be used to expose these services is the TPM 1.2 interface, which has been standardized by the TCG. As a consequence, the TPM service may comprise the ritualized TPM that has been described in the OpenTC proposal.

10.1.7 Cryptographic Services

The security services discussed above are based on different cryptographic schemes and protocols which are logically summarized in this service. The cryptographic services require platform keys and TPM services. Furthermore, they provide access to the key management infrastructure that is detailed in Section 10.4 and provide security protocols such as SSL/TLS that leverage the platform's security capabilities. They also offer a user-level interface to selected cryptographic services of Workpackage 03.

10.1.8 Virtual Network Management

In data centers it is essential to manage different virtual networks and the association of hosts to networks efficiently. For managing this association we have developed a model called "trusted virtual domains". Trusted virtual domains are comparable to today's security domains except that they provide well-defined assurances that are automatically enforced as well as automated membership management. The goal is to only admit hosts to a domain that satisfies the security policy of the domain.


10.2 OpenTC Security Management Services

We aim at managing a set of multiple trusted platforms with embedded TPMs and implementation for Trusted boot. The set of platforms is under the control of a single *Management Entity*. From a logical point of view, this entity is centralized; from a physical point of view, however, it can be implemented as a central controller or as decentralized, co-operating agents.

Each trusted platform runs a Virtualization Layer hosting a set of virtual machines and services. The responsibility for managing the virtualized environment of a specific platform lies with the platform's *Management Layer*, which in turn requires support from the following security services:

- **Hardware Management** This service provides functionality to allow both local and remote management software to securely perform critical hardware management operations. One important piece of hardware that needs special management functions is the Trusted Platform Module. Management tasks include taking and revoking ownership of the TPM, creating platform identities, and migrating owner-specific keys. This service must honor and enforce policies defined by the Management Entity when performing these and similar actions.
- **Identity Management.** On a given physical machine, this service allows the *VM Management Component* to securely and provably create and receive credentials for platforms and users. During interactions with the centralized *Management Entity*, these credentials are used to identify the local *Management Component* and to establish its trustworthiness. Access to these credentials is subject to policies defined by the Management Entity. This services provides the security context for the compartment trust and security managers as well as the storage managers. It uses the public key infrastructure outlined in Section 10.4.
- **Compartment Security Management.** This service supports the creation and management of Virtual Machines on behalf of the *Management Entity* in a secure manner. In particular, the *Management Entity* uses this service to ensure that no other entities can access the data contained in the image of the VM that

is instantiated.



- Compartment Trust Management.** This service is used by the platform's *VM management component* to prove the platform integrity to the *Management Entity*. In particular, it supports the deployment of policies and configurations provided by the *Management Entity*.
- Key Management Services:** Services to manage keys for platforms and other services. As key management is a complex service that requires various infrastructure services, we provide a detailed description in Chapter 10.4.
- Trusted Platform Module (TPM) Management** According to the TCG specification, a TPM should be able to work in a number of different roles, handle key and data material in diverse operational conditions while supporting various user roles. A special SW package, the TPM manager, will control the TPM and allow the user to configure the TPM as required.

We now describe the latter two management services in more detail.

10.3 Management of the Trusted Platform Module

We now outline the services that are needed to manage the TPM and enable the services that depend on the TPM.

10.3.1 Initialization of the Security Platform

An administrator shall be allowed to start the Security Platform Initialization process. During this initialization phase, the following capabilities are required:

- Take ownership* of the Security Platform by the Security Platform Owner (mandatory)
- Initialization of the *emergency recovery* feature, which is required for a restore process (creation or assignment of Emergency Recovery Token / Public Key). This is a non-mandatory function recommended by the TCG. For reasons of operational continuity, it is advisable to implement this functionality.

- Initialization of *password reset* feature (creation or assignment of Password Reset Token / Public Key) (optional).
- If the TPM Chip has already been initialized with a Security Platform Owner and Storage Root Key (SRK) but the configuration data of the Security Platform Solution does not match this state (for instance, because a new OS was installed or another partition was created on the same platform), the authentication of the Security Platform Owner is performed as the first step.
- The Security Platform Initialization process must be able to handle loss of electrical power during platform initialization.

10.3.2 TPM Configuration

A local administrator has the ability to process the emergency recovery initialization and perform the password reset initialization steps at any time after a successful platform initialization has been performed.

- Enable and Disabling the TPM: the procedure indicates the current TPM state (enabled or disabled) and allows the Security Platform Owner to change it.
- Defining TPM Usage Policies: A user may choose not to use all TPM functionality. This requires that a user can enforce a policy on the TPM. Examples are to use the TPM for key management but not for attestation. Another example is to temporarily disable the TPM. The procedure indicates the current TPM state (enabled or disabled) and allows a user to temporarily disable the TPM Chip. This step is non-reversible for a boot cycle. The system must be rebooted to re-enable the TPM. The platform administrator (TPM owner) can disable this feature via a policy setting.

10.3.3 TPM Backup and Restore Functionality

The Backup and Restore feature safeguards for situations of data loss in case of a hardware or storage medium failure or destruction of the system. With this feature, keys and certificates, the configuration and feature data of a user are saved. It also covers accidental erasure or overwriting of data.

The backup storage medium can be a hard drive, a server share or a separate storage device such as a removable medium. The TPM management procedure handles archive locations in the Back-up and Restore feature extensively as it does not require the user to provide multiple locations.

10.3.3.1 Emergency Recovery

This feature is used to support emergency recovery in the event of a damaged Security Platform, damaged Platform Security Chip or when the Storage Root Key is lost. Therefore, the basic user keys are transferred to another medium that is not bound to any specific PC. This software release allows the use of other storage media for the Emergency Recovery Token such as a floppy disk or a network share with restricted access. In a future version of the software, a smart card or secure USB-token will also be allowed to store this token.

10.3.3.2 User-Initialized Key Migration

In contrast to the Emergency Recovery feature, key migration addresses the user's ability to utilize keys (including credentials) on another platform. This process allows the transfer of keys to another platform. This action requires another Trusted Platform to successfully complete the migration by the Security Platform Owner. The keys are not allowed to leave the protected environment of a TPM-secured system.

The user can transfer (migrate) his or her keys and the related credentials (USK, CSP keys, PKCS#11 keys and Certificates) from one TPM system to another. User-initialized Key Migration utilizes the rewrap mode as specified by TCG.

The Security Platform is designed to address the situation in which a user has forgotten their Basic User Password. Also, a user does not have to remember any secret data to process a successful password reset. However, it is expected that the user will have a removable medium to store a secret that is required for the successful completion of the password reset process.

10.4 Key Management Services and Infrastructure

The goal is to build a trusted computing (TC) enabled PKI and to resolve the challenges arising during its implementation. This includes flexible management software on the user side, key and certificate exchange protocols aware of additional trusted computing features, and servers offering identity creation, revocation and verification services of credentials. The infrastructure building block requirements, possible adaptations and enhancements of (existing) public key infrastructure services are researched in Workpackage 05d.

10.4.1 Public Key Infrastructure Overview

One approach to address the “trust problem” of a client/server connection is the use of a public key infrastructure. By using specialized cryptographic methods and their application in certificates, an assessment of trustworthiness of a communication partner can be realized. Although a server can show its identity to a client with a credential, the client is still forced to prove this credential and decide its trustworthiness. Only after this step can the client connect to a service and can all communication be handled over a cryptographically secured channel. From the server point of view, it has to be verified that the connecting client is really the one he or she claims to be (think e.g. of e-banking applications).

There are inherent administrative needs of a security infrastructure. One cannot simply claim some information to be true: a third party has to attest the information (e.g. one's identity or the identity of a web server) by issuing credentials. The collected evidence must be distributed and made available on-line in order to be (re)checkable at later times by anyone. The management of the security tokens throughout their entire life-cycle in the PKI must be considered from the beginning until their phase-out and appropriate processes must be specified.

10.4.2 Trusted Computing enhancement of PKI

The perspective of having a TPM hardware module in every PC in the near future – or even other types of connected equipment such as mobile phones – provides both an improvement and new challenges for a PKI. The TPM itself provides a unique and

tamper-resistant cryptographic key pair which can be used for securing endpoint to endpoint connections. The association of these key with identities, the creation of person bound as well as anonymous certificates, however, require new management practices because of the unchangeable TPM. The collision of the concept of a unique identifier and the importance of preserving a level of anonymity while being part of a security infrastructure will have to be evaluated in different application scenarios. This Workpackage works on the design and implementation of a PKI capable of supporting as many usage scenarios as possible, while e.g. the extent of key backup and policy migration of hardware-bound keys is still to be determined.

10.4.3 Privacy-enabled Key Management

In Trusted Computing the TPM module itself is a part of the demonstrated trust level. Being part of a network and utilizing a well-known secure TPM obviously increases this trust level and enable one to securely execute transactions. A “Privacy CA” server embodies a trusted third party and thus the PKI component turning TPM-specific information into certificates called Attestation Identity Keys (AIKs), which prove the backing of a TPM module but do not reveal the specific user. These AIKs can be used further in cooperation with traditional certification authorities to derive common X.509 style certificates. A PKI must provide defined interfaces and processes to allow the status of the credentials in the system to be queried. On revocation of a TPM and its derived certificates all affected parties must be reachable immediately or be informed of the change in status on their next related PKI operation.

As an alternative implementation to the Privacy CA, the new TPM standard (1.2) has defined a protocol called “Direct Anonymous Attestation” (DAA). The goal of DAA is to enable users to create unlinkable pseudonyms without interacting with a third party such as the Privacy CA. Once a platform has obtained its DAA keys, it can visit any site and establish a new attestation identity key (AIK) while proving that the key is stored in a valid and certified TPM platform. Besides providing open implementations of DAA as a stand-alone protocol, a focus of OpenTC is the integration of DAA into existing protocols such as SSL/TLS for both platform and user authentication (see SWP03c). This enables users to anonymously browse web-sites while securely establishing unlinkable pseudonyms for secure transactions in the background.

The following services will be implemented:

- Privacy CA server (optionally TPM-enabled)
- Classic CA server (optionally TPM-enabled), enabled to issue X.509 certificates including the SKAE extension
- DAA roles as stand-alone servers: issuer, verifier and anonymity revocation authority (optionally TPM-enabled)

The services and the authorities will communicate through network protocols. For communicating with the CA and PCA, the XKMS and CMC protocols will be developed.

For communicating between the various DAA roles, a dedicated network protocol will be defined as well as standard formats for DAA data and messages: these aspects will be implemented by an overall DAA wrapper built on top of the DAA functions provided by TSS.

10.5 Implementation Architecture

We now outline how the core security and management services are implemented on the different implementations of the Virtualisation Layer.

10.5.1 Implementation on L4

On L4, the OpenTC security and management services are compartments that run directly on top of the L4 micro kernel. Each service provides a well-defined interface for inter-process communication (IPC). Interaction between services or between instances of L4Linux and services is performed by using these interfaces. An IPC call that is issued by a process first goes to the L4 micro kernel, which then transfers it to the callee. The IPC mechanism is implemented similarly to the IPC architecture of CORBA.

10.5.2 Implementation on Xen

The Implementation of the security and management services on the Xen Hypervisor is split into two parts. The low-level part is implemented directly in the Xen Kernel running with full privileges. This part contains the security enforcement of the security services. The lower-level part controls the basic access, communication and enforcement and provides a well-defined interface to the higher layers. The higher level includes non-enforcement parts of the security services as well as the management components. Both run in a privileged service VM (usually called Dom0 in Xen) or in a special security service VM as normal user processes.

The Compartment Security Manager, the Compartment Trust Manager and the Storage Manager directly interface Xen by using the provided low-level interface. The TPM Server component is also split into a low-level hardware-interfacing part for device abstraction, which is implemented in the service VM Linux Kernel, and the TPM Server that uses this abstract interface to multiplex the Hardware TPM in many virtual TPMs and provide these to Xen via the low-level interface. For communication between these services in the service VM IPC is used.

10.6 Management Applications

We now describe the applications that enable owners to manage their machines. We distinguish two types of applications:

- The Trusted Platform Agent (TPA) allows individual end-users to manage their own machine.
- A management agent based on the DMTF-CIM standard allows remote automated management of machines in enterprises.

10.6.1 Trusted Platform Agent (TPA)

A local management software, the Trusted Platform Agent (TPA), will offer full control over all issues of the system to the user. This starts with the operation to be done to use the capabilities of a Trusted Platform, the so-called “take ownership” operation during which a root system identity is built within the TPM. Further operations are the creation and handling of extra keys needed for various applications and different users – there may be distinct secure storage areas, dedicated keys used for backup and migration, etc. The option of full activation/deactivation at will of a TPM is a necessity

to keep user trust in the TC concept.

The local TPA is also capable to interface with a PKI and its authorities (servers) to enable the use of TC features in a networking context. For endpoint to endpoint communication this requires a common standardized PKI protocol capable of carrying “traditional” PKI exchanges as well as TC-specific ones. A good choice of a specific protocol base or the support and extension of multiple ones will hopefully be revealed during the runtime of this Workpackage while implementing demo applications.

The architecture of the local TPA is shown in Figure 20. The TPA modules that will be developed in Workpackage 05d are represented as gray boxes.




Figure 20: Trusted Platform Agent

The Trusted Platform Agent is based on the following components:

- A standard user interface to the services implemented by the underlying modules:
 - Interface to Privacy CAs for requesting the certification of AIKs
 - Interface to Classic CAs with support for SKAE X.509 extension
 - Local repository for certificates
 - 'DAA platform' role running on top of the DAA wrapper
 - Management of the Trusted Platform Module
 - DAA wrapper (built on top of the DAA functions provided by TSS) that will provide the implementation of
 - standard formats for the exchanged DAA data for using DAA as a stand-alone protocol or integrated within other protocols,
 - a network protocol for using the DAA as a stand-alone protocol.
- A set of console commands running on top of the TPA API

The architecture of the TPA will be designed to support additional services through the development of the related plug-ins.

The local TPA will be designed to run on both a single box with a conventional OS and within a Virtual Machine provided by the OpenTC framework.

In the context of the OpenTC framework, one instance of the local TPA will run within the Management VM for managing platform-wide tasks such as the management of the TPM and requesting the certificates for the trusted services: this instance of the TPA will run itself as trusted service and will therefore be part of the TCB.

Other instances, in contrast, might run within generic VMs for VM-specific tasks such as requesting the certificates for services and applications running within the VM itself. These instances will not be trusted because they run outside the TCB, but they will rely on a virtual TPM that will be part of the TCB.

For managing a TPM, it is essential that the user interface be context-aware. The overall Security Platform state depends on the individual state of the TPM Chip, the BIOS settings for the Platform Security Chip, the Security Platform initialization status and the Security Platform User status. Because of this complexity, users will need guidance on actions that are reasonable to perform at a given state. The guidance has to provide status-sensitive alerts, dynamic menus and tips. The current status of the Security Platform must be visible to the current user.

10.6.2 Remote Management Provider (DMTF CIM)

To allow remote management of servers, we will implement a so-called DMTF-CIM provider. This agent runs on each server and provides an XML-based interface based on the DMTF-CIM standard for managing the machine.

This management interface will wrap all functions that are needed to manage a server remotely. Examples include managing the life-cycle of virtual machines, provisioning keys and security policies, and configuring the hardware.

11 Workpackage 06: Trusted Computing Applications

11.1 General

This Workpackage includes the development of test and prototype applications that show how to use the TPM and the trusted services provided by OpenTC-OS and which are advantages of such technologies. These use examples and proofs of concept span Digital Rights Management, messaging system, electronic signatures, encrypted file service and multi-factor authentication.

11.2 SWP06a: Interoperable DRM

The Workpackage will provide a preliminary DRM system specification which will be followed by a concept prototype. The concept prototype will demonstrate (at least basic) DRM functionality supported by the OpenTC platform, but will be limited in terms of real-time capability and media type support. Integration of specifications from WP3 and WP4 will lead to a final system specification which will include platform-dependent details and adaptation for the L4- and XEN-based trusted computing systems. The final deliverable will be a complete system prototype supporting a multitude of media types and a complete DRM capability spectrum.

11.2.1 Requirements breakdown

The Interoperable DRM system application scenario describes a DRM system that is based on Trusted Computing and MPEG-21 for protecting multimedia content. The system mainly consists of 2 components: the *DRM core* and the *secure media player*. The DRM core is a secure service that handles content licenses and encryption keys, exposing its functionality through an application programming interface (DRM core-API) to applications. The media player is a secured application that uses the DRM core-API to render protected content. After the integrity of the image of the VM has been checked, the application runs in a secure environment of a separate VM

The DRM system expects the presence of an underlying trusted system and requires the following services from it:

- **Secure Environment:** The DRM core and the media player application may only execute when a secured environment is present. Thus, the underlying system must provide:
 - Memory isolation and protection of processes running in the secure environment.
 - Secure audio and video output paths to certified (signed) hardware drivers and/or hardware. No unauthorized application or service should be able to read from this output path. Optionally cryptographic protection between the driver and the hardware can also be applied when supported by the hardware.
 - A means to measure the integrity of the DRM system and associated applications. This implies the existence of a method for measuring applications before they are loaded and executed.
- **Cryptographic services.** The DRM core requires several cryptographic services which have to be provided by the underlying system:

- *A Trusted Software Stack (TSS)*, supporting AIK generation and sealing. AIKs are required for authentication/remote attestation purposes, while sealing is used to lock cryptographic keys to specific system configurations. The core can thus ensure that content encryption keys are only accessible when the systems integrity is ensured.
- *Trusted Storage*. The DRM core will use trusted storage for its license and key databases.
- A system-wide *database of certificates* of root certification authorities, along with services to verify certificates.
- **Central policy management:** Operation of the DRM core and the media player application will be subject to an operation policy of whatever kind. It would be beneficial if the underlying system can provide a system-wide policy management facility, so that DRM-related configuration can be seamlessly integrated into the management tool.

11.2.2 Planned features

One main feature of the system will be the interoperability to other DRM systems. The OpenTC system will be based on the MPEG-21 standard, which is an international standard developed by ISO. The standard is a joint development by a number of companies from the multimedia sector and it is a good basis for a wider support. Furthermore the system will contain a component that provides support of other existing DRM systems.

The principal scope of the OpenTC DRM system will be the protection of multimedia content. Generally the system can also be used to protect other contents, e.g. personal or secret information. There exists the need for a secure DRM system in the medical sector, which governs the access to the medical records of the patients.

Another feature of the research in this area will be the conception of a “fair” DRM system. That means that the resulting systems will be beneficial not only for the content provider, but also the consumer of a content. It is planned that all participants in the system will be treated equally, so that every participant can either act as a consumer or as a content provider. A content provider can use the system to protect his own creation against any misuse.

Nevertheless the content provider can still decide to restrict the usage of the content in an “unfair” way. This decision isn't based on a technical problem, it's more of a consequence of the business model. In order to have a fair usage of DRM, each participant has to consider carefully its business model. The business model should provide different added-value to the user, by granting additional rights to the user. We foresee the following rights, which would support a “fairer” usage of DRM:

- copy
- burn
- sell

With the right to “copy” the consumer can create a limited amount of private copies. By transferring these copies, the content can be shared with a small number of OpenTC devices, which belong to the domain of the user. This domain has to be defined beforehand by the user and has to be limited to a maximum number of devices. In the same way, the right “burn” grants the user to save the content on a

disc. “Sell” means, that a consumer can sell the content to another user. With these technical possibilities, the DRM works in a way transparent to the consumer.

11.2.3 High level Specification and Design

The main components of the system are the DRM core and the media player application. The DRM core is an operating system component that handles tasks related to interpretation and management of licenses and content encryption keys, while the media player is a secure application that uses the functionality exposed by the DRM core to access and render protected content. By placing all key and license-related functionality in an operating system component as a secure service, we enable a higher level of trust from all involved parties toward the DRM system. The system's overall architecture is shown in Figure 21: the components developed for this Sub Workpackage are represented as grey boxes.




Figure 21: Architecture of a DRM system

11.2.3.1 DRM core

The DRM core handles the following tasks:

- License parsing services.** The DRM core contains an implementation of the MPEG-21 Rights Expression Language (REL) and is thus able to parse MPEG REL license files. In case a foreign license is introduced to the system, the core invokes the license translation services described below to convert it to MPEG REL. Whenever the media player application requests an action on a media file, the core parses the corresponding license to decide if access shall be granted or not. The respective content decryption key can then be handed out to the secure player. This implies that the DRM core is sure about the integrity of the media player application.
- License translation services.** The DRM core supports translation of licenses

to other formats (e.g. OMA REL) and creation of sub-licenses, i.e. licenses with modified policies that replace existing ones. This enables the system to import and export from different DRM systems and devices (e.g. portable devices, network devices), as well as enable sub-licensing for third parties. Translation and sub-licensing are only possible when the peer's integrity is ensured.

- **Secure storage.** The content encryption keys, licenses and other important information regarding media items are stored in protected databases under the control of the DRM core. The core seals the master keys for the databases using the underlying TSS services. This ensures that the databases can only be accessed when the system is verified to be running in a secure state.
- **General management services.** Key and license databases are maintained by the core. The core's general management services can be used to perform various maintenance operations on the databases, e.g. listing of licenses, license terms, decryption key management etc.
- **Legacy player application support.** The DRM core provides an interface to legacy media player applications, that may be preferred by users. The interface maps a file access of the legacy player to a complete DRM procedure under the core's control. Thus, the legacy player application will be provided with decrypted content only if this is allowed by the license, even though the player is not aware of the existence of the license. Such functionality can be enabled at the legacy player side with a plug-in mechanism and must be supported by the legacy player.

11.2.3.2 Media player application

The media player application is able to recognize and playback a variety of media formats. If protected content is to be accessed, the DRM core is invoked to parse the corresponding license and provide the content decryption key. Protected content is only rendered through secure output paths to video and audio drivers. Decryption of content is handled by the player application in real time.

11.2.3.3 DRM core-API

The complete functionality of the DRM core is exposed through the DRM core-API, which provides sets of function calls that enable applications to use the core's services. The function sets map directly to the service classes given above:

- **License parsing.** Applications can reference existing licenses through unique identifiers and request the core to check if particular rights are applicable. Applications receive the respective content decryption keys if the requested right is granted.
- **Content key and license management.** Applications can request insertion or deletion of licenses and respective keys in the core's databases. If foreign licenses are introduced, the core's translation services are invoked to translate the license into MPEG REL. Sub-licenses can be requested from the core, for portable or other external parties. License management functions also take care of license download for newly acquired content.
- **DRM system identification services.** The core-API includes services that request the core to create AIKs and/or identifiers for attestation and

authentication purposes. There are also functions that describe the core's capabilities to applications.

- **Legacy interface.** This is the part of the API that enables plug-ins of legacy players to access protected content as described above, without them being aware of the DRM process.

11.3 SWP06.b: Message Exchange Infrastructure

Message Exchange Infrastructure for Trusted Computing (MEITC) provides security services for message exchange; the confidentiality of exchanged messages, authentication of the message source, non-repudiation of sent messages by the sender and integrity of the messages will be provided the capabilities of the OpenTC framework and by using the security features of TPM.

11.3.1 Requirements breakdown

In this Sub Workpackage, the following main components will be implemented

- MEITC Database Server
- MEITC Mail Server
- MEITC Web Server
- MEITC Trusted Log
- MEITC Certificate Service Provider (CSP)

MEITC expects the presence of an underlying trusted system and requires the following services from it:

- **Secure environment.** All components may only execute when a secured environment is present. Thus, the underlying system must provide:
 - Memory isolation and protection of processes running in the secure environment.
 - A mean to measure the integrity of the components: this implies the existence of a method for measuring services before they are loaded and executed. These measures will be also provided during the remote attestation procedures executed among the components before starting the communication between them
- **Cryptographic services.** MEITC components require several cryptographic services which have to be provided by the underlying system:
 - *A Trusted Software Stack (TSS)*, supporting AIK generation and sealing. AIKs are required for authentication/remote attestation purposes of each component while sealing is used to lock cryptographic keys to a specific system status. This way the keys are only accessible when the systems integrity is ensured. Also the TPM asymmetric encryption is needed.
 - Implementation of SSL/TLS protocols enabled with the platform authentication (i.e. the remote attestation)
 - Classic and Privacy CAs for getting the digital certificates and for the revocation services

11.3.2 High-level Specification and Design

The components that will be developed in this Sub Workpackage are:

- **MEITC Database Server.** A database server will host user-mailboxes. All e-mail headers and official tracking information will be kept in this database. E-mail content can optionally be stored in the database or in the file system
- **MEITC Mail Server.** This component e-mail transfer server will handle all the e-mail traffic and it will use the Trusted Log and the CSP to implement the security services for the messages, namely, integrity checking and non-repudiation.
- **MEITC Web Server.** This component will be the front-end for users and the system administrators. Users will connect to this web server via their browsers to compose or read e-mail messages.
- **MEITC Trusted Log Server.** This component guarantees the integrity checking of e-mails and also the non-repudiation: it holds a record for each e-mail that includes data about the message (i.e. the sender and the recipient addresses, etc.), the digest calculated over the message and optionally the details of the remote attestation of the various components.
- **MEITC Certificate Service Provider.** This component will hold the required users' digital certificates and keys for signing and encrypting e-mails. It can use the TPM as crypto device for asymmetric operations and also other hardware signing devices for high-volume operations; symmetric encryption will be done by using the cryptographic trusted services developed within WP5. The user and the CSP keys will be sealed to the state of the CSP in order to be released only if the system integrity is effective.

The integrity of the components must be checked before starting any communication among them. When all components run on a single box on top of the OpenTC framework, the checking will be done by the TCB before loading and starting each module. The architecture for this scenario is represented in Figure 22: the components developed for this Sub Workpackage are represented as grey boxes.

For the scalability of the message infrastructure, the various components can also run on different physical servers. In this case MEITC servers will communicate with each other through trusted channel, implemented by using SSL/TLS with the service and also the platform authentication (i.e. the remote attestation). Each server will store its certificate for the authentication and the corresponding private key within the local protected storage provided by the TPM through the TSS. In this case the web server and the database component can run on top of the OpenTC framework or on a single box with Linux and both TSS and TPM while the other components should run only on top of the OpenTC framework.

The infrastructure will be designed to be used in a closed environment; therefore the messages will be managed by a single instance of the mail server; therefore the integrity and the non-repudiation of the messages can be guaranteed through the trusted log server while the confidentiality and encryption by using the CSP keys.





Figure 22: Architecture of a MEITC system

However the infrastructure will be designed to implement some features that are specific for system running in open environments where the messages are exchanged among different mail servers, per-user message security services must be used; therefore the digital signature and encryption of e-mail must be performed by using the users' keys and certificates, handled by MEITC CSP.

The access to the web server will be done through a web browser: in order to guarantee the trustworthiness of the whole system, the browser and the web server will communicate on a trusted channel by using HTTP on top of the conventional TLS/SSL protocols enabled for the mutual platform authentication. The communication between the components is represented in Figure 23.



11.3.3 Functionality: Services/APIs, Message/Key/Policy formats

11.3.3.1 Main functions

The definitions used for the actors that interact with the MEITC system can be made as follows:

- *User*: This includes the end-user of the system who will connect to MEITC by a web user interface. The policies of the user can be restricted by using definitions committed by system administrator.
- *System Administrator*: Manages the whole system with predefined administrative privileges. These are creating user accounts, resetting passwords, changing user rights etc.

An end-user can do the following actions after being authenticated to the MEITC system: access to her e-mail inbox, send an e-mail to another user whose mailbox is defined in the system and deleting an existing email.

Administrator can do the following actions after the authentication step: create a new user account, reset a user's password, delete existing user accounts.

As example some basic functions for the user will be described, when the system is configured for scalability (i.e. MEITC components running on different servers) by using the additional features specific for open environments (i.e. with the per-user message security services enabled):

User authentication

- [user] opens web browser
- [web browser] establishes a trusted channel with the MEITC web server: a mutual remote attestation will be executed
- [user] enters her username and password

- [web browser] sends username and password to the web server.
- [web server] establishes a trusted channel with the MEITC mail server: a mutual remote attestation will be executed
- [web server] sends username and password to the mail server.
- [mail server] establishes a trusted channel with the database server: a mutual remote attestation will be executed
- [mail server] asks the database server for the username and password
- [database server] returns username and password
- [mail server] checks username and password with the database server
- [mail server] establishes a trusted channel with the CSP: this channel is controlled by the TCB of the OpenTC framework
- [mail server] asks the CSP for the presence of valid certificate and key for the user
- [CSP] returns the result of the checking about the user's certificate
- [mail server]: if the authentication process fails the operation stops.

Accessing the inbox

- all communications between the MEITC components will occur through trusted channels as described above
- [web server] connects to the MEITC e-mail server for accessing the e-mail inbox data of this user
- [mail server] demands these data from MEITC database server
- [database server] gives this user's mails data to e-mail server
- [mail server] sends these data to web server
- [web server] forwards these data to the web browser
- [user] chooses the next operation.

Sending a signed and encrypted e-mail

- all communications between the MEITC components will occur through trusted channels as described above
- [user] composes the e-mail and select the signature and encryption options
- [web browser] sends the e-mail data to the web server
- [web server] sends the e-mail data to the mail server
- [mail server] sends the e-mail data to the CSP for signing and encrypting the e-mail
- [CSP] generates the signature for the e-mail by using the sender's private key and encrypts it by using the public keys of the recipients;
- [CSP] sends the signed and encrypted e-mail back to the mail server
- [mail server] sends the e-mail data to the trusted log server
- [trusted log server] stores a record that contains details of the e-mail and the

digest calculated over the message bytes; this secure record is held for non-repudiation purposes

- [mail server] sends the e-mail data to the database server
- [database server] stores the signed and encrypted e-mail to the sender's and the recipients' mailboxes in the proper folders
- [mail server] sends the acknowledge of the operation and the update of the mailbox to web server
- [web server] forwards the acknowledge to the web browser
- [user] chooses the next operation.

11.3.3.2 Policies

The administrator will be able to define policies that can be used to set the system configuration:

- general MEITC operations
 - setting the system for normal or high workload: MEITC components running respectively on a single box or on multiple server
 - setting the data to be stored within of the trusted log
 - enabling the per-user services for the messages (digital signature and encryption)
 - selecting crypto device to be used for signing/encrypting e-mails
- policies about e-mails and users (e.g. creation of groups of recipients, etc.)

11.3.4 Dependencies: Required services from sub layers

MEITC needs basic security properties, such as memory isolation, to run the different components on the same platform and SSL/TLS protocol enabled platform authentication for some trusted services. Other required services are Classic and Privacy CAs, the TSS and a centralized policy management infrastructure.

11.4 SWP06.c: Trusted Platform WYSIWYS application

“What You See Is What You Sign” (WYSIWYS) is a functional requirement for electronic signatures, especially when used in legal contexts (e.g. the European Directive 1999/93/EC on electronic signatures). To guarantee the trustworthiness of the displayed content being signed, there is the need to guarantee a trusted path from the signing (or verifying) application to the user. Many past and present solutions that claim to be WYSIWYS compliant, in reality they are not. In fact they do not protect against the Trojan software or „malware“ of either the document image displayed to the user or the user’s input to activate the smart-card signing operations. This is caused by the insecure architecture of the I/O subsystems integrated within the actual Operating Systems. This can be guaranteed only if the electronic signature application is build upon a trusted platform.

The objective of this Sub Workpackage is to design a reference architecture and implement a proof-of-concept to show that by using a TPM, its integrity measurements

and sealing capabilities and a proper Trusted Software Layer it is possible to create a trusted path to the user when generating or verifying the electronic signatures and guarantee the true satisfaction of WYSIWYS. This work is based on the output of WP4, namely the Trusted OS.

11.4.1 Requirements Breakdown

The WYSIWYS application scenario describes an application that is based on a Trusted Computing architecture and shows the benefits of the Trusted Computing for digitally signing the electronic documents. The application can perform the following actions: displaying the document being signed or verified, digitally signing the document, verifying the digital signature.

The application should be able to access documents stored onto other VM machines on external network servers, but during the signature generation and verification operations the WYSIWYS VM should be disconnected from the network while the other services and VMs running on top of the OpenTC framework can continue to work connected.

The application will be designed to support different formats for the electronic documents; therefore an interface to helper applications able to parse and display specific document formats will be developed.

The WYSIWYS application is built upon the OpenTC architecture on expects the presence of an underlying trusted system and requires the following services from it:

- **Secure Environment and basic services.** The WYSIWYS application may only execute when a secured environment is present. Thus, the underlying system must provide:
 - memory isolation and protection of processes running in the secure environment.
 - secure video output paths
 - secure input channels (keyboard, mouse)
 - other secure I/O channels (serial, PCMCIA, etc.) with a temporary exclusive access
 - measurement of the integrity of the WYSIWYS system and associated applications before they are loaded and executed
 - network isolation during the critical applications
 - application setup managed by policy (policies stored within a system-wide repository)
- **Cryptographic services.** The WYSIWYS requires several cryptographic services which have to be provided by the underlying system:
 - (hardware and software) crypto devices and standard interfaces (e.g. PKCS#11)
 - a Trusted Software Stack (TSS), supporting AIK generation and sealing for the signing keys. AIKs are required for platform authentication/attestation purposes (that can be included within the digital signature), while sealing is used to lock the signing keys to specific system configurations (when a TPM

is used as crypto device).

- trusted storage SWORM (Software Write Once Read Many) for storing the document to be presented and signed or verified
- trusted storage RW (Read/Write) for storing temporary files
- a system-wide database of certificates of root certification authorities, along with services to verify certificates.

11.4.2 High-level Specification and Design

The architecture of the WYSIWYS application is represented in Figure 24. Four main components will be developed: a control module, a user interface module, a helper application interface module and a policy module. These modules developed for this Sub Workpackage are represented as gray boxes inside the WYSIWYS VM component..




Figure 24: WYSIWYS VM with components

These modules will run in a single Virtual Machine devoted to the WYSIWYS application and will access the trusted storage service running outside the VM.

- **Control module:** This module controls all operations done by the application and accesses services (TWR and TSWORM storage), APIs (PKCS#11, TSS) and other WYSIWYS modules. This module exposes a simple API to access the main functions of the application. This way it is possible to develop a user interface as a console command or a GUI.
- **User interface module:** This module, built on top of the control module, serves for the interaction with the user.
- **Helper application interface module:** This module exposes a common interface to control the helper application used to present the document to be signed or verified. This makes the WYSIWYS application capable to support any document format: a helper layer must be implemented for each helper application to be supported. This module is accessed by the control module.

- **Policy module:** This module is responsible for enforcing the policies specific for this Virtual Machine.

11.4.3 Functionality: Services/APIs, Message/ Key / Policy formats

11.4.3.1 Main functions

The WYSIWYS application will provide three main functions. The breakdown of these function into elementary steps is the following:

Setting the WYSIWYS compartment

- [operator or user] starting point: trusted status of the platform and OS (how to guarantee this condition is out of the scope of this use case)
- [operator or user] definition of the WYSIWYS compartment (manually by trusted console or by policy - locally or remotely enforced)
 - resource assignment: trusted I/O channels – which ones among them can be used exclusively – and trusted basic services that can be used within this compartment
 - static registration of the integrity measurement of each software module that is allowed to run within the WYSIWYS compartment
 - installation of the software modules (device drivers, application components, helper applications, etc.) for the WYSIWYS application

Signing operation

- [user] (if not yet started) starting the WYSIWYS application within the WYSIWYS compartment previously set
- [user] displaying the document
 - [machine] taking the exclusive control of the video device in full screen (the user must unequivocally recognize that the content is displayed by the WYSIWYS application)
 - [machine] document check-in: loading the document file from the untrusted local or network file system
 - [machine] storing the document file onto the TSWORM storage
 - [machine] parsing the document file and presenting it (loading file from TSWORM, using TRW for temporary files)
- [user] signing the document
 - [user] selecting the signing device (among those allowed by the policy)
 - [user] selecting the signing key (among those allowed by the policy)
 - [machine] digest calculation in software (loading file from TSWORM)
 - [machine] taking the exclusive control of the channel to the crypto-device
 - [machine] user authentication for using the private key stored within the crypto-device
 - [machine] sending digest to the crypto-device for signature generation

- [signing device] performing the signature generation
- [machine] receiving the digital signature from crypto-device
- [machine] releasing the exclusive control of the channel to the crypto-device
- [machine] creating the digital signature envelope (e.g. CMS or XML signature) with the optional inclusion of the document file, if requested by the user and other additional operations (like requesting a time stamp, etc.)
- [machine] storing the digital signature envelope onto TSWORM
- [machine] optionally verifying the digital signature (by loading envelope file from TSWORM)
- [machine] optionally logging all operations to a trusted log
- [machine] check-out: storing the digital signature envelope on the untrusted local or network file system
- [machine] cleaning TSWORM and TRW
- [machine] releasing the exclusive control of the video device

Note: it is possible to design the application to support a single user authentication to crypto-device for a session of multiple signatures

Verifying operation

- (under the hypothesis of signature and document stored in the same “envelope”, i.e. the same file)
- [user] (if not yet started) starting the WYSIWYS application within the WYSIWYS compartment previously set
- [user] verifying the document
 - [machine] taking the exclusive control of the video device in full screen (the user must unequivocally recognize that the content is displayed by the WYSIWYS application)
 - [machine] document check-in: loading the digital signature envelope (including the document) file from the untrusted local or network file system
 - [machine] storing the document file onto the TSWORM storage
 - [machine] digest calculation in software of the document (loading “envelope” file from TSWORM and extracting the document)
 - [machine] selecting the proper subset of trusted CA certificates according to the policies
 - [machine] sending the calculated digest and the digital signature to verification procedure and displaying the result
 - [machine] optionally logging all operations to a trusted log
- [user] displaying the document
 - [machine] parsing the document file and presenting it (loading file from

TSWORM, using TRW for temporary files)

- [machine] cleaning TSWORM and TRW
- [machine] releasing the exclusive control of the video device

11.4.3.2 Policies

The following classes of policies will be supported and enforced:

- Compartment-oriented: setting up the trusted compartment for the WYSIWYS application (managed by the Trusted Computing Base)
- Application-oriented:
 - crypto-services options (they can come directly from the crypto-services, if supported – capability defined in WP3 - or they can be defined within the WYSIWYS context)
 - Selection of the allowed crypto devices according to the environment/user/whatever
 - Selection of the allowed signing certificates/keys according to the environment/user/whatever (different levels of assurance/quality keys/certificates bring to different profiles)
 - Selection of the allowed verifying certificates according to the environment/user/whatever (different levels of assurance/quality keys/certificates bring to different profiles) => different sets of trusted CA
 - *(optional)* Selection of the allowed cipher suites
 - digital signature options
 - allowed document formats
 - detached/enveloped/enveloping signatures
 - *(optional)* advanced options/services (e.g. time-stamping)
 - remote attestation (full measurement) of the TSA
 - light remote attestation: verifying that the status is the same as a previous state, considered as trusted (either self-certified or certified by a TTP through a full remote attestation) OCSP server, CRL repository
 - setting for accessing local (but external to the compartment) and network file systems: only outgoing connections must be allowed

11.4.4 Dependencies: Required Services from Sublayers

The WYSIWYS application needs basic security properties, such as memory isolation, secure input and output paths and Trusted Storage (SWORM and RW) for some trusted services. Other required services are the TSS, a PKCS#11 interface to crypto devices and a centralized policy management infrastructure.

11.5 SWP06.d: Encrypted File Service

The Encrypted File Service (EFS) targets use cases not covered by conventional disk and partition encryption, but require finer-grained protection mechanisms on a per-file basis. Example scenarios are:

1. Providing users with portability of encrypted data, while keeping support of Trusted Computing (TC). For instance, users might want to protect just a few files but might wish to move them frequently between different machines (within the same domain of the EFS) or keep backup copies of the files.
2. Providing a decryption policy which can be applied to individual files. This adds management features to file protection and provides the possibility to grant decryption rights to a particular user or group of users (optionally, within a certain defined period of time). This can be combined with a corresponding key recovery mechanism.

The EFS is transparent to applications, allowing legacy software to utilize the EFS without modifications. The OpenTC architecture provides the following benefits to the implementation of the EFS:

1. The decryption keys can be kept in a separate decryption compartment. Virtualization in OpenTC provides isolation of the key and memory area of the enc/decryption compartment from the client compartment where the application is executed.
2. The OpenTC framework provides trusted communication channels. This allows for the inclusion of remote server side components, including a central point of management for all computers within a controlled network.
3. The storage of decryption keys on the hard disk is encrypted and bound to the integrity of the platform using the TPM measurements.

The EFS is geared towards providing basic data security functions through an architecture based on web services, trusted computing and virtualization. This architecture has potential applications in stand alone installations for individuals as well as for corporations making use of remote laptops, virtualized desktops, or thin clients. Compared to volume encryption as standard protection mechanism, EFS specifically targets aspects of manageability, portability, and recoverability, maintaining a balance between security and usability.

Our current approach assumes EFS to be provided by a set of Java based web services running in a single JVM. Alternatively, EFS web services can be configured to run separately on different virtual machines or servlet containers such as Jetty or Apache Tomcat. Since running separate JVM and container instances will increase the memory consumption of EFS services, this design is advisable only if load balanced EFS services are serving many clients at the same time. The services could also be deployed on a J2EE compliant application server and even contribute to an enterprise service bus (ESB) and act as a generic encryption service for a service oriented architecture (SOA).

11.5.1 Requirements breakdown

The basic requirements of EFS are based on a client-server scenario.

- Trust in the client operating system should be minimal. This suggests to run

most of the critical operations on the server side (EFS core and EFS encryption-decryption server). The server side is verified by a trusted boot sequence at virtualization layer, and is implicitly trusted. The decryption keys are sealed to the attestation measurements of the server-side VMs, thus ensuring that the keys can only be used when the server-side VMs are integral.

- The server operating system instance has access to a TPM, possibly through a virtual TPM (vTPM). Correct configuration and functioning of the vTPM on both sides of vTPM architecture is assumed in order to carry out TPM sealing operations.
- The server OS instance has an installed Java platform including all libraries and the virtual machine. OpenTC-partner IAIK's jTSS wrapper wrapper provides Java applications with access to the TPM functionality. The Java side of EFS is configured as a set of Java web services, supporting XML-RPC. The web services can be started using a service starter Java class.
- No key should be stored on the client side, and no password is kept in memory on the client side. Sessions between client and server should be limited in lifetime and in the number of interactions performed.
- The design should prevent replay attacks, e.g. by utilizing an (implicitly trusted) time base provided by the server. Session hijacking should be prevented, e.g. by cryptographically verified initial handshakes. In a stand-alone installation of EFS for an individual's home PC, virtualization based isolation is assumed to be sufficient. For networked cases, the use of a cryptographic protocol is mandatory.

We further assume that the following requirements that are at least partially supplied by the OpenTC demonstrator prototype configuration:

- Memory isolation and protection of memory among virtualized operating system instances
- Integrity of OS instances is measured at booting (optionally it would be beneficial to periodically check the integrity of selected static portions of OS instances during run time)
- A TSS should be working with trusted connection to a TPM device. The TSS may interface a virtual TPM, provided that the integrity of the vTPM instance residing in the controller domain on the server side is maintained.
- The functionality of a vTPM based TSS must support a subset of the TPM functions for sealing. The vTPM must retain the information required for unsealing objects when being stopped and restarted.
- The networking support between OS instances, possibly provided by a TVD virtual switch OS instance, should provide protection against subverting the SSL/TLS protocols by attacks at lower level network protocols.
- A certificate authority (CA) and a privacy CA should be available.
- Sensitive information, such as user names and passwords should be entered through a secure channel, e.g. the vmGUI application.

11.5.2 High Level Specification


The EFS is composed of a client side and a set of server side components. The client side is composed of the following components:

- A component that provides a Linux C/C++ API extension through LD_PRELOAD mechanism (C++) (see section on Functionality)
- A component that initiates and continues communication with the EFS servers (C++)

The server side includes the following components:

- EFS Core Server functions as a common broker for all EFS services (Java).
- EFS Authentication Server (AS) to initiate an authentication request through the UI server and returns the result for authentication. The AS also accesses the EFS user database, which is by default an LDAP server (Java).
- EFS Policy Server checks if a policy is consistent or broken (Java).
- EFS Encryption Decryption Server (EDS) manages sessions, checks policies for user requests and upon acceptance, runs encryption/decryption commands. EDS also accesses the EFS key database, which is by default a relational database (Java).
- EFS Recovery Server is used to back-up and recover key databases (Java).
- EFS User Interface Server (UI) manages connection to vmGUI, acting as an easy to use façade, and optionally provides an SSL/TLS based connection (C++).

On the basis of OpenTC demonstrator 2007 configuration, which has a vmGUI already installed, this would appear as in the following figure (rounded corners denote EFS components).



For scalability, these components could be distributed to multiple JVM's or different virtualized OS instances. On a large scale scenario with many physical machines, it is

advisable that EDS remain on the same physical machine to reduce network traffic and improve security.

All communication between client and Core, and between EDS and other services have very small chunk size. On the other hand, the traffic between client and EDS involve sending back and forward files. This is best handled in memory, which is isolated and secured by virtualization infrastructure.

EDS would have its local encrypted key database, whose key is sealed using the local TPM. Only for backup purposes and using trusted communication channels (like remote attestation enabled SSL, trusted virtual domains) encrypted keys would be sent towards recovery server.

11.5.3 Functionality

For demonstrative purposes, the basic functionality of decrypting a file is explained step by step.

domClient:

- A user wants to open an encrypted file and it initiates an *fopen()* C library call.
- The *fopen()* call is trapped by the EFS modified *fopen()* function, which first checks if the file is encrypted.
- After having seen an encrypted file, the EFS function initiates contact with the Core Server.

domCore:

- In order to update the anonymous session to one with a designated user, CoreServer initiates Authentication Server.
- The Authentication Server connects with the UI Server and asks for a username and a password.

domUI

- The UI server makes use of the local interface of vmGUI which appears on the user's screen.
- The user enters user name and password. The keyboard can not be logged by the domClient virtual machine.
- The UI server securely sends back user name and password.

domCore

- EFS Authentication Server completes the authentication process and notifies Core Server.
- EFS Core notifies a designated EFS Encryption Decryption Server instance about the client and shares its session with EDS.
- EFS Core sends back the location (network address) of the designated EDS along with session information to the client.

domClient

- Client send an EFS command (decrypt file) with the file attached.

domCore

- EDS server first checks the policies embedded in the file header. The policies are signed using the Policy Server, so their validity can be secured.
- EDS then sends the policies with the user name and context variables (IP address, time, etc) to the Policy Server.
- The Policy Server checks the policies for current context and user name as well as global policies not stored in the file but only on itself. If the file can be accessed it is granted a one time access.
- EDS now accesses the encrypted part of the header. This part is encrypted using an RSA key that resides on EDS key database. Within this part is the symmetric key that has been used to encrypt the file itself.
- EDS then starts decrypting the file on the fly. As each network chunk arrives it is decrypted immediately not using any disk space or scratch disk.

domClient

- The client receives the decrypted file. It checks the integrity of the decrypted file using the file hash that was in the header's signed part.
- The client side then accesses the file as usual.

Note: Upon closure of the file using *fclose()*, a reverse action is carried on for encrypting back the file. Also note that enforced policies play a crucial role in granting access to a user for a specific file.

The policies are developed by a rule language that is commonly used in business applications and they are executed using ReTe algorithm.

- Policies exist for time and location as well as for user roles and groups as defined in LDAP.
- Combined effect of a set of policies can be like this: “users of group personnel can only access this file in weekdays and in business hours and in local network, but users of group managers can access this file at any time, and any where”.
- Additional global policies that reside in the server can exist. This can be used for many purposes. For instance a legal inspection on files could start with adding a global policy that denies access to everyone so that files could not be changed at all.

EFS supports several PKI based actions.

A common problem is that keys should be reset from time to time. In this case, users normally need to decrypt and encrypt all their files, while both old and new keys are valid.

- On the other hand, one could need a previously encrypted file on a back-up set, but the key would be no longer valid. In order to access the file a point-in-time recovery should be initiated. EFS Recover Server can do this by storing all previous keys with their respective validity periods (start of period, planned expiration, actual expiration).
- The server will just identify and supply the correct RSA key.
- As the correct key for any file can be identified, EFS recovery server actually can be used to initiate Just-In-Time access to any file encrypted any time. This could be particularly useful for a large document management system (DMS)

where terabytes of data is stored.

- In a DMS, files are centrally stored and accessed by users from time to time. Changing the keys by decrypting and encrypting back terabytes of data is practically impossible. But it is possible to securely access the DMS storage, even when the particular RSA key for the file has been exposed through further (volume) encryption of DMS storage.
- Upon authenticating the user, the DMS software would just make use of EFS EDS and EFS RS to artificially recover the file in hand.

11.5.4 Dependencies

EFS needs a subset of TSS functionality. If the TSS interfaces a virtual TPM, we assume that the vTPM integrity is guaranteed by means of a securely virtualized OS instance configuration, e.g. by a vTPM running in a trusted virtual domain which can make use of remote attestation.

11.6 SWP06.e: Multifactor Authentication

The MFA application scenario describes an application that is based on a Trusted Computing architecture and shows the benefits of the Trusted Computing for ensuring that only users who own registered platforms may have access to the remote server. Multifactor authentication to remote server involves components executed at server and client computers. Client components will register platform with the remote server. Client component will interface with the local TPM through TSS. User can log on to a remote server once platform registration is completed.

The parameters of multifactor authentication system can be controlled by authentication policies of the trusted platform.

11.6.1 Requirements breakdown

As long as an authorized system is used to access corporate resources, the entire infrastructure can be thought of as protected. Even if somebody's credentials have been stolen, the intruder will have to operate from trusted corporate platform to gain access to the resources. On the other hand even the authorized user may mistakenly try to gain the access from improperly configured system, such as a home computer, untrusted device, etc. - platforms that by definition are outside the corporate control.

The multifactor authentication, including both user and platform authentication covers up most of these threats. The access to the network is granted only if both elements - user and platform are successfully authenticated.

Implementation of a Multifactor Authentication application expects the presence of an underlying trusted system and requires the following services from it:

- an installed and running OpenTC framework on the client platform.
- Multifactor authentication services require fully implemented Trusted Software Stack (TSS) for Linux according to TCG specification. TSS stack must support basic TCG functionality including Attestation Identities Keys (AIK) generation, TPM Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) calculation, storing, and retrieval.
- security services such as OpenSSL to provide TLS for the HTTP protocol.

- Crypto and PKI services developed in SWP03c and SWP05d, e.g a Privacy CA

11.6.2 High-level Specification/Design of selected Workpackages

The following components will be developed:

- Client component
- Remote server component
 - Platform identities database
 - Policy Enforcer

The client and server components are installed on two systems by the system administrator. After installation is completed the user has access to the client system. The system administrator has access to the server computer.




Figure 26: MFA components

These components can run on on a single Linux box with TSS and TPM as well as on top of the OpenTC framework. In the latter case, these components can also run on a single physical machine but in different VMs with the purpose of the local authentication: this is shown in Figure 26.

11.6.3 Functionality: Services/APIs, Message/Key/Policy formats

11.6.3.1 Functionalities

There are three actions that can be performed on the client:

1. **Platform registration with the remote server:** An existing user with administrative rights can register the platform authentication information (Platform AIK): First the Platform AIK is created inside the local TPM (if does not exist yet). Then, the AIK certificate request is built and sent to the OpenTC Privacy CA. Finally the Platform AIK is activated and the AIK certificate is being retrieved. OpenTC Privacy CA holds the copy of this certificate for the authentication purposes, and the platform as the unique identifier.
2. **User registration with remote server.** The possibility of a new user registration relies solely on the existing infrastructure. The application does not intend to interfere in any way the security practices existing in the infrastructure. If no support for user authentication exists the proprietary demo authentication will be used.
3. **Logon to the remote server.** The Logon Application (LAP) establishes secure communication channel with a remote server using HTTPS protocol through the OpenSSL library. The LAP then retrieves the TPM Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) values, unlocks the Platform AIK, and collects the User Identity (UI). If no PCRs are available at the time of the implementation the PCRs will not be used. If PCRS are available they can be used to unlock the Platform AIK.

The LAP sets up the Combined Authentication Information (COAUTH):

- the User Identity (UI) - username and password pair
- Platform TPM PCRs
- Platform Identifier (public part of Platform AIK)

Both UI and PCRs are signed with the Platform AIK to ensure the information integrity. This Combined Authentication Information (COAUTH) is being send to the remote server for authentication.

Remote server receives COAUTH and proceeds with the platform authentication. It queries the OpenTC Privacy Certificate Authority (CA) to certify the Platform AIK. OpenTC CA verifies that the specified Platform AIK is registered with the corporate infrastructure and acts as a platform credential repository. The second pass involves verification of the Platform TPM PCRs, known as a platform attestation procedure. If both steps succeed the server proceeds with user authentication, which relies on the existing authentication infrastructure and is out of the scope of this scenario.

There are four actions that can be performed on the remote server:

1. **Register platform and store platform information.** A server supports the platform registration. This procedure involves registering Platform AIK certificate with the OpenTC Privacy CA.
2. **Register user and store user information.** A server can verify user credentials. This basically relies on the existing authentication infrastructure.
3. **Edit user/platform policy for multifactor access.** System administrator can change user policies on the server to determine required credentials in order to log on to the server.
4. **Enforce policy for server access.** A server can verify user credentials with defined policy set and reject logon if multifactor authentication fails.

11.6.3.2 Policies

The policy determines what type authentication is required to access the network. The following policies will be defined:

- Platform authentication is required (optional if policy is not set).
- The list of platforms a user is allowed to login from (user can use any registered platform if this policy is not set).

11.6.4 Dependencies: Required services from sub-layers

MFA needs basic security properties, such as memory isolation to run the different components of MFA on a single physical machine. Services like a Privacy CA, the TSS and a centralized policy management infrastructure will be required for a complete server-client scenario.

12 Workpackage 07: Evaluation and Assurance

12.1 General

The aim of this Workpackage is to verify and validate the OpenTC platform produced in WP04, WP05 and WP03, consisting of a trusted virtualization layer (L4/XEN) and additional security services. The ultimate objective is to certify this software at level CC EAL5. Verification and validation decompose into 1) testing, 2) formal verification 3) methodology and 4) risks analysis. The certification activity is concerned by the production of data (testing and analyses results) to support CC certification, that is a project in itself. The target of these activities is a significant and representative part of the code of WP04.

In order to reach this goal, significant efforts will be spent on research, to improve the existing methods and tools of the partners as well as applying them to the targets. The latter will evolve along the project, as the components of the OpenTC framework are made available. Indeed, WP04 develops several versions of the OpenTC platform during the first period (18 months) of the project. Since a complete framework will not be available initially, WP07 started in year 1 to focus on selected modules that are already available and stable, namely XEN 3.0.1, Fiasco V2 and the Linux kernel V2.6. During the second project period, the XEN and Fiasco project specific components remain valid targets and the TSS module of WP03 is added. As developments of the OpenTC framework progress, WP07 will examine if new components might be considered too. When possible, the same targets will be used in several SWP07x, allowing results to be comparable. However, targets must also be diversified, to cover as much code as possible of the OpenTC platform.

12.2 SWP07a: Manual and automated Security Testing, Risk Analysis

This SWP is mainly concerned with the security assessment of the targets.

The core activities of this SWP are

- **Security testing** will be carried out. The used testing method will employ automated mechanisms as well as manual techniques with the aim of looking for security-relevant programming bugs.
- A **risk analysis** of the ToE will also be performed using formal languages and models. Such models provide useful input to SWP07b and SWP07d as they are required during the CC process and will be refined in a more detailed formal specification.
- Finally, an **evaluation** will be created based on the results of the security testing and **recommendations** will be given to overcome the discovered weaknesses. These recommendations will be channelled back into the development process in order to increase the security properties of the ToE.

12.2.1 Objectives

The following objectives can be formulated for this SWP:

- Select one target among those defined above. The TSS will be considered.

- Identify the exact content of the target (i.e. modules, modules version, modules source code, etc.).
- State the requirements set forth against the ToE (based on the results of WP2, available in this document).
- Create a Test Plan listing the test cases to be executed during the project.
- Adapt the automated test vector generation application to the ToE.
- Carry out testing based on the Test Plan.
- Carry out the risk analysis.
- Create the evaluation and collect the recommendations.
- Finalize the results in a Test Report.

12.2.2 Approach

SWP07a aims at carrying out a security assessment of the ToE consisting of the modules provided by WP4 and WP5. For this purpose (1) a security testing will be carried out, (2) a risk analysis will be done and (3) recommendations will be given to overcome the discovered weaknesses and an overall evaluation will be given.

12.2.2.1 Security testing

During security testing the main focus is on evaluating, whether (1) **applied protection measures are strong enough** to enforce the control objectives set forth towards the ToE and whether (2) the **measures are implemented and operated in an adequate way**.

Before starting the security testing of a module, first the developers of that component need to provide a version suitable for testing. This is the point, where this SWP relies on other activities of the project.

The applied security testing method will follow two approaches:

- **Black-box testing:** with the black-box testing approach the basic idea is to analyse the ToE as an already compiled and executable binary application, which can be influenced only by external input (i.e. messages or configuration files).

This approach is useful in case the ToE is not available in source code, it is not possible or feasible to test it with modified source code or when the unmodified ToE has to be tested.

During black-box testing the tester aims to create an environment (by setting appropriate configuration options) and alter the input data of the ToE (by either generating the messages himself or intercepting and altering existing test input) so that the ToE will be driven into a potentially unforeseen state resulting in an exposed flaw.

- **Source-code-based approach using fault-injection:** when using this approach the source code of the ToE is altered so that its internal data structures can externally be modified easily based on the needs of the tester.

The usual technique is that a so-called hook is inserted into the code which transfers the contents of the tested internal data structures to an external

entity, which can even modify the ToE's internal state by returning the modified test data. The ToE is then re-compiled with the inserted hook and can then be used by the test vector generator similarly to the black-box mode.

For the approaches discussed above the following main techniques are planned to be used to trigger and detect the security bugs:

- **Automated test algorithms** – for common types of security-relevant programming bugs – create test vectors based on generic algorithms. These algorithms can be employed on virtually any types of data structures without modification.

It has to be emphasized that the majority of the security-relevant programming bugs belong to a small and identified set of bug types, for which such generic algorithms can be constructed, which detect the bugs with a very good probability, thus increasing the security properties of the ToE significantly.

For the automated test vector generation we will use the software tool named **Flinder**, which (1) provides a plug-in architecture to insert various generic test algorithms, (2) can process various kinds of data encoding (e.g. binary, text-based, etc.), (3) is capable of following complex test sequences on protocol statecharts and (4) is outfitted with a crypto module to be able to process cryptographically encoded messages as well.

- Besides the automated testing, **manual testing based on human intelligence is also planned**. For several test scenarios it is difficult or simply not feasible to create automated algorithms. These test cases need to be manually set up and executed.
- Finally, besides searching new types of flaws, **looking for previously discovered bugs** is an important activity to be carried out. For the collection of relevant bugs BME will carry out a research in the known public vulnerability databases (e.g. SecurityFocus and CERT databases) and also rely on internal vulnerabilities discovered during the execution of previous security evaluation projects.

Test results document the observations made during the course of execution of the different test cases of the security testing effort. These results describe objectively the behaviour of the ToE, no judgement will be given at this point about the seriousness of the potential flaws. Risk analysis is accomplished in a separate step.

12.2.2.2 Risk analysis

The main goal of risk analysis is to (1) identify threats to the ToE and (2) derive the potential risks of these. For this purpose formal models are used (such as finite state models, access matrices or information flow models) in order to produce an output usable for the CC evaluation up to EAL5.

Please notice that this risks analysis task has been started during Year 1, but is temporarily interrupted during the second year of the project. It will possibly continue in Year 3. The efforts associated to risks analysis will be moved to SWP07b (see below)

temporarily.

12.2.2.3 Evaluation and recommendations

An **evaluation**, based on the results of the security testing will be carried out in order to assess the weaknesses found. During the evaluation they will be categorized according to (1) the required preparedness needed to mount an attack on the ToE based on the weakness in question and (2) the seriousness of the attack that can be executed.

As the round-up of the evaluation BME will give **recommendations** based on the identified and categorized weaknesses for the developers of the ToE with the goal of eliminating or at least minimizing the risk posed by the flaws discovered.

12.2.3 Dependencies with other SWP

This SWP shall test some of the software components produced by WP4. Testing can only be carried out on the available modules provided. For testing purposes, different specifications (architecture, design, etc.) are required, as well as the code or executable of the module and its documentation.

Furthermore, a list of requirements defined for the ToE within WP2 (in this document) are needed in order to be able to verify the results obtained from the security testing with the intended behavior of the ToE.

The results of the formal risk analysis will be used in SWP07c and SWP07d.

The recommendations based on the results of the security testing will be channeled back to WP4 so that appropriate corrections can be done to the created modules in order to overcome the found weaknesses.

12.3 SWP07b: Linux Package Verification

This SWP is mainly concerned on a **formal static analysis** of the ToE using pre-existing and currently developed tools that have been used primarily for embedded applications. Static analysis encompasses a set of techniques whose objectives is to verify exhaustively that a given program or model meets its specifications. These techniques are complementary to testing techniques (SWP07a), who generally, can not test exhaustively a given program. Static analysis techniques consider specifications, designs and models with mathematical rigour, as the main means to manipulate them and prove properties. Abstract Interpretation (Cousot&Cousot) and Hoare Logics (Floyd, Hoare, Dijkstra) are the two main techniques involved here.

Using existing tools and the partners experience, the partners of this SWP study how to formally analyse the ToE with the objective to extract the most errors possible out of the code. During the first year of the project, both partners mainly considered and examined different approaches (automata and deductive techniques) and surveyed existing tools and their adequacy to the ToE nature. During the second year, two tools will be applied to the ToE: a commercial tool selected during year 1 will be used by TUS and a home-made tool, adapted to OpenTC, will be applied by CEA. On the same ToE, it is expected that both approaches will extract a maximum of errors.

The ToE raises many technical problems for research and development, that concern the methods, tools and methodology aspects. A significant portion of the SWP is

devoted to solving fundamental problems and implementing solutions to these problems, whenever feasible.

The ultimate aim of SWP07b is to analyze essential components of the final OpenTC framework developed in WP04.

12.3.1 Objectives

The objectives can be decomposed as follows:

- Select a representative sub-part of the ToE.
- Examine and install it.
- Understand and model the target.
- Perform an exhaustive analysis of the target.
- Examine if possible tool extensions, necessary for the analysis of the target.
- Implement the tool extensions.
- Produce recommendations to the developers.

12.3.2 Approach

Given the nature of the target, the partners will proceed as follows:

- Examine the virtualization tool **XEN 3.0.3** final (source and binary code). This tool has a significant size (180+ KLOC) and presents some difficulties inherent to the open-source code: limited design documentation, rapidly evolving versions of code, mixture of low-level assembly and C code, Python, etc.
- Install, test and understand these virtualization tool (VT).
- Examine their code to gain some understanding of the VT structure and architecture.
- Discuss with the authors of the code to define what sub-parts are important and should be analyzed formally. The partners developing XEN propose to consider that the initialization function and the hypercalls.
- Perform the analysis of the selected parts, using the tools selected by the partners during the first year.
- Enhance the tools and their method if necessary: the PPC (now FRAMA-C) C code analyzer will be improved. Initially, FRAMA-C supports the C language only.
- Experiment on a C++ analysis method, adapted from PPC. This work will not become a part of FRAMA-C as it consists of initial research on the analysis of C++ code, based on some modules of the OpenTC framework. The ultimate aim is to build a C++ analyzer prototype able to analyze the C sub-language of Fiasco. It proceeds by translating C++ into C and will use FRAMA-C when necessary.
- Research solutions to the tricky problems encountered along the ToE analysis.

Among the foreseen problems are:

- Difficulties to analyze C++ templates, multiple inheritance and virtual methods statically.

- Built-in assembly code are not well recognized, and must be hand replaced by equivalent code.
 - The modeling of the memory and its paging system, because it requires to set the right granularity for describing every data in memory and because of the different memory address types.
- Implementation of the tools extensions: the C analyzer along the target code analysis.
 - Tools extensions: the PPC (FRAMA-C) tool continues to improve and adapt to the ToE.
 - Synthesis and reporting: this will lead to deliverable D07.2 that will describe the results of all previous tasks.

12.3.3 Functionality

Basically, the static C analysis tools inputs C code and produce a set of warnings and errors as well as a set of traces. The former indicate at which places in the code something abnormal happened, as well as the nature of the abnormalities. Traces help the analyzer to understand how the source code has been traversed and what hypotheses (such as abstracting away an array into one element) and simplifications (such as ignoring chunks of assembly code) have been made by the analyzer.

Discovered abnormalities have to be checked manually, as they might be false alarms or real alarms. False alarms are due to abstract interpreters who approximate the behavior of the program (data and code), leading to false errors.

12.3.4 Dependencies with other SWP

The dependencies with other SWP are as follows:

- The methodology to be developed in SWP07c depends on the methods and tools used herein.
- The present SWP depends on the progress of WP04, namely for the targets XEN and Fiasco.

12.4 SWP07c: Applied Trust Verification and Integrity Methodology

The objective of this SWP is to develop an open, peer-reviewed methodology for security, trust and integrity testing. This methodology should apply to the other SWPs in this WP as well as to the framework application developed by WP04. The security tests provide the data for quantifiable metrics which in turn allow one to quantify trust and transpose it into a form one can recognize and deduce, like a percentage or a grade. Finding the trust in Trusted Computing means applying verification methods for integrity and the components of trust. The **Applied Verification for Integrity and Trust (AVIT)** is a methodology to understand and relate in a scientific manner to the ephemeral concept of trust. Trust is something we can do innately but which we cannot yet measure without bias.

12.4.1 Objectives

The development of AVIT consists of the following tasks:

- Final completion of the Risk Assessment Value security metric (November 2006).
- Define international terminology for use with Trusted computing.
- First draft of the Trust metric within the RAV scope (January 2007).
- Develop the manual for applying the Trust metric and RAV within the AVIT methodology (from December 2006 to December 2007).
- Apply the Trust metric and RAV to WP components such as to the base framework and the various stages of a completed build to measure progress and gage loss of security with the addition of new components (from April 2007).
- Ascertain public review and commentary to the security testing methodology and AVIT (from December 2006 to May 2008).

12.4.2 Approach

The follow-up to the research on methodology which has been provided in the first 18 months will continue with peer review, practical application within this project and elsewhere, and error and constraint testing. With security one can define the components of protection and control and measure if those components are in place. Measuring the components requires tests and those tests will also determine the reality of the protection and controls as well as their limitations. A generic test case will be defined and analysed by AVIT. This test case will contain a set of OpenTC specific modules, running on top of a trusted SUSE Linux.

12.5 SWP07d: Towards CC EAL5 Certification

12.5.1 General

The main objective is to study how the target made of the code developed in WP04, composed of the combination of some trusted virtualization layers (L4/XEN) and the Linux kernel, could satisfy with CC level EAL5 and/or above.

12.5.2 Objectives

This work does not perform the evaluation in itself, but examine its feasibility and prepare some other project to do this work together with a Certification Authority. Such a project is provided with guidelines and a table of existing and missing items concerning this target.

This decomposes as follows:

- The definition of the ToE is an ongoing effort that changes with the use cases manifested in the demonstrator prototypes engineered by the partners. While the purposes of the software change, security-relevant requirements remain the same or similar with their focus being on separation and isolation of virtual machines.
- There is evidence that there are misconceptions and misunderstandings on behalf of the project partners about the exact security objectives and requirements of the frameworks generated. Workshops in the first period of the project have clearly shown that **educative support** is necessary within the consortium, especially during workshops where design decisions are being made.

- The **feasibility** of undertaking an EAL5 certification will evolve in the course of the project similar to the changes of the purposes of the software as described above. Both the risks associated and the recommended actions need investigation.

12.5.3 Approach

The first year of the project investigated what is really relevant for CC certification and what open-source Linux-based targets are feasible. The results have been discussed along the CC EAL5 criteria in D07.1. and pointed on some major obstacles. This work will continue during year 2, and address the remaining criteria. We concluded that entire Linux core is not certifiable at EAL5 but merely lower components might be reasonable. Modules specific to OpenTC, especially XEN, will be the target of SWP07d for Year 2. The definition of ToE also remains a priority, as the OpenTC framework are continuously evolving.

An audit of the XEN core code will be conducted, to examine the domains separation functions. Flaws & implementation will be reported. This work is shared by WP07 and WP09.

12.5.4 Dependencies with other SWP

This SWP depends on all other SWP07x as well as WP04, because

- SWP07x provide tangible evidence on the semi-formal and formal representation of Linux/XEN/L4 Fiasco modules, that are necessary to satisfy ADV criteria.
- WP04 and its SWP provide the essential material (binary and source code, documentation,...) of the OpenTC framework, necessary for this study of the CC EAL5 evaluation criteria.

13 Workpackage 08: TC for embedded controllers in mobile phones

Trusted computing concepts can be applied to IT systems other than just PC platforms, such as embedded controller based systems. These are used in large numbers for dedicated systems including mobile phones, automotive and industrial control equipment. Such equipment needs trust and security functionality to prevent malfunctions of the services, and resulting negative effects on the related networks.

The requirements in this area are substantially different from those of conventional trusted PCs. In particular, they have to consider cost pressure, limitations of resources, space and energy, real time requirements etc. We will therefore investigate how the principles explored and evaluated by other OpenTC WPs can be used in this application area.

13.1 Overview

This Workpackage has two main elements, namely:

- Mobile-specific applications requirements analysis to investigate TPM properties that are needed for running key applications on embedded devices. This will help understand whether a subset of TPM functions is sufficient to supported this class of devices.
- the prototyping of a mobile trusted platform with the specification and implementation of an sample trusted OS on a mobile platform.

The detailed activities for both elements are listed the following two sub-sections.

Market requirements and technical capabilities

Security and Trust Requirements prerequisites

- Extract stakeholder security requirements, including device manufacturer, network operator, service provider (e.g. OMA-DRM), and end-user security requirements.
- Define a minimum set of (abstract) functionalities required from the underlying platform (HW and SW) to meet the extracted security requirements;
- Analysis of TC specifications for mobile devices:
- TPM hardware and the corresponding software stack;
- Investigate options of using other platforms (e.g., ARM, TrustZone);
- Analysis of the underlying hardware example (S-GOLD3, an already existing two processor mobile phone base band chip from IFX), and how it can be interfaced and used for TPM functionality;

Market and mobile standards requirements

- Analysis of markets, user and mobile phone provider requirements;
- Analysis of mobile phone standard requirements and dependencies with regard to trust and security;

Evaluation of security needs and critical issues;

- Definition of the dependability requirements for a mobile and trusted secure mobile platform;
- Planning, discussing and specification of the issues to define the minimum needs for next generation trusted platforms.

Security analysis of the resulting trusted mobile platform

- Analyse which minimal set of trust functions are sufficient for TPMs for embedded controllers to realize a trusted and secure mobile platform.
- Analysis and evaluation of application scenarios and corresponding profiles

Trusted OS for embedded mobile phone controller

- Porting most important parts of secure operating system to the underlying hardware:
 - Selection of the appropriate kernel;
 - Improving system for required security services.
- Analysing applications for a trustworthy mobile platform, and define/realise prototypes, concerning:
 - Secure software upload and update;
 - Secure SIMlock;
 - International Mobile Equipment Identifier (IMEI) protection;
 - DRM applications.
- Analysing and optimizing real time performance of the trusted OS to make the complete system useful for its target applications:
 - Selection, configuring and optimization of the appropriate kernel;
 - Improving system with less impact on real time response.
 - Defining the appropriate real-time properties for such a system

13.2 SWP08a: Market Requirements and technical Capabilities

Our main activities are:

1. Analysis of market, user and mobile network provider requirements
2. Specification of a minimum set of functionalities for an embedded HW/SW platform to meet the extracted requirements
3. Investigation of suitability and possible realization of mobile TPMs for demonstrator

For the mobile phone demonstrator, the two use cases IMEI protection and secure wallet will be investigated in more detail.

Output of WP08a is a report summarizing the results of our investigations.

Documentation and ongoing standardization activities of organizations like OMTP, TCG or OMA are reflected in our work. It should be noted, however, that they can only be

included in the official output of this Workpackage to the extent they have been made available to the public by these organizations.

The investigation will start out from an overview of features present on current mobile phone that would benefit from enhanced security mechanisms. If applicable, existing standardization to address the corresponding security are referenced.

13.2.1 Market, user and mobile network provider requirements

SWP8a investigates security and trust requirements of relevant stakeholders, namely mobile network operators (MNOs) and end users, and security features on end systems will impact both the MNO business model and customer satisfaction. We will have to investigate whether end user requirements depend on how a mobile phone is used: for instance, a business user may have requirements that are different from those of private one. Recent trends show that mobile phones are increasingly used as a replacement for PDAs. This raises the question whether the attitude of end users to security features will also need to change, suggesting to include security awareness as a topic for the investigation.

The analysis has to account for features on present day mobile phone features which could benefit from TC based security mechanisms. This includes the process of system software update, the installation of application software, SIM-lock, IMEI protection, digital rights management schemes and features exploiting (U)SIM card protection capabilities.

The vast majority of mobile phones currently in the market are closed systems, allowing at most the download of JAVA games, ring tones etc. We will mainly focus on scenarios that go beyond the current state of art by investigating open mobile platforms that allow to download and install software and corresponding threats. Recent standardization efforts on platform security provided by the Open Mobile Terminal Platform (OMTP) will be analysed The Mobile Phone Work Group of TCG has begun to work on trusted computing concepts for mobile devices. Their approach is based on adapting and enhancing TCG concepts for use in mobile phone platforms, which operate in a rather different business environment and have a business model requirements different to those of the standard PC.

The analysis of mobile networks will focus on GSM and UMTS networks to gain a comprehensive overview of all system aspects concerning security.

Some threat scenarios will be considered with a focus on how shortcomings of existing specifications or implementation deficiencies could be exploited. One example is the network authentication scheme which has been significantly enhanced from GSM to UMTS by introducing mutual authentication. Threat models may have to account for varying roles of stakeholders in particular scenarios. One example is broadcast access protection as known from the pay TV industry: in this case, the owner of the handset could also be a potential attacker. It will be investigated in more detail how current security requirements can be mapped to technical functionality.

Special focus is put on the IMEI protection feature which is now used as a countermeasure to prevent handset theft. In some countries it is now a criminal offence to reprogram the IMEI on a handset, or under some circumstances, even to possess equipment capable carrying out such an operation. The IMEI has special requirements on the mobile phone, as it represents a read-only and unchangeable piece of information stored in non-volatile memory.

Problems related to IMEI protection are representative for a class of security use cases where a static data object such as a certificate and its use has to be protected. A secure wallet feature will be investigated to explore security requirements for protecting dynamic data, such as PIN codes, private addresses etc.

Output of this Sub Workpackage is an internal report at M06 which will summarize the investigation results.

13.2.2 Minimum set of functionalities for embedded HW/SW platforms

Using the M06 report, a minimum set of security and trust functionality required to form a basis for the implementation of a robust security architecture in a mobile phone will be defined. Requirements for both hardware and software will be specified. One example is the ability to provide a certificate based boot procedure, which guarantees to arrive at a well defined system status after power-on.

In addition to boot-time requirements, OS runtime requirements need to be addressed as well. For example, this includes questions related to robustness attributes of a secure execution environment on an open mobile phone to process secret keys.

Special constraints on mobile platforms in terms of limited memory and processing power, real time requirements, power consumption demands and availability of I/O facilities will be considered.

Output is a list of abstract functions and facilities which will be summarized in an internal report at M09.

13.2.3 Suitability and options of mobile TPM for demonstrator

This Sub Workpackage will analyse how TPM and TSS specifications can be mapped to the S-GOLD3, a dedicated embedded controller from Infineon. It will be investigated which subset of TPM functionality is needed for a demonstrator implementing the IMEI protection and secure wallet use cases. The S-GOLD3 controller already contains a set of security features. Taking into account effort and budget considerations, we will determine how to best realize the target use cases and what level of protection can be achieved with the available resources.

An important aspect concerns the question of how OS security requirements map to TPM/TSS functionality. Initially the work will be based on the use of a discrete TPM. Depending on the results of the analysis, some functionality of the TPM may then be mapped directly to the S-GOLD3 security hardware.

The results of this investigation will be presented in an internal report at M15.

13.3 SWP08b: Trusted Operating System for Mobile Platforms

This Sub Workpackage is concerned with the specification and implementation of trusted platform components on mobile and embedded hardware. The main goals and objectives are as follows:

- Specify and analyse components of a trusted mobile operating system
- Investigate a microkernel-based operating system for the Infineon S-GOLD3 hardware
- Investigate the requirements for running a demo-application on mobile

platforms

- Implement a demonstrator-application

13.3.1 Overview

In order to specify and implement functionality of a trusted mobile operating system, OpenTC SWP08b has to analyse existing hardware platforms, in particular those provided by the industrial partner: Infineon's S-GOLD2 and S-GOLD3. These platforms are single chip ICs that are manufactured specifically for the mobile market and include not only all functionality of a cellular radio, but also other features like multimedia extensions. It has to be examined, to what extent they are suitable for a trusted operating system and how the trusted computing functionality can be emulated.

SWP08 is currently working on an operating system prototype for the Infineon S-GOLD2 hardware platform which is based on the L4 microkernel version developed by TU-Dresden. This prototype is a modified Linux system, called L4-Linux.

Moreover, real time performance of the prototype is analysed with the goal to improve the overall system's behaviour with respect to its target applications. SWP08b aims at providing a system that can be used to run a demo-application (cf. Subsection 13.3.2) on mobile platforms based on S-GOLD2.

The first step towards a trusted platform on top of S-GOLD3 is to analyse the hardware's capabilities for the required trusted computing functionality. The specifications must be examined in order to determine how trusted computing functionality – for instance, building a trusted bootstrap – might be realized on such systems.

Furthermore, the development of an appropriate kernel is necessary. For this purpose, SWP08b will apply the lessons learned from the work with S-GOLD2 hardware to porting the L4 microkernel to S-GOLD3. Additionally, it will be examined, how other components of the operating system have to be adapted for the new hardware.

In a further step, it will be analysed how to port the required components from the S-GOLD2-based system to S-GOLD3. It will be examined which changes are needed and the extended functionality of S-GOLD3 – especially with regard to trusted computing – will be taken into account.

13.3.2 Demonstrator Applications

For demonstration purposes, an application implementing one of the WP08 use cases will be developed. Two use cases are currently being analysed in detail:

- *Secure Wallet*. This use case analyses an application implementing secure address book and secure wallet functionality on mobile platforms. A secure address book provides encrypted storage to protect users' data, for instance addresses. If confidential data – especially authentication tokens such as PINs for online banking – is stored that should be used only with a certain application, then the user wants to ensure that only the appropriate application is able to use the secret. This functionality should be provided by a Secure Wallet.
- *IMEI Protection*. This use case analyses an application to protect the

International Mobile Equipment Identifier (IMEI) on mobile phones. Every mobile phone possesses an internationally unique 15 digit identification number, its IMEI. For privacy reasons, it would be beneficial to mobile phone users to protect their IMEIs from unauthorized access. This use case studies requirements for IMEI protection and how trusted computing functionality can be used to enhance security.

For both use cases, security requirements of the respective application scenarios are studied and the security architecture model is examined in detail. Moreover, their realization on mobile platforms with trusted hardware functionality (such as provided by S-GOLD3) will be considered. At least one of these use cases will be implemented as a demo-application.

It has been decided to run such a demo-application on a Linux-based PC first. Later, SWP08b will investigate porting this application to mobile platforms, in particular the L4-Linux environment on S-GOLD2 described above.

Although SWP08b will concentrate on *Secure Wallet* and *IMEI Protection*, other use cases and application scenarios may be considered, as well.

13.3.3 Use Case: Secure Wallet

As mentioned above, Secure Wallet is one of the two main use cases in WP08. The use case includes a security and requirement analysis of the scenario as well as a threat model.

The Secure Wallet shall provide secure storage, where a user can store confidential data, such as authentication tokens like passwords, PINs, and so on. Access to this storage can be restricted to certain applications specified by the user. A more detailed description of this use case can be found in chapter 13.5.

13.4 SWP08c: Trust and security profiles for application structures

The current work involves identifying and investigating a series of use cases of trusted computing functionality on a mobile phone (or similar mobile device). Recent work has involved consulting Vodafone on their views on important use cases, as well as reviewing other published work on applications of trusted computing on mobile devices.

13.4.1 Background on use cases

“At the current time, the number of applications that use trusted computing is quite limited, both in volume and in scope” (Kursawe 2005). However, as the advantages of integrating trusted computing functionality into a wide range of devices have become more apparent, the baseline TCG specification set has been expanded to include specifications describing specific platform implementations for the PC client, servers, peripherals and storage systems.

One such working group is the mobile phone working group (MPWG), whose main challenge is to determine the ‘roots of trust’ (see TCG 2005a), required within a trusted mobile phone. The functionality provided by each of these roots of trust must also be specified. In order to identify the capabilities required of a trusted mobile phone, a number of use cases, whose secure implementation may be aided by the

application of trusted platform functionality, have been identified by the MPWG. Among the use cases described are SIMLock, device authentication, mobile ticketing, mobile payment and robust DRM implementation (TCG 2005b). As stated by the MPWG (TCG 2005b), the use cases lay a foundation for the ways in which the MPWG will:

- derive requirements that address situations described in the use cases;
- specify an architecture based on the TCG architecture that will meet these requirements;
- specify the functions and interfaces that will meet the requirements in the specified architecture.

13.4.1.1 Implementing OMA DRM v2

Currently, 3G systems are already capable of delivering a wide range of digital content to subscribers' mobile telephones, for example music, video clips, ring tones, screen savers or java games. As network access becomes ever more ubiquitous and media objects become more easily accessible, providers are exposed to the risks of illegal consumption and use of their content. Digital rights management facilitates the safe distribution of various forms of digital content in a wide range of computing environments, and gives assurance to the content providers that their media objects cannot be illegally accessed.

A Digital Rights Management system is an umbrella term for mechanisms used to manage the life cycle of digital content of any sort. A DRM agent, i.e. the DRM functionality of a device responsible for enforcing permissions and constraints associated with DRM content, must be trusted in terms of its correct behaviour and secure implementation (OMA 2004). Stipulation of a trust model, within which robustness rules are defined, is one method of specifying how secure a device implementation of a DRM agent must be, and what actions should be taken against a manufacturer that builds devices that are insufficiently robust (Irwin 2004).

As part of WP8, an external deliverable, D08.1 "Market Requirements and Functionality for a Mobile Phone Trust Demonstrator", has been completed, which, in part, details how a robust implementation of OMA DRM v2, core software download, SIMLock and IMEI protection may be achieved using trusted computing technologies. This document presents the four use cases and highlights the security threats that may impact upon devices on which these mechanisms are not robustly implemented. This enabled the derivation of requirements for a robust implementation of each mechanism. Following this, a description is given of the architectural components, based on the TCG architecture, and the functions and interfaces, as specified in the version 1.2 TPM and TSS specifications, which meet these requirements. This has enabled those architecture components, functions or interfaces not currently defined within the TCG specification set, but required for the secure implementation of the selected use cases on a trusted mobile platform, to be identified.

13.4.1.2 IMEI protection

Given the explosive growth in the number of mobile devices in use nowadays and the increase in the number of stolen phones, the need for identification of a given device or group of devices is paramount so as to ensure a correct management and functioning of mobile platform networks. The IMEI (International Mobile Equipment

Identifier) is a unique identifier assigned to each GSM or UMTS mobile station by its manufacturer. The IMEI was originally devised for type approval reasons so that mobile phones that are out of specification could be removed from the network, but was later used as a more general identifier. The format of the IMEI changed in June 2002 and the device manufacturers were asked to ensure the non-duplicate use of allocated IMEIs and that they were factory set so as to be tamper resistant.

The IMEI can help in preventing mobile phone stealing, but it is only one element of the solution. It has to resist tampering, an aspect that has been required by regulation bodies as the GSMA. Laws complemented the technical aspect by making (in the EU) illegal the modification (or re-programming) of the IMEI by anyone other than the manufacturer.

The particular position of the IMEI in-between hardware and software makes it an ideal candidate for using Trusted Computing technologies. The main goal of the work on IMEIs within WP8 SWP08c is to use TC functionality to try to ensure that IMEIs are immutable and that it is used in a correct fashion.

13.4.1.3 Secure wallet

This use case is primarily being investigated by RUB. However, we will support by reviewing and provide input to this evolving use case.

13.4.2 Other Activities

Participation in Software Defined Radio (SDR) security working group conference calls. Discussions as to how trusted computing functionality may be integrated into the 'SDR Security Architecture' in order to meet their requirement set.

Lecture given for the MSc in Information Security: 'An introduction to trusted computing'.

13.4.3 Future activities

We will continue to identify important use cases, and perform requirements analyses of these use cases against TC functionality.

13.4.3.1 SDR Forum

We are currently participating in regular SDR security group conference calls with a view to proposing a trusted computing based solution to the secure download and execution problem for mobile devices. This will involve reviewing how TC can help, what functionality is lacking from the TC specifications, etc. Currently we are participating in conference calls, reading relevant documents, and discussing possible work with the SDR security group.

13.4.3.2 Priority use cases

We are awaiting a list of 2-3 priority use cases (as identified by Vodafone) from the MPWG use case document, so that a mapping can be done from requirements to TPM functionality for these priority use cases. We also plan to perform a gap analysis on the MPWG specification and provide input to the TCG MPWG.

13.5 Use case analysis: Secure wallet on the mobile phone

The Secure Wallet use cases analyse an application for storing passwords and confidential information on mobile platforms. For this purpose, cryptographic and trusted computing functionality of the mobile hardware is used.

Users can securely store private data and seal secrets – such as PINs – to trusted applications – such as a dedicated banking application.

13.5.1 Overview

The use case describes

- how the Secure Wallet is started,
- how the user authenticates to the Secure Wallet,
- how the user can change his pass phrase,
- how secret data is stored,
- how secure storage (e.g., address book) is used and
- how an application accesses secret data.

The following figure gives an overview of the organization of *Secure Wallet* into sub-use cases.

The Secure Wallet shall provide secure storage, where a user can store confidential data, such as authentication tokens like passwords, PINs, and so on. Access to this storage can be restricted to certain applications specified by the user.

13.5.2 Motivation and Problem Description

As mobile platforms like PDAs and mobile phones are nowadays ubiquitous and equipped with increasingly powerful hardware, they are used more and more for different application scenarios: Users browse the web and do home banking or online shopping. Users demand to securely store different kinds of private data they use in various application scenarios, like PINs for home banking, for instance. Therefore, it is important to examine how secret data can be protected on mobile platforms.

The use cases presented here concern a Secure Wallet application that protects secret data, assuming the availability of both trusted computing hardware and an operating system providing access to TC functionality.

The Secure Wallet shall provide secure storage, where a user can store confidential data, such as authentication tokens like passwords, PINs, and so on. Access to this storage can be restricted to certain applications specified by the user.

The current hardware platforms of mobile devices is usually quite restricted in terms of computational power and functional features. Today, hardware with cryptographic and trusted computing functionality becomes available. In particular S-GOLD3 platform is a current mobile hardware platform with such capabilities. The Secure Wallet use cases consider a security architecture model based on these hardware features to ensure confidentiality of private data.

The following analysis and structures of objectives and requirements gives an overview at the current status. Work will continue in the next project-phase by

adapting the use case results from the other Workpackages.

13.5.3 Terms and Definitions

- TCB: The Trusted Computing Base is the totality of protection mechanisms within the computer system, including hardware, firmware and software, the combination of which is responsible for enforcing the security policy.
- S-GOLD3: Single-chip baseband IC for mobile platforms with cryptographic and trusted computing functionality, manufactured by Infineon;

13.5.4 Security Objectives & Security Requirements

13.5.4.1 Security Objectives

/SO 10/ Confidentiality and integrity of data

The data must remain confidential and integrity must be ensured.

13.5.4.2 Security Requirements

/SR 10/ No unauthorized access

No unauthorized entity can access data stored in the Secure Wallet, neither when the Secure Wallet is running, nor when it is inactive or the mobile device is switched off. All users must be authenticated correctly before they can access secret data.

/SR 20/ Integrity of the TCB

The TCB should be protected from manipulations to guarantee the enforcement of security policies. Strongly isolated compartments should be supported by the TCB.

/SR 30/ Integrity of trusted application

This requirement should hold during execution and storage.

/SR 40/ Trusted path to user

The inputs/outputs of the application a user interacts with should be protected from unauthorized access by other applications.

A secure user interface is needed for:

- Entering new secrets and selecting applications for sealing
- Entering and changing the pass phrase

13.5.4.3 Threats

/T 10/ Spoofing of authentication information

An adversary may try to eavesdrop the user authentication information.

/T 20/ Trojan horse

An adversary may try to eavesdrop confidential information by deceiving users by a Trojan horse application that looks like a secure application.

/T 40/ TCB manipulation

An adversary may try to violate security policies by maliciously manipulating software-components of the TCB. Examples are manipulations of the bootloader or the security kernel. Alternatively, the adversary may try to bootstrap an alternative (untrusted) security kernel.

/T 50/ Circumvention of TCB**13.5.4.4 Assumptions****/A 10/ Correct hardware**

The underlying hardware (e.g., CPU, devices, TPM or S-GOLD3) is non-malicious and behaves as specified.

/A 20/ No physical man-in-the-middle attack (Mafia fraud)

An attack using a dummy device that relays the whole communication between the user and the platform to another device is not considered.

/A 30/ No other physical attacks

Physical attacks against the underlying hardware platform, like bus snooping, physically damaging devices, etc., are not considered.

/A 40/ Trusted Installation

The system (mobile phone) must be manufactured/installed/set up correctly and securely. A trusted software layer providing access to trusted hardware must be set up properly. A defined starting state of the TCB and security-critical applications must be guaranteed.

An adversary may try to circumvent access control mechanisms which should be enforced by the TCB.

An example is manipulating device drivers such that hardware functions – e.g., direct memory access (DMA) – can be used to violate security policies.

/T 60/ Stolen device

An adversary may steal the mobile device and try to access secret data.

13.5.4.5 Preconditions**/PR 100/ Trusted Software Layer**

A trusted operating system with support for trusted hardware is required and has to

be initialized in a trusted way (secure boot).

13.5.5 Functional Requirements (Use Case Model)

13.5.5.1 Goal

A user should be able to use his mobile platform (PDA, mobile phone) to store sensitive data securely. Only trusted applications that were specified when storing the data should be able to get access to this data and unauthorized users should not gain access.

13.5.5.2 Target Groups

- Home user who owns a mobile platform (mobile phone, PDA)
- Employee whose mobile platform is owned by his employer

13.5.5.3 Roles and Actors

Owner: The owner of a platform is an entity who defines the allowed configurations of the underlying platform. Note that this also includes certain changes to the platform's configuration. In practice, these changes are patches/updates. The platform owner is also owner of the TPM and thus is aware of the owner authorization information.

Typical examples are an end-user owning a personal mobile platform or an enterprise providing employees with mobile phones / PDAs.

User: The user of a computing platform is an entity interacting with the platform under the platform's security policy. Examples are employees using enterprise-owned hardware. User and owner might also be identical.

Application: Applications are entities interacting with the platform under the platform's security policy. They can invoke other applications, store, access and modify data and communicate with the user.

13.5.5.4 Required Criteria

/RC 10/ L4 microkernel support

The realization of the use cases should be based on an L4-microkernel-based architecture.

/RC 20/ Trusted hardware support

Trusted hardware (like a TPM or Infineon S-GOLD3) must be supported.

/RC 30/ Authentication timeout calculation

Every second, the system must decrement the authentication timeout T_{auth} by one without user interaction.

14 The OpenTC Project

The OpenTC project is co-financed by the EC, the partners are:

Particip. Nr.	Participant name	Participant short name	Country
1 ³	Technikon Forschungs- und Planungsgesellschaft mbH	TEC	AT
2	Infineon Technologies AG	IFX	DE
3 ⁴	Hewlett-Packard Ltd	HP	UK
4	IAIK, Graz University of Technology	IAIK	AT
5	Lehrstuhl für Datenverarbeitung, Technische Universität München	LDV	DE
6	SUSE Linux Products GmbH	SUSE	DE
7	Royal Holloway and Bedford New College	RHUL	UK
8	ITAS, Forschungszentrum Karlsruhe GmbH	ITAS	DE
9	TUBITAK, National Research Institute of Electronics & Cryptology	TUB	TR
10	Politecnico di Torino	POL	IT
11	Budapest University of Technology and Economics	BME	HU
12	Commissariat à l'Energie Atomique-LIST	CEA	FR
13	Horst Goertz Institute for IT Security, Ruhr-University Bochum	RUB	DE
14	Technische Universität Dresden	TUD	DE
15	University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory, University of Cambridge	CUCL	UK
16	IBM Research GmbH	IBM	CH
17	Institute for Security and Open Methodologies	ISE	ES
18	Advanced Micro Devices	AMD	DE
19	Portakal Teknoloji Egitim Danismanlik Yazilim Turizm Taahhut	PORT	TR
20	INTEK	INTEK	RUS
21	Technical University of Sofia	TUS	BG
22	Katholieke Universiteit Leuven	KUL	BE
23	Comneon GmbH & CoOHG	COM	DE

3 Coordinator

4 Technical Leader

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16 List of Abbreviations

Listing of term definitions and abbreviations used in the overview documents and architectural design specification (IT expressions and terms from the application domain).

Abbreviation	Explanation
ADV	(Assurance Class) – Development
AIK	Attestation identity certificate
API	Application Programming Interface
AVIT	The Applied Verification for Integrity and Trust
CC	Common Criteria
CPU	Central Processing Unit
CV	Configuration Verification
BUK	Basic User Key
DAC	Discretionary file access control
DEV	Device Exclusion Vector
DHCP	Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol
DMTF-CIM	Distributed Management Task Force – Common Information Model
DNS	Domain Name System
EAL	Evaluation Assurance Level
FRAMA-C	FRAMework for modular Analyses of C
GUI	Graphical User Interface
GUID	Globally Unique Identifier (a 128-bit value)
IMEI	International Mobile Equipment Identifier
IP	Internet Protocol or Intellectual Property
KLOC	Thousands of lines of code
MAC	Medium Access Control
MPWG	(TCG) Mobile Phone Working Group
MSR	Machine Specific Register
HTTP	Hypertext Transfer Protocol
HVM	Hardware Virtual Machine Monitor
ODBC	Open Database Connectivity
OMTP	Open Mobile Terminal Platform
OS	Operating System
PC	Personal Computer
PCR	Platform Configuration Register
PIN	Personal Identification Number
PKCS	Public Key Cryptography Standards
PPC	Preuve de Programmes C
Procs	Processes
RAV	Risk of Assessment Value
SDK	Software Development Kit
SL	Secure Loader
SKINIT	Secure Kernel Initialization
SOAP	Simple Object Access Protocol
SSH	Secure Shell
SSL	Secure Sockets Layer
SVM	Secure Virtual Machine technology by AMD

SW	Software
SWP	Sub Workpackage
TAN	Transaction Authentication Number
TC	Trusted Computing
TCB	Trusted Computing Base
TCG	Trusted Computing Group
TCS	TCG Core Service
TCSI	TCG-Interface
TDDL	TCG-Device Driver Library
TDDLI	TDDL-Interface
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TPA	Trusted Platform Agent
TPM	Trusted Platform Module
TSF	TOE Security Functions
TSPI	TSP-Interface
TSS	Trusted Software Stack
TSS-SDK	TSS-Software-Development-Kit
TSWORM	Trusted Storage Write Once Read Many
TWR	Trusted Write Read (storage)
VM	Virtual Machine
VMM	Virtual Machine Monitor also known as hypervisor
VT	Virtualization Tool
WP	Workpackage
XML	Extensible Markup Language

17 Appendices

17.1 Consortium-internal Questionnaire

[Email from ITAS to OTC_ALL@LISTSERV.DFN.DE]

Consortium-internal Survey

Dear partners,

As planned in the Technical Annex, we wish to conduct a consortium-internal survey for

- (a) identifying areas to be addressed in our survey work
- (b) identifying issues to be taken into account when specifying OpenTC.

Therefore we have prepared a few questions on your experiences with TC, on possible use cases for Open TC, on the perception of TC in the media and on design issues of OpenTC. We will evaluate your response anonymously. Please fill in your answers by responding to this email. Please respond to me only <weber@itas.fzk.de>, and not to the list.

Experiences with TC

1. Do you have any practical experiences with Trusted Computing yourself?

If yes:

- What are your experiences?
- Against which threats has TC been used in your case?

2. Is your institution involved in selling TPMs, computers with TPMs, or in offering related software or services?

If yes:

What sort of products and services are on offer?

Which experiences did your company make in that field?

Why are your customers interested in TC?

Are there any documents available about private or corporate user interests and experiences?

If yes, please make them available to us or tell us the URL.

Use Cases and Threats

3. What are the most important use cases for OpenTC which should be taken into account during the design, in your view? Please describe them.

Use case 1:

Use case 2:

- For use case 1, please tell:
 - i.Major threats to be addressed:

 - ii.Specific requirements to be fulfilled by OpenTC:

 - iii.Operating system to be used:

 - iv.Number of compartments needed:

 - v.How many users or implementations can you realistically imagine for this use case, in 5 years time?

- For use case 2, please tell:
 - i.Major threats to be addressed:

 - ii.Specific requirements to be fulfilled by OpenTC:

 - iii.Operating system to be used:

 - iv.Number of compartments needed:

 - v.How many users or implementations can you realistically imagine for this use case, in 5 years time?

Trusted Computing and the Media

4. Are you aware of any benefits of Trusted Computing discussed in the media? Which are these?

5. Are you aware of any disadvantages of Trusted Computing discussed in the media? Which are these?

6. Which critiques are justified or unjustified, in your opinion?

7. Do you think the public debate around Trusted Computing has somehow changed during recent time? If so, how would you characterise the current state of debate around TC?

8. Are there any particularly important websites, newspapers or journals we should take into account?

9. Are there any specific documents which were published during the

last few months which we should take into account?

10.If you think of the perception of Trusted Computing by the general public, is there any action the OpenTC-consortium should take, e.g. regarding PR activities, or use cases to be chosen?

Design Issues

11.Are there any open issues in the design of OpenTC? Which are these?

Regarding issue ___ :

- How could it be addressed?
- Do you think it might be possible to address it in our survey work?

Issue ___ :

- How could it be addressed?
- Do you think it might be possible to address it in our survey work?

Any Comments?

Thank you! And please respond to me, <weber@itas.fzk.de>, not to the list.

Kind regards

Arnd

=====
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